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Game theory is not about "playing" a» usual understood. 
It is about conflict among rational but distrusting beings. 
William Poundstone in 'Prisoner's Dilemma' 
INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE 
0.1 CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO BIMATRIX GAMES 
Game theory provides mathematical models for situations where the interests of 
several individuals play a role. The foundation of the theory was laid in a paper of 
von Neumann (1928), but it was the book of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
('Theory of Games and Economic Behavior') that really started game theory. Nowa-
days game theory has applications in e.g. economics, social and political sciences and 
biology. 
The several branches of game theory can roughly be divided into the theories of 
cooperative and noncooperative games. In both theories a modelled situation is called 
a game and the involved individuals are called players. In general the players are 
understood to be perfectly rational, i.e. each player is concerned with doing as well 
for himself as possible, subject to rules and possibilities imposed by the model. It is 
the aim of game theory to search for solutions of games, enforced by the self-interest 
of the players. 
Cooperative game theory focuses on possible cooperation of the players. As a solution 
one generally tries to find an optimal way of cooperation (e.g. a fair division). 
In noncooperative games no binding agreement (cooperation) is allowed. Each player 
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must make at least one move, i.e. choose a strategy from a set of possible strategies 
This must happen independent of the other players. The players may communicate 
before they choose a strategy, but this communication cannot result in a contract 
that fixes the choice of strategy. The fundamental solution concept in noncooperative 
game theory is the concept of equilibrium according to Nash (1951). An equilibrium 
for a game is essentially an outcome which none of the players regrets, in the sense 
that none of the players would have played differently given the strategies that the 
other players have chosen. 
The following situation is a well-known example of a noncooperative game; it is known 
as 'battle of the sexes' (see e.g. Luce and Raiffa, 1957): 
One day a man and a woman who are living together, have to decide upon how to spend 
their evening. They both have the following two choices (strategies!): They can choose to 
go the theatre or to a soccer game. Before the evening arrives, each of them has to decide, 
independent of the other. The man prefers to go to the soccer game, but the woman prefers 
the theatre. However, above all, both prevale to go together. We represent the possible 
outcomes of this game as follows: 
woman 
soccer theatre 
(two times happy, happy) (not happy, not happy) 
(not happy, not happy) (happy, two times happy) 
The four possible outcomes of the game are represented as (·, ·). On the left side there is the 
valuation of the man and on the right side the valuation of the woman. So if, for example, 
both choose to go to the soccer game, the man is two times happy (he gets to watch the 
¡occer game and he is together with the woman, while the woman is one time happy since 
¡he is together with the man, but cannot go to the theatre. 
This game has two obvious ways to be played: these are the cases where the man and the 
woman make the same choice. These two outcomes are also equilibria of the game: given 
the choice of their partner, both the man and the woman do not regret their own choice. 
The game in the example above is typical for the sort of games that are studied in 
;his monograph. It may seem that such games are rather restricted, but already for 
ihese games finding a single equilibrium solution is not an easy task, and secondly a 
arger class of games is involved than may seem at first sight. 
so in this monograph we study noncooperative games that involve two players and 
satisfy four more assumptions. Let us have a look at these assumptions. Two of them 
ire: 
41 'all cards are on the table'; 
42 а к а т е is played only once. 
soccer 
theatre 
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The assumption Al means that all information about the game is common knowledge. 
Since we assume the players to be rational this implies that, when they consider what 
move to make, they should take into account all the possible moves the opponent can 
make. 
The second assumption implies that in the games we study we do not have to take 
into account that the players may have learned from a previous play of the game. 
A third important assumption is that: 
A3 each player can perform only one move. 
It is this last assumption that is not so restrictive as it seems. This is illustrated in 
the following example: 
Instead of playing a 'normal' game of chess, a referee can ask both players to write down 
a list of what move they will make in every situation that might occur on the chess board 
(note that this is possible since by its rules chess is a finite game!). After the referee has 
collected both lists, he will be able to play the game the players would have played and find 
out what the result of the game is. The lists of the players may be viewed upon as the one 
move they make in the thus defined one-move chess game. Of course there are too many 
possible situations that can occur on the chess board in order to bring this in practice, but 
theoretically the game of chess has this one-move equivalent. Moreover, it may turn out that 
there is an obvious way to play the one-move chess game and that it is essentially a boring 
game (as John von Neumann said according to Bronowski (1973): "Chess is not a game. 
Chess is a well-defined form of computation."). There may be a move for one of the players 
such that he always wins or, if this is not the case, there may be a combination of moves of 
both players such that the games always ends in a tie. 
The last assumption we make is that: 
A4 the game is finite. 
This means that the players have only finitely many strategies to choose from. Only 
in chapter 7 we will abondon assumption A4. 
A noncooperative game that satisfies A1-A4 is called a strategic game. Formally a 
two-person strategic game is defined by the quadruple < Χι,Χ2, Ky, K2 > , where Χχ 
and X2 are the (non-empty) sets of strategies for player 1 and player 2 respectively 
and K\, K2 : Χχ χ X2 —+ ГО, are the payoff functions. So the valuation (utility) of a 
player for a specific outcome is represented by a real number. In a general two-person 
strategic game the sets X\ and X2 may contain infinitely many elements (A4 is not 
required). 
Formally an equilibrium for a strategic game < Xχ, X2, Κχ, K2 > is a pair (χχ, x2) 6 
Χι χ X2 that satisfies K\(xi,x2) > K\(y, x2) for all у £ Χχ and Κ2(χχ,χ2) > 
Κι(ii, ζ) for all г G X2. 
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The important question here is of course: does there exist an equilibrium for every 
two-person strategic game? If the game is defined as above, the answer is negative as 
the example below shows. However, in this example a way is indicated to overcome 
this problem. 
Consider a man, let us call him the bar frequenter, who goes to a bar one Friday night. He 
goes there by car and also drives home late at night. Let there also be a policeman, who is 
on duty that very Friday night and who has to decide whether to check on car drivers with 
respect to use of alcohol. We assume that the two know each other, but are not exactly 
friends. We also assume that the two are aware of each others activities that evening and 
that the policeman, if he decides to do the check, will be able to stop the car of the bar 
frequenter on his way home. 
The barfrequenter has of course two strategies: he either drinks alcohol 01 sticks to soft 
drinks. The policeman either does the check or not. We represent the game as follows: 
policeman 
check no check 
alcohol Γ (-100,10) (10,0) 1 bar frequenter , , . , 
soft drinks [( lo.- io) (-10,0) J 
This must be interpreted as follows: If the policeman decides to check and the bar frequenter 
decides to drink alcohol, then the bar frequenter is in big trouble (he may loose his driver's 
licence, his car; payoff -100); the policeman however, is rather pleased (payoff 10). If the 
policeman decides to check and the bar frequenter decides to drink soft drinks, then the bar 
frequenter is pleased (payoff 10), since the effort of the policeman to check upon him was in 
vain. The policeman doesn't like this (payoff-10). Etc. 
This game doesn't seem to have an equilibrium. With respect to every of the 4 possible 
outcomes, there is one of the two players who regrets his choice of strategy. For example 
if the outcome is that the policeman did not check and the bar frequenter sticked to soft 
drinks, the latter regrets not have taken alcoholic drinks. 
In order to overcome this problem mixed strategies are defined. These are strategies that put 
some weight on two or more 'normal' or pure strategies with the sum of the weights equal 
to 1. The bar frequenter may choose 'alcohol' with a weigt j a n d also 'soft drinks' with a 
weigt £. He could throw a coin to achieve this. The result would be that the policeman's 
expexted payoff is £xlo+£x(-lO)=0 if he chooses 'check' and obviously also 0 if he chooses 
'no check'. So the policeman is indifferent with respect to this mixed strategy of the bar 
frequenter. There is also a mixed stategy for the policeman that will make the bar frequenter 
indifferent: He has to play 'check' with weight j ^ ^nd 'no check' with weight yj. Then, no 
matter what the bar frequenter decides, his expected payoff is — -fi. The combination of 
these two mixed strategies clearly is an equilibrium for the 'new' game. 
Also in general it is possible to define, for a (not necessarily two-person) strategic 
game, a new game with mixed strategies and expected payoffs. Such a game is then 
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called the mixed extension of the strategic game. The mixed extension of a two-
person strategic game is generally refered to as a bimatrix game, for the reason that 
the payoffs of the underlying game with pure strategies can be represented by two 
matrices (see section 1.3). This monograph is particularly devoted to the theory of 
bimatrix games. Nash (1951) showed the important result that every bimatrix game 
possesses an equilibrium. 
A bimatrix game generally has more than one equilibrium and may have infinitely 
many equilibria. This makes it worthwile to look for equilibria with special properties 
or to study the structure of the set of all (types of) equilibria. 
In the literature two approaches are followed to find equilibria with special properties: 
In the first approach so-called refinements of equilibria are investigated (beginning 
with Wu Wen-tsiin and Jang Jia-he, 1962 and Selten, 1975). These are equilibria that 
are stable against some type of perturbations (of the payoffs in the matrices or of the 
strategies). Examples are perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975), strictly perfect equilibria 
(Okada, 1981), minimal strictly perfect sets (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), proper 
equilibria (Myerson, 1978) and stable equilibria (Mertens, 1989,1991, Hillas, 1990 and 
Vermeulen, Potters and Jansen, 1993). 
In the second approach selection procedures to select 'nice' equilibria are studied (e.g. 
Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). 
The structure of the set of equilibria is investigated in Vorob'ev (1962), Kuhn (1961), 
Winkels (1979) and Jansen (1981). The structure of the set of perfect equilibra is 
revealed in Borm et al. (1993a) and Vermeulen and Jansen (1992), of Pareto equilibria 
in Borm et al. (1993b) and of proper equilibria in Jansen (1993). 
0.2 OUTLINE OF THIS MONOGRAPH 
In this monograph we concentrate on structure problems and refinements. The or-
ganisation of this monograph is as follows: 
In chapter 1 we settle (most of) the notation for the rest of the monograph, give the 
basic definitions with respect to the theory of bimatrix games and provide the tool for 
understanding the structure of the set of equilibria: the elementary theory of convex 
polytopes. 
In chapter 2 we study extensively the structure of the set of all equilibria for a bimatrix 
game. A new proof is provided of the fact that this set consists of a finite number 
of polytopes and it is shown that equilibria in the relative interior of the same face 
of such a polytope have a property in common that distinguishes them from other 
equilibria. In the second half of chapter 2 a characterization of the extreme points of 
the polytopes is given along with a way to find all these points in general. The set of 
all equilibria can be constructed from the extreme points. 
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In chapter 3 we discuss the refinements of the concept of equilibrium that are related 
to the idea of (strict) perfectnese. Specific perturbed bimatrix games are introduced 
that help finding out the structure of the set of '(strictly) perfect equilibria' and oí 
minimal strictly perfect sets. From the latter sets it is shown that they have a finite 
number of elements, and that, though there may be infinitely many minimal strictly 
perfect sets, there is a finite number of equivalence classes of them. 
In chapter 4 there is a focus on further refinements of the concepts of perfect and 
proper equilibria. Equalized, weakly equalized and iterated equalized perfect and 
proper equilibria are introduced (partly based on work of Garcia Jurado, 1989). Re-
lations with other refinements are discussed as well as some structure questions. 
In chapter 5 we consider two extreme types of equilibria: completely mixed (where 
some weight is put on every pure stategy of both players) and pure equilibria. In 
particular we study bimatrix games of which at least one of the polytopes that con-
stitute the set of equilibria, does only contain completely mixed equilibria. We study 
the special properties of these games in the light of some work that has been done 
on completely mixed equilibria for so-called matrix games (which are bimatrix games 
where the payoffs of the players are exactly opposed). Inspired by some work of 
Shapley (1964) on pure equilibria in matrix games, we study (the absence of) pure 
equilibria in bimatrix games. 
In chapter 6 à sy mme trizat ion method for bimatrix games is studied. This leads to a 
symmetric equivalent for every bimatrix game. We show that there is a nice relation 
between equilibria for a bimatrix game and for its symmetrization. A similar result 
is shown with respect to perfect equilibria. 
In the final chapter of this monograph, chapter 7, we deviate from the path of finite 
games. We discuss two-person strategic games where one of the players has (count-
ably) infinitely many pure strategies. Since such games can still be represented by 
two (in one direction infinite) matrices, we call these games semi-infinite bimatrix 
games. It is shown that a semi-infinite bimatrix game does not always possess an 
equilibrium. In Tijs (1981) it is shown that in special cases semi-infinite bimatrix 
games do possess at least one almost equilibrium. In this section it is shown that a 
semi-infinite bimatrix game where one of the players has only two strategies to choose 
from, does possess an almost equilibrium in all cases. In order to prove this a labeling 
technique is used which cannot be straightforwardly extended to games where the 
finite set of pure strategies contains more than two elements. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PRELIMINARIES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we introduce (finite) bimatrix games. Section 1.3 deals with definitions 
and some well-known results in the theory of bimatrix games. These will be used 
throughout this monograph. 
In later chapters we will see that convex polytopes play a crucial role in the study of the 
structure of the set of equilibria for a bimatrix game. In fact the facial structure and 
the undominated elements of polytopes are used in many of the proofs in chapters 2 
and 3. This makes it worthwile to give some basic results concerning polytopes before 
going deeper into the theory of bimatrix games. Section 1.4 shows the equivalence of 
two generally used definitions of a polytope. Section 1.5 describes the facial structure 
of polytopes and in section 1.6 undominated elements of polytopes are discussed. The 
reader who is already familiar with the theory of polytopes may skip these sections. 
Except for lemma 1.6.8 which, according to the author, is a new result, all results in 
this chapter are well-known. However, it is not always easy to trace back in literature 
the present form of some of the results in sections 1.4 - 1.6. 
In the next section we give the notation which is used throughout the monograph. 
β Chapter 1: Preliminaries 
1.2 NOTATION 
We denote IN := {1,2,3,...}. Ш. denotes the set of real numbers. 
For t G IN we denote by IR* the vector space of ¿-tuples of real numbers. 
The elements of the standard basis of Ш.' are denoted by ei, e 2 , . . . , e( and 1 ( denotes 
(i,i,...,i)ero/. 
The i-th coordinate of a vector χ in IR* is denoted by x, (or (x) f). 
For i , } 6 E ' we denote χ • у := Σ Ϊ = ι x,y, and χ > у (χ > у) if xt > у, (χ, > у,) for 
all ι' G {1, . ,ί}. Further if A is an s χ t matrix, χ G IR* and y G IR', then by χ Ay 
we denote £ *
= 1 Σ)=ι хі<*чУ]-
Let 5 С Ш.'. Then conv (S) denotes the convex hull of S and aff (5) is the affine hull 
of 5 
If 5 is a convex set, then ext (5) denotes the set of extreme points of S and relint (5) 
is the relative interior of S, i e. the interior of S if regarded as a subset of its affine 
hull. By dim (5) we denote the dimension of the affine hull of S. 
If 5 is a finite set, then | 5 | is the number of elements of S. 
We frequently use the following special subsets of Dt': 
Δ« = {i G IR' Ι Σΐ=ι Χι = l,x > 0} and Δ« := {χ G ГО.' | x G Δ« and χ > 0}. Δ ( 
is a bounded polyhedral set and hence a polytope. In fact it is the convex hull of the 
standard basis vectors of IR* (see also section 1.4). 
We use the shorthand notations M := {l,...,m} and N := {1,.. ,n}. 
1.3 BIMATRIX GAMES 
Let A .= KjlieAijeW and В := [by]iej»fjeAr be two real m x n matrices The strategic 
game < A
miAn,K1,K2 > where for (p,q) G Am χ Δ„ 
КАР, Ч) = PM and К2(р, q) = pBq 
is called a bimatnx game and is denoted by (A, B). 
In fact the bimatrix game (A, B) above is the mixed extension of the game 
< MtN,Li,Li >, where for (i,j) e Μ χ Ν, 
Li(i,i) = atl and L2(i,j) = bt¡. 
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The strategies i G M for player 1 and j G N for player 2 correspond respectively to 
the strategies e, £ lRm and e ; G IR" in the game (A,B). The latter strategies aie 
called pure strategies. 
A. strategy pair (p, q) G Д
т
 χ Δ
η
 is an equilibrium for the game (A, B) if xAq < pAq 
and p.Bj/ < pBq for all pairs of strategies (x,y) G Д
т
 χ Δ „ . The set of all equilibria 
For a bimatrix game is denoted by E{A,B). 
Further a strategy which is an element of A
m
 or Δ
η
 is called completely mixed . 
The terms 'pure' and 'completely mixed' are used similarly with respect to strategy 
pairs and equilibria. 
For a strategy ρ G A
m
 we denote by C(p) := {i G M|p,- > 0} the earner of p, and by 
PB(B,p) := {j G N\pBej = maxjgjvpöef} the pure best replies of player 2 against 
o. For q G Δ
η
, C(q) and PB(A,q) are defined analogously. 
The following results are well-known. 
PROPOSITION 1.3.1 Lei [A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and let (p, q) G A
m
 χ Δ „ . 
Then (p,q) G E(A,B) if and only ifC{p) С PB{A,q) and C(q) С ΡΒ(Β,ρ). 
PROOF. First suppose (p,q) G E(A,B). Then pAq > 
maxfc e fcAq = Ц | б С ( р ) Pi m a x t ekAq > Σΐεθ(Ρ) PieiAq = pAq. Hence we find е,Лд = 
maxjfc etAq for each t G C(p). Consequently C(p) С PB(A,q). Similarly one shows 
C(q) С PB(B,p). 
Secondly suppose that C(p) С PB(A,q) and C(q) С ΡΒ(Β,ρ). Then for ι G M we 
tiave that e¿Aq < maxjt ejtvlq = XTiec(p)P'm a x* cfc·^? = P-^7· Similarly it follows 
that pBq > pBej for each j € N. Hence (p, q) G -E(-A, 5 ) . • 
PROPOSITION 1.3.2 Let (A, B) be an m χ η 6ima<ni jame, a G IR" and b G IR m . £ei 
4 ' 6e Me m χ η matrix with rows e¡A' = e¡A + a for ¿ E M and let В' be the τη χ η 
matrix with columns B'e, = Be, + b for j G N. Then E(A', B') = E(A, B). 
PROOF. For q G Δ „ and i G M we have е,Л'д = е,Лс - f a g . Hence PB(A',q) = 
PB(A,q). Similarly one shows that PB{B',p) = PB(B,p) for each p G A
m
. So in 
/iew of proposition 1.2.1 we find E(A', B') = E{A, В). a 
We recall the fundamental result of Nash (1951): 
THEOREM 1.3.3 For each bimatrix game there exists an equilibrium. 
Finally in this section we define a matrix game A as the bimatrix game (A, B), where 
В = -A. 
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1.4 TWO EQUIVALENT DEFINITIONS OF POLYTOPES 
This section deals with the main results in the theory of polytopes in a Euclidean 
space. The reader of this section should be familiar with the basics of linear algebra, 
convex and affine sets, and some basic topological properties of convex sets. 
A polytope in ïït* is the convex hull of finitely many elements of Si'. This definition 
implies that a polytope is a compact (closed and bounded) convex set. 
In order to show that besides this definition there is another way to describe a poly-
tope, we introduce hyperplanes, halfspaces and polyhedral sets. 
The hyperplane # ( n , a) in IR* determined by the normal η G IR* \ {0} and the real 
number a, consists of the elements ζ € IR* such that χ • η = a. A hyperplane in iït' is 
an affine set of dimension t — 1, and consequently is spanned by t affinely independent 
elements of Ш.'. 
The halfspace Ή(η,α) in Ш.' determined by the normal η £ Ж* \ {0} and the real 
number or, consists of the elements χ € IR,1 such that χ • η < a. Obviously to the 
halfspace 7i(n,a) there corresponds the hyperplane H(n,a). 
A polyhedral set is the nonempty intersection of finitely many halfspaces. A polyhe­
dral set is closed and convex. 
Let V be a polyhedral set in Ш.' and let η 6 Ш* \{0} and a 6 И. Then the hyperplane 
H(n, a) is called a supporting hyperplane of V, if # ( n , a ) ( l P ^ ( i and V С Ή(η, a). 
Our starting point in the study of polytopes is Farkas' lemma, which reads (see e.g. 
Rockafellar, 1970, p. 200): 
LEMMA 1.4.1 Let a},a?,... ,am,a e IR". Then the following two statements are 
equivalent 
(i) у • a < 0 for every у € ИГ such that yak<0for all к G {1,2,. . . , m}; 
(xi) there is a Xe Шт,Х > 0 iticA that a = £™
= 1 λ*α*. 
Now we can show: 
THEOREM 1.4.2 Every polytope is a polyhedral set 
PROOF. Let V be the convex hull of a 1,... ,a' G IR*. Without loss of generality we 
suppose that dim (V) = t (we can identify the affine hull of V with the Euclidean space 
E W). We prove that V is the intersection of the halfspaces that correspond to 
the supporting hyperplanes that are the affine hull of some of the a'. Therefore it is 
sufficient to show that for each χ £ V, there is one such halfspace so that χ is not 
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contained in it. At this moment, of course, we do not know that such a halfspace 
exists. 
So let χ & V. Then clearly χ cannot be written as a convex combination of the α', 
i.e. there is no λ € Δ , so that χ = Σ?=ι ^· α ' · An equivalent statement is that there 
is no A G IR', A > 0, so that (x, 1) = ]Ci=i λί(α*, 1). To the latter statement we can 
apply Farkas' lemma above and we obtain that there is an (n, —or) G ГО* x ГО, so that 
(x, 1) · (n, —a) > 0 and (a', 1) · (n, — a) < 0 for all i, or equivalently χ · η > α and 
α' · η < α for all i. 
Since V is compact, there is a ρ G "Ρ such that ρ · η = max y 6p y • п. Since ρ is а 
convex combination of the a', this implies that a' · η = ρ - η for at least one i. Let I 
be the set of those i for which ο' · η = ρ · η and let Ie := { 1 , . . . , s} \ I. If afF {a* |i G 1} 
has dimension t — 1, then afF {a'\i £ 1} = H(n,p · n) and 7ί(η,ρ· η) is a halfspace of 
the type we are looking for. 
So suppose that the dimension of afF {a'\i 6 /} is less than t — 1. Then there is a 
u G ГО.' so that u φ η and α' • и = ρ • u for all t G /. First we show that, if necessary, 
we can redefine и in such a way that а' и < ρ • и for all i € I e and о* · u = ρ · u for 
at least one element of Ie, say j . 
Suppose that u does not fit to this requirement. Then we can distinguish two cases: 
(i) a' · u < ρ · u for all i € Ie; 
(ii) there is an i G / e such that a' · u > ρ · ti. 
For both cases we define u' := u + an, where α G ГО.. Then clearly α' • u' = ρ · u' for 
all t G /. In case (i) we let 
(р-а')и 
a := — max 7 г^  
ійІ
с
 (ρ— о') · η 
and in case (ii): 
( a ' - p ) « 
α := max 7 r£ . 
{iel'\a'u>pu} (p— a') · η 
In both cases this is enough to let u' fit to the requirement. We show it only for case 
If » G Ie and a' · u < ρ · 11, then clearly also a' u' < ρ · u'. If i G / c and a* · u > ρ · и, 
then 
a' · (11 + an) = (a* — p) · u + ρ • u + aa' · η 
< a(p — a') • η + ρ · u + ara' · η 
= ρ· (ti + απ). 
By defenition there is a j G Ie such that (a* — p) · u > 0 and α = )"!"?(.„. Then 
a> • u' = a' • p, which shows that u' fits to the requirement. 
Now if the dimension of aff {a'\i G IU {j}} is τ — 1 the proof is completed, since then 
7ί(η + tu,p - (η + tu)) is a halfspace of the type we are looking for. If the dimension 
of aff {a'\i G / U {j}} is still less than t — 1 we can repeat the construction above 
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(and, if necessary, again). Since there are only finitely many o"s, repetition must 
stop somewhere. Hence we can always find a halfspace of the type described above.α 
Since by definition a polytope is bounded and a halfspace is not, it is clear that not 
every polyhedral set is a polytope. Both, however, are closed subsets of IR'. We will 
show that if a polyhedral set is bounded, then it is a polytope. In order to show this 
we use the idea of extreme points. A point of a polyhedral set is called extreme if 
it is not a convex combination of two other elements of the polyhedral set. First we 
prove a lemma. 
LEMMA 1.4.3 Lei V := nj
=1W(n*,a*), where nk G ГО.' \ {0} and ak G Ш. for all 
к G {1, . . . ,«}. Let e ζ V. Then e is an extreme point of V if and only if the 
dimension of the linear hull of those nk such that e G H(nk,ak) is equal to t. 
PROOF. For an extreme point e oí V we denote the linear hull of those n* such that 
e G Я(п*,a*) by L(e). 
First suppose that the dimension of L(e) is less than t. Then there is an χ G Dl' \ {0} 
such that ι n* = 0 for all n* G L(e). Since e n * < a* for all n* 0 L(e), we can find a 
small positive number « such that e + ex, e — f x G P. Hence e = j(e + ex) + ^(e — ex) 
and therefore is not extreme. From this we learn that if e is extreme, then the 
dimension of ¿(e) is equal to t. 
Now conversely suppose that the dimension of L(e) is equal to t. Suppose e = 
^x1 + | z 2 , where x1, x2 € V. Then it is straightforward to verify that whenever 
e G H(nk,ak), then also x1, x2 6 H(nk,ak). Hence x1 = x2 = e, so that e is an 
extreme point. α 
It follows immediately from lemma 1.4.3 that 
THEOREM 1.4.4 A polyhedral set has only finitely many extreme points. 
Lemma 1.4.3 also helps us to show 
THEOREM 1.4.5 A bounded polyhedral set has at least one extreme point. 
PROOF. Let V as defined in lemma 1.4.3. be a bounded polyhedral set. For i £ P 
let K(x) consist of those к G { 1 , . . . , β} for which χ · η* = α*. Assume that V has no 
extreme point. Below we will show that this implies that for every x G "Ρ there is a 
y eV such that Κ (χ) С K(y) and К(х) φ К(у). Since there are only finitely many 
subsets of { 1 , . . . , s} this cannot be true. 
Take χ e V. Since χ is not extreme, there are u,v 6 V \ {x}, и φ ν, such that 
x = ì (u + ν). One easily checks that K(x) С K(u) and K(x) С Κ (ν). 
We proceed using u. Suppose that u · n* < χ · η* for all k and let μ € Ш-, μ > 0. 
Consider ζ(μ) := x + /i(u —χ). Then ζ(μ)ηκ = a?• η* + / Í ( U · η * — χ η*) < χ η* < α* 
for all k. This implies that ζ(μ) G V for every μ > 0, which contradicts V being 
bounded. So we learn that there is at least one lb such that u · nk > χ · η*. 
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Hence we can define 
α * - χ · η * 
μ0 : = min τ г . (к I un,1>r-n»} U · Π* — Χ · Tl' 
Now let zo : = χ + /*о(и — x)· Then for all Jb such that u · n* > χ · n* we have 
a
k
 — ζ · η* = α* — χ · η* — /ІО(« · η* — χ · η*) > 0, 
s i n c e
 ,"
И
 -«"^ > Po-
For all fc such that u · η* < χ · n* we find (because of μ 0 > 0) 
z 0 n * = χ · η * + μο(« — *)-nk = ι · η ' + / ί ο ( « · η ' - ι · η ' ) < α ' + μ ο ί « « * — x-nk) < ak 
Hence z 0 € V. By definition z0 • n
k
 = a* for all Jfc G Κ (χ) (С K(u)). Hence 
A : ( Z 0 ) D A"(X). We can find fc0 G { 1 , · · . , « } such that un*Î0~Jg"X = Po- Then 
u · nfco > χ · n*° so that ko £ K{z) and zo · n*° = a f c°. Consequently K(z0) φ K(X)JÜ 
Now we can show 
LEMMA 1.4.6 A bounded polyhedral set is the convex hull of its extreme points. 
PROOF. Let Ρ be a bounded polyhedral set and let Ve be the convex hull of the 
extreme points of V. By lemma 1.4.5, Ve is a nonempty subset of V. Then, by 
theorem 1.4.3, we may write Ve : = C\'k=17i(nk,ak), where nk £ ГО.* \ {0} and a* G ГО 
for * € { 1 , . . . , * } . 
Suppose V \ V* is nonempty and let у be an element of this set. Then there is 
an ¿o G { 1 , . . . , s } such that y • nk° > ak°. Since Ρ is a compact subset of IR', 
γ : = m a x i e p χ ·η*° exists. By assumption y > α*°. Let Q := ПН(пко,у). Then Q 
is a bounded polyhedral set. Hence, by lemma 1.4.5, an extreme point e of Q exists. 
If e is the convex combination of two elements of V, then these two elements lie in 
tf(n*°,y) and hence also in Q. Since e is an extreme point of Q, this implies that 
there are no such elements. Hence e is also an extreme point of V. Consequently e 
lies in Ve. However, this contradicts the fact that e lies in H(nk°,y). Hence V \VC 
is empty. α 
Lemma 1.4.6 has two obvious consequences: 
THEOREM 1.4.7 A bounded polyhedral set is a polytope and conversely. 
THEOREM 1.4.8 A polytope is the convex hull of its extreme points. 
1.5 THE FACIAL STRUCTURE OF POLYTOPES 
In this section we describe the facial structure of a polytope. We start with the 
definition of a face for a polyhedral set. Let V be a polyhedral set in IR'. Then F 
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is called a face of V if either F = V or F is the nonempty intersection of Ρ and a 
supporting hyperplane. If F ф , then F is called a proper face of P . 
From the definition of a face it follows directly that a face of polyhedral set is a 
polyhedral set again. In the previous section we learned that a subset of IR* is a 
polytope if and only if it is a bounded polyhedral set. This implies that every face of 
a polytope is also a polytope. 
Our starting point in this section is a characterization of proper faces of a polyhedral 
set (lemma 1.5.1 below). For the proof of this characterization we use Farkas' lemma 
(lemma 1.4.1). 
LEMMA 1.5.1 Let V be defined as in lemma 1.4.8. and lei F be a nonempty subset 
of V. Then F is a face ofV if and only if either F = П *
е 5 # ( п * , о*) Г) V for some 
nonempty subset S of {1, . . . , s} or F = V. 
PROOF. First suppose F = r)kesH(nk ,ak) Г\ for some nonempty 5 С {1,...,«}. 
Define (η,α) := Лг ^ t e s ( n * i t t * ) · Then it easily follows that H(n,a) is a supporting 
hyperplane of V. Furthermore one can check that F = H(n,a) Π V. Hence F is a 
face of V-
Secondly suppose that F is a proper face of V = П'
к=1Н(пк ,ak). Then there are a 
normal η G Щ,'\{0} and a real number α such that F = Г\Н(п, a) and V С W(n, a). 
We show that this impies that 
t 
(η,α) = Y^\k(nk,ak), with A G IR', A > 0, Α φ 0. (1.5.1) 
Suppose that this is not true. Then by Farkas' lemma (lemma 1.4.1) there exists an 
I E E 1 such that χ • nk < 0 for all к and χ • η > 0. Now take ρ € F. Then clearly 
ρ + x G V. Since V С Ή{η, a), we find that α > (ρ + χ) · η = a + χ · π, which is a 
contradiction. Hence (1.5.1) is true. Now let S := {Jb G {1,...,«} | A* > 0} and take 
i £ f . Then it is easy to verify that (1.5.1) implies that χ nk = ak for each jfc G S. 
Hence FC П 1 е 5 Я ( п ' , о 1 ) П Р . On the other hand, if χ enkesH(nk,ak)M>, then 
(1.5.1) yields that χ • η = a, so that χ G F. Hence F = П 1 6 і Я ( п 1 , а ' ) П . This 
completes the proof. π 
Lemma 1.5.1 has some interesting consequences: 
THEOREM 1.5.2 A polyhedral set has only finitely many faces. 
THEOREM 1.5.3 Let F be a face of the polyhedral set V and G С F. Then G is a face 
ofV if and only if G is a face of F. 
PROOF. We only show that if G is a face of F, then G is also a face of V. We may 
suppose that F is a proper face of V. 
Let Ρ С Ш.' be defined as in lemma 1.4.3. By lemma 1.5.1 there is a nonempty S С 
{!,...,«} such that F = r\tesH(nk ,ак)Г\Р. Since G i s a face of F, lemma 1.5.1 also 
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implies that there exists a nonempty Г С {l,..., s) such that G = Пі
€
тЯ(п к , ak)r\F. 
Then G = П*е5ит#(п*,ак) Г\ so that, by lemma 1.5.1, G is also a proper face of 
V. о 
THEOREM 1.5.4 If F and G art faces of the polyhedral sei V and F Π G φ 0, then 
Fr\G is a face of all three F, G and P. 
PROOF. This result can be shown using arguments similar to those in the proof of 
theorem 1.5.3 о 
At this point we explicitly turn to polyhedral sets that are bounded, i.e. polytopes. 
Theorems 1.5.2 - 1.5.4 describe the facial structure of a polyhedral set and hence also 
of a polytope. Some authors use these results to define a face lattice for a polytope 
(see e.g. Br0nsted (1983)). A face lattice consists of sequences of faces. A face in 
such a sequence includes all faces on its left and is included by all faces on its right. 
In the next theorem we show that we have already met the smallest members (i.e. 
those faces on the utmost left) of such sequences. 
THEOREM 1.5.5 A face F of a polytope does not include any other face if and only ij 
F = {e}, where e is an extreme point of the polytope. 
PROOF. Let V С IR1 defined as in lemma 1.4.3 be a polytope. 
Let e be an extreme point of P. From lemma 1.4.3 we obtain that the dimension 
of the linear hull of those nk such that e G H(nk,ak) is equal to t. Let K(e) be 
the set of those Jfc such that e £ H(nk,ak). Then clearly K(e) is nonempty and 
{e} = П 4 е х( е )Я(п*,а к ) = П 1 б х ( е ) Я ( п ' , а ' ) П Р . By lemma 1.5.1 this implies that 
{e} is a face of V. Clearly {e} cannot include another face of V. 
Suppose that F is a proper face of V that does not include any other face of V. Let ƒ 
be an extreme point of F. Since, by lemma 1.5.1, F can be described using a subset of 
the halfspaces that are used to describe V, lemma 1.4.3 implies that there is a subset 
Τ of { 1 , . . . , s} such that the dimension of the linear hull of {nk \ к £ Τ] is t and 
ƒ G #(η*,α*) for every fc £ T. Lemma 1.4.3 then immediately implies that ƒ is also 
an extreme point of V. From the first part of this proof we obtain that {ƒ} is a face 
of F. Then in view of theorem 1.5.3, {ƒ} is also a face of V. Hence, by assumption, 
{ƒ} = F. 
The proof of theorem 1.5.5 also implies the following result. 
COROLLARY 1.5.6 Let F be a face of a polytope V. Then the extreme points of F are 
also extreme points ofV. 
Using theorem 1.5.5 we can also show: 
COROLLARY 1.5.7 Let V be the convex hull of a1,· • · ,a' € Hi'. If e is an extreme 
point ofV, then there is а к G { 1 , . . . ,s) such that e = ak. 
PROOF. If e is an extreme point of V. then, by theorem 1.5.5, [e\ is a face of V and 
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hence there is a supporting hyperplane of V such that {e} is the intersection of this 
hyperplane and V- Since this intersection is nonempty it contains at least one of the 
a*. Since the intersection consists of one point only, it is equal to one of the a*. с 
Next we extend our knowledge of the facial structure of polytopes by studying topo­
logical aspects. We make use of the following well-known result(Rockafellar (1970), 
p. 47): 
LEMMA 1.5.8 Let С be a nonempty convex set in Ш,*. Then χ is an element of the 
relative interior of С if and only if, for every у G С, there exists a real number μ > 1 
such that (1 — ß)y + μχ G V. 
THEOREM 1.5.9 Let V, as defined in lemma Ц.З, be a polytope and let χ Ç.V. Then 
χ € relint (V) if and only if xnk < ak for alike { 1 , . . . ,s) for which V £ H(nk,ak). 
PROOF. First assume that xnk < ak for all к G {1, . . . , s} for which V <£. Я(п*, α*) 
and suppose that χ £ relint (V). Then, by lemma 1.5.8, there is а у G V, у φ χ, such 
that, for any real number μ > 1, χ(μ) := (1 — μ^ + μχ £ V. This implies that for 
every μ > 1 there is some ifc(/i) G {1,. . . ,s} such that χ(μ) • n*^) > α^μ\ If we let 
μ I 1, we may suppose, without loss of generality, that it(/i) = ko for all μ. Further, 
for μ J. 1, χ(μ) —* χ. Hence / i j l yields χ · n*° > a* 0. Since χ 6 V, we obtain that 
хт»*° = a*° and consequently that ynk° < aka. By assumption xnka = aka implies 
V С H(nk,ak). However this contradicts у · n*° < a*0. 
Secondly suppose that χ G relint Τ and assume that x n * = o;* for some λ G {1, . . . , «} 
for which V ¿ Я ( п * , а * ) . Take y G V \H(nk,ak) and let μ G ΠΙ, μ > 1. Then 
((1 - μ)
ν
 + μχ) · π* = (1 - μ)
υ
 • n
k
 + /ία* 
> (1 - μ)^ + /ία* 
= a
k
. 
Hence (1 — μ)y + μx £ V. Now lemma 1.5.8 implies a contradiction with our assump­
tion that χ G relint V. π 
Theorem 1.5.9 has the following consequences. 
COROLLARY 1.5.10 Let V in Ю,' be a polytope. Let F be a face ofP. Then relint ( )П 
Fф% if and only ifF = V. 
PROOF. We only need to prove the 'only if' statement. Let P c E ' a s defined in 
lemma 1.4.3 be a polytope. Suppose relint (V) Π F φ 0. Since F is a face of V we 
find from lemma 1.5.1 that F = r u 6 5 # ( n * ,ak) П for some 5 С {1, . . . , s} . Hence 
F С H(nk,ak) for all ifc G S. Since we can find an element of F which fies in the 
relative interior of V, theorem 1.5.9 implies that V С H(nk,ak) for all ifc. Hence 
F = P. a 
COROLLARY 1.5.11 Let С be a convex subset of the polytope V. If СП relint (V) = 0, 
then there is a proper face FofV such that С С F. 
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PROOF. Let V be denned as in lemma 1.4.3 and define К := {k £ {1,... ,s) \V <£ 
H(nk ,<**)}. 
(a) Suppose that for all к G К there is an x(k) £ С such that i(ife) • nk < ak. Then 
x := jL· 5 3 t 6 i f z(Jfc) € С and moreover χ · nk < ak for all ib € К. So by theorem 1.5.9 
we have that χ G relint (Τ) and hence СП relint (Τ) φ 0. 
(b) Now assume that CD relint (V) = 0. Then we obtain from part (a) of this proof 
that there is a Jfc G К such that, for all χ G С, χ · пк = α*. This implies that С is 
contained in H(nk ,ак)П , which by lemma 1.5.1 is aface of V. Since V <fc H(nk,ak) 
it is a proper face. a 
We use corollaries 1.5.10 and 1.5.11 in the proof of 
THEOREM 1.5.12 Let С be a convex subset of the polytope V. Then there is exactly 
one face F ofV such that С С F and СП relint (F) φ 0. 
PROOF. If СП relint (V) φ 0, the theorem is obvious. So suppose that С Π 
relint (Τ) = 0. By corollary 1.5.11, С is contained in a proper face of V. 
Further, since V has only finitely many faces, we can find a smallest face F which 
contains С (a face that includes no other face in which С hes). 
First we show that F is the only smallest face containing С Suppose G is also 
a smallest face that contains C. Then, in view of theorem 1.5.4, F Π G is a face 
of V containing C. Since F and G are both smallest faces containing C, we find 
FHG=F = G. 
Secondly we show that СП relint (F) φ 0. Suppose СП relint (F) = 0. Then by 
corollary 1.5.11 (applied to the polytope F) С lies in some face of F, which is not F 
itself. By theorem 1.5.3 this face of F is also a face of V. Hence this contradicts F 
being the smallest face of V containing C. So СП relint (F) фЪ. a 
If in theorem 1.5.12 the convex set С consists of one point, then we obtain 
COROLLARY 1.5.13 Let V be a polytope and let χ G V. Then there is exactly one face 
F ofV such that χ G relint (F). 
A direct consequence of the corollary above is that a polytope V can be partitioned 
into the relative interiors of its faces, i.e. the set {relint (F) | F is a face of V) is a 
partition of V. 
We conclude this section with a useful lemma. 
LEMMA 1.5.14 Let V be a polytope and ¡et F be a face ofP. Then χ G relint(F) 
is contained in a supporting hyperplane of V if and only if F is contained in this 
hyperplane. 
PROOF. Let χ G relint (F) and let η φ 0 be a normal and α be a real number such 
that #(n, Q) is a supporting hyperplane of V that contains x. Let y G F. Then by 
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lemma 1.4.1 there is a μ > 1 such that μχ + (1 — /i)y E F. Hence 
a > (μχ + (1 - /i)y) · η = μχ η + (1 - /i)¡/ · η > μα + (1 - μ)α = α. 
This yields y G Я(п, α). ι 
Ι.β UNDOMINATED ELEMENTS OF POIYTOPES 
In this section we study we undominated elements of a polytope V. If x, y G V wt 
say that χ dominates y if χ > y and χ φ y. We call x G V undominated if for everj 
y E V such that y > x, we have y = x. The set of undominated elements of V ií 
denoted by P*. 
Our starting point in this section is the following lemma which can easily be obtained 
from Farkas' lemma (lemma 1.5.1): 
LEMMA 1.6.1 Let a1, a 2 , . . . , am G IR". Then precisely one of the following two state-
ments is true 
(ι) there is a y G ГО." \ {0} such that у > 0 and у · a* < 0 for all к G {1,2,..., m}; 
fu; Mere ie о A G UV, λ > 0 such thai E™
= 1 A t a
l
 > 0. 
We use lemma 1.6.1 in the proof of 
LEMMA 1.6.2 Let V be a polytope in Ht'. Then ζ G V* if and only if there exists о 
supporting hyperplane ofP, containing z, such that all coordinates of the normal o¡ 
this hyperplane are positive. 
PROOF. First let ζ G Ρ * . By theorem 1.4.3 we can find normals n 1 , . . . , n' G Ht' \ 
{0} and real numbers a1,...,a' such that V = f | J
= 1 Щп
к
,а
к). Let K{z) := {k G 
{l,...,s} |z G H(nk,ak)}. Clearly K(z) φ 0 for otherwise there is a small positive 
real number с such that ζ + elt G V, while obviously ζ + c l t > z. There can be no 
vector x G ГО.' \ {0} such that χ > 0 and χ · nk < 0 for all lb G K(z). Indeed if there 
was such a vector this would imply that, for 6 > 0, ζ + Sx G V, while ζ + 6x > ζ 
and ζ + δχ φ ζ. Then lemma 1.6.1 implies that there exists a λ G ΠΙ* with \t = 0 
tf к $ K(z) and λ 4 > 0 if ¿b G Κ (ζ) such that η := £*€*(*) At"* > 0. Let ρ G V. 
Then 
pn= Σ XkPnk< Σ λ * α * = Σ AfcZ-n4 = 2 г п . 
кек(і) keK(z) *ек(х) 
Hence Н(п, ζ • η) is a supporting hyperplane of V containing ζ while η > 0. 
Secondly let # ( y , 7) be a supporting hyperplane of V and let у > 0. Suppose z G 
Я(У.Т) Π ? . If ζ is not undominated, then there is an x G V such that χ > ζ and 
τ φ ζ. Consequently χ y > ζ y, which contradicts our assumption. 0 
We now can show: 
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THEOREM 1.6.3 Lei V be a polytope, then V* φ 0. 
PROOF. Let η be a normal such that η > 0. Since V is compact, there is a ζ € V 
such that ζ · η = maxx€p χ · η. Suppose y > ζ for some y G V. Since y · η < ζ · η and 
η > 0, this implies у = ζ. а 
Suppose ζ is an undominated element of a polytope V. Then lemma 1.6.2 yields 
that there are a normal η with η > 0 and a real number a such that H(n,a) is a 
supporting hyperplane oîV. Hence F := V Π H(n,a) is a face of Τ7 and ζ £ F. By 
lemma 1.6.2 all elements of F are undominated. Hence 
THEOREM 1.6.4 Let V be a polytope. Then V* is the union of faces ofV. 
More of the structure of the set of undominated elements of a polytope is revealed in: 
THEOREM 1.6.5 Let V be a polytope in IR*. Then V is connected. 
PROOF. Let the map F : Δ ( —• V be denned by 
F(y) :={zeV\zy = maxx · y}. 
In view of lemma 1.6.2 and the fact that any normal of a hyperplane with only 
positive coordinates can be normalized so that it becomes an element of Δ», we have 
V* = Vyçb,F(y). Note that F (y) is a face of V for every y € A,. 
Suppose that V* is not connected, i.e. there are open subsets X and Y in the relative 
topology of V* such that 
V* = XUY and Χ Π Y = 0 . 
Then, since F(y) is convex for every y 6 Δ«, either F(y) С X or F (у) С Y for every 
y. Let F+(X) := {y € Δ, \F{y) С X] and F+(Y) := {у e Àt\F(y) С Y). Then 
Àt := F+(X) U F+(Y) and F+(X) П F+(Y) = 0. Clearly these sets are nonempty. 
We show that they are open, which completes the proof, since it contradicts the fact 
that At is convex and hence connected. 
Suppose that F+(X) is not open. Then there are a g G F+(X) and a sequence 
{?*}*eN С Δ ( \ F+(X) = F+(Y) such that this sequence converges to q. Since 
F(qk) is a face of V for every к G IN and a polytope has only finitely many faces, we 
find that the sequence {•F(?k)}tgi>i contains a constant subsequence. Without loss 
of generality we suppose that { i , (? i ) } teN itself is constant, say F(qk) = F for all 
Jb G IN. Take u G F(q) and ν € F. Then и • qk < ν • qk for all Jfe and ti · q > υ • q. 
Letting к go to infinity, we obtain that и · q = υ • q. Hence u G F(q). This implies that 
F С F(q) so that, since F С Y, we have F(q)flY φ 0. This implies F(q) С Y, which 
contradicts q G F+(X). So the latter set is open. Similarly one shows that F + (Y) is 
open. a 
We continue this section examining undominated subpolytopes, which are important 
in chapter 2. 
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Let V be the convex hull of a1, · · · , a' £ 1 ' , A subset V' of V is called a subpolytope if 
7*' := conv {a* | Jb G S } for some 5 С { 1 , . . . ,β}. Hence by corollaries 1.5.6 and 1.5.7 
every face of a polytope is a subpolytope. The converse statement is not generally 
true. For example the diagonal of a square in Ol2 is a subpolytope, but not a face. 
Let S С { 1 , . . . ,s]. Then the subpolytope conv {a* | t G S] is called undominated 
if it is contained in V*. Further it is called maximally undominated if for every 
S С Τ С { 1 , . . . , s} such that conv {α' | ι € Γ} is undominated, conv {a* \ i G S} = 
conv {α' 11' € Γ } . 
Now we have: 
LEMMA 1.6.6 Let V be a polytope in ffi.'. Then a subpolytope ofV is undominated 
if and only if there exists a supporting hyperplane ofV, containing this subpolytope, 
such that all coordinates of the normal of this hyperplane are positive. 
PROOF. Let 5 С { 1 , . . · , s } so that the subpolytope conv {α* | ι € 5 } is undominated. 
Let ζ := Дт Σί£5 α ' · Then ζ is an undominated element of Ρ and hence, by lemma 
1.6.2, there are a normal η G IR* with η > 0 and a real number α such that Η (η, a) 
is a supporting hyperplane of V• Then it is easy to check that ζ η = a implies that 
a' · η = a for each t G S, so that conv {a* | i G S] С V*'. 
The converse statement follows immediately from lemma 1.6.2 • 
With help of lemma 1.6.6 we show 
COROLLARY 1.6.7 A maximally undominated subpolytope of a polytope is a face of 
that polytope. 
PROOF. Let V be a polytope in IR* and let 5 С { 1 , . . . , s} so that the subpolytope 
conv {a' | i G S} is maximally undominated. By lemma 1.6.6 there are a normal η G 
IR' with η > 0 and a real number α such that H(n,a) is a supporting hyperplane of 
V and conv {a* | i G S} С Г\Н{п, a). Now by definition of a maximal undominated 
subpolytope aln < a for each » G { 1 , . . . , s}\S. Hence conv {a' | i G S} = Г\Н(п, a) 
and therefore a face. • 
We conclude with the following lemma 
LEMMA 1.6.8 Let V : = conv {a1,...,a'} be a polytope in IR* and let S С { 1 , . . . , s } 
be such that V := conv {a* \ i G S} is a maximal undominated subpolytope of V. 
Suppose V' С H(y,y) for some y G At and y G Ю» TAen H(y,j) is a supporting 
hyperplane ofV. 
PROOF. For S = { 1 , . . . , β} the lemma is trivially true. So suppose S φ { 1 , . . . , s } . 
By lemma 1.6.2 there are a η G Δ« and an α G IR such that α' · η = a for all i G S 
and о* · η < α for all i G { 1 , . . . , « } . Moreover, the maximal i ty of V' implies that 
a' · η < α for all t G { 1 , . . . , «} \ S. 
Let us assume that H(y, y) is not a supporting hyperplane of V. Then there is an 
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» € {1, . . . , * } \ 5 such that a' y > y. Moreover for t h i s * we have that α* · η < a. 
This implies that we can find a n i o € { l , - - , « } \ 5 s u c h t h a t 
^χζΐ
= m a x
 ¿ у - ч
 > 0 . ( 1 Л Л ) 
Q-a'o-n ¿e{i,...,*}\s a — a* · η 
Then 
0 < Ao := j 5 — j l < 1 
a —
 α
·θ .
 П
 -|_
 α
· θ . у γ 
and it is straightforward to check that a* · n ° = or0 for all ι € S U {*o}> where 
(τ»0,α0) := λ 0(η,α) + (1 -λ 0)(!/,γ) € A m χ IR. Clear ly n ° G A t . Hence, by lemma 
1.6.6, 7>":=conv {a' | i G SU{»'o} } is an undominated s u b p o l y t o p e of "P if J/(yo, 70) is 
a supporting hyperplane of V- Since the first c o n t r a d i c t s t h e max imal i ty of 7*', we find 
that #(¡/o.7o) is n o t a supporting hyperplane of T>. T h i s impl ies the existence of an 
»1 G {l , . . . , s} \ (5U{i 'o}) suchthat a*1·«0 > a0. T h i s impl i e s λ 0 α , χ n + ( l — A o V 1 y > 
AQO; + (1 — λο)7· Hence 
а'
1
 -У-Ύ
 > Ар a*° · У — Ύ 
a — a'
1
 · η 1 — A0 at — α*° - η ' 
which contradicts (1.6.1). So H(y,y) is a support ing hyperp lane of "P. a 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SET OF EQUILIBRIA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we investigate the structure of the set of equilibria for a bimatrix game 
and then concentrate on extreme equilibria. 
For the special case of matrix games the set of equilibria is completely described in 
Shapley and Snow (1950), Bohnenblust, Karlin and Shapley (1950) and Gale and 
Sherman (1950). It appears that the set of equilibria for a matrix game is the Carte-
sian product of the two sets of optimal strategies, both being a polytope. The extreme 
points of these polytopes are characterized. 
These results for matrix games have been generalized towards bimatrix games by 
Winkels (1979), Jansen (1981) and Quintas (1989). These authors showed that the 
set of Nash equilibria for a bimatrix game is the finite union of so called maximal Nash 
subsets, each of which is the Cartesian product of two polytopes. Vorob'ev (1958) 
and Kuhn (1961) provide a characterization of the extreme points of the polytopes 
that form a maximal Nash subset. 
In the next section we give a new proof of the fact that the set of equilibria for a 
bimatrix game is the union of finitely many maximal Nash subsets. We use a method 
which incorporates the approaches of Jansen and Quintas. This method also leads 
to some new results which serve as tools in the proofs of several results in chapter 3. 
The results of section 2.2 are based upon Jansen and Jurg (1993). 
In section 2.3, which is based upon Jurg and Jansen (1990), we extend the result of 
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Vorob'ev and Kuhn. Therefore we use some results concerning undominated elements 
of a polytope (see section 1.6). 
In section 2.4 we give an example of how to find all equilibria for a bimatrix game. 
2.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF EQUILIBRIA 
An important role in the study of the set of equilibria for a bimatrix game is played 
by (maximal) Nash subsets. For an m ж η bimatrix game (A, B), a set Τ С E(A, В) 
is a Nash subset if there are sets 7\ С A
m
 and Ti С Δ
η
 such that Τ is the Cartesian 
product of 7\ and T2. A Nash subset Τ is called maximal if it is not properly 
contained in another Nash subset. The term maximal Nash subset was introduced 
by Heuer and Millham (1976). Nash (1951) called such a set a subsolution, while 
Winkels (1979) used the term Nash component. 
In order to describe the structure of the set of equilibria for a bimatrix game, Jansen 
(1981) showed that a convex subset С of the set of equilibria is maximal (i.e. not 
properly contained in another convex subset of the set of equilibria) if and only if 
С is a maximal Nash subset. Applying Zorn's lemma, one can show that for an 
equilibrium (p, q) for a bimatrix game (A,B) there is a maximal convex subset of 
E(A, B) containing (p, q). Consequently, every equilibrium for a bimatrix game (A, B) 
is contained in a maximal Nash subset and E(A,B) is the union of such subsets. In 
order to show that the number of maximal Nash subsets for a bimatrix game is finite, 
Jansen used the fact that a maximal Nash subset Τ is completely determined by 
the quartet (C(p),PB(B,p),C(q),PB(A,q)), where (p,q) is some equilibrium in the 
relative interior of T. Finally he showed that a maximal Nash subset is the Cartesian 
product of two polytopes, and hence is a polytope itself. 
In Quintas (1989) a similar result is derived for so-called polymatrix games. These 
are η-person games which are, for η > 2, an extension of bimatrix games. We give a 
short description what Quintas' method is about. For an m χ η bimatrix game (A, B) 
and for a 2-tuple (I, J) С Μ χ Ν, he introduces 
H(I,J) = {(p,q) € Д
т
 χ Δ„ I C(p) C / C PB(A,q) and C(q) CJC PB(B,p)}. 
From proposition 1.3.1 we obtain that, for every (I, J) С (Μ, Ν), the set H(I,J), if 
non-empty, is contained in E(A,B). From the definitions of carriers and pure best 
replies we obtain that H(I, J) consists of those (p,q) G A
m
 χ Δ„ for which: 
Pi = 0 for all i G M \ I 
q¡ = 0 for all j G N \ J 
pBej > pBe, for all j G J and l G N ' 
е,Л<7 > eicAq for all i G I and к £ N 
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Hence each set H (I, J) is a product of two polyhedral sets in A
m
 and Δ„ respectively. 
Theorem 1.4.7 implies that H(I,J) is either empty or a product of polytopes. 
If, for an equilibrium (p, q), we take I := PB(A, q) and J := PB(B,p), then obviously 
(p,q) e н(і, j). So 
E(A,B) = ( J H(I,J). 
(I,J)C(M,N) 
One can show that for a pair (I, J) С (Μ, Ν) the polytope H(I, J), if non-empty, is a 
face of a maximal Nash subset. However, generally there is not a one-to-one relation 
between these subsets of (M, N) and faces of maximal Nash subsets. This can be 
seen by examining the game in the following example. 
EXAMPLE 2.2.1 Let 
(A,B) = (2,1) (1,0) (1,1)1 (2,0) (1,1) (0,0)J 
Although ((^, ^ ) , ei) is an extreme point of a maximal Nash subset for this game (and 
hence a face of this maximal Nash subset), there is no pair (ƒ, J ) С ({1,2}, {1,2, 3}) 
such that H(I,J) = {((%,%),ei)}. Moreover for this game Я({1,2},{1,2}) = 
#({1,2}, {1,2,3}). So there is not a one-to-one relation between the subsets H(I,J) 
and faces of maximal Nash subsets. In the following we use an approach which does 
not suffer from this drawback. 
We improve the method of Quintas to describe the set of equilibria for a bimatrix 
game. Instead of the 2-tuple he dealt with, we define a 4-tuple, composed of the 
carriers and the sets of pure best replies belonging to an equilibrium. Contrary to 
Jansen (1981), who only used these 4-tuples for equilibria contained in the relative 
interior of a maximal Nash subset, here we consider 4-tuples for all equilibria. In 
this way we come to a description which reveals more of the structure of the set of 
equilibria and in particular of maximal Nash subsets. It is worth noticing that we do 
not need Zorn's lemma in the proofs of these results. 
Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game. In order to decide whether a strategy pair (p, q) 
is an equilibrium for the bimatrix game (A,B), we have to check the (equilibrium) 
inclusions C(p) С PB(A,q) and C(q) С ΡΒ(Β,ρ) (cf. proposition 1.2.1). For that 
purpose we need the 4-tuple 
(C(p),PB(A,q),C(9).PB(B,p)). 
If (P> ?) is a n equilibrium for (A, B), we call this quartet the characteristic quartet of 
(p, q) and denote it by χ(ρ, q). The set of characteristic quartets for the bimatrix game 
(A, B) is denoted by χ(Α,Β). Clearly this set is finite and it introduces a partition 
on the set of equilibria for (A, B). In fact there will turn out to be a one-to-one 
correspondence between the elements of χ(Α, В) and the faces of the maximal Nash 
subsets for the came (A.B). First we introduce some notation. 
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Let χ = (I, J,K, L) and ζ = (I', J', K', L') be two characteristic quartets. Then χοζ 
denotes the 4-tuple 
(WI',JnJ',KUK',LnL') 
and we write χ С С if 
ICI'.JD J',К CK' and LD L'. 
Observe that χοζ is not necessarily a characteristic quartet. However, always χ С xUC 
andCCxUC-
Further we define the characteristic sei of a characteristic quartet χ by 
Fx •= {(p,q) e A
m
 χ Δ„ | x(p,q) С χ } . 
Note that Fx is non-empty by definition. Let χ = (ƒ, J, K, L) be a characteristic quar­
tet and let (p,q) G F*. Then C(p) С I,PB(A,q) D J,C(q) С К and ΡΒ(Β,ρ) Э L. 
As χ G χ(Α,Β), we have I С J and К С L, and hence (p,q) satisfies the equilib­
rium inclusions. Hence Fx С E(A,B). On the other hand every equilibrium (p,q) is 
contained in the characteristic set of χ(ρ, q). So we have 
E(A,B)= [J F*. 
хех(А,в) 
Let χ = (I,J,K,L) be a characteristic quartet. Then Fx consists of those strategy 
pairs (p,q) Ε Δ
π
 ж Δ
η
 for wich: 
p¡ = 0 for all i G M \ I 
tjAq > erAq for ail j £ j and г G M 
qk = 0 for ail к € N \ К 
pBei > pBe, for ail / e L and s S N 
Hence each set Fx is a product of two polyhedral sets in A
m
 and Δ
η
 respectively. 
Theorem 1.4.7 implies that Fx is a product of polytopes. Now since there are only 
finitely many different characteristic quartets, there are also finitely many different 
characteristic sets. Hence we have: 
THEOREM 2.2.1 The set of equilibria for a btmatnx game is the union of a finite 
number of polytopes. 
Next we are going to study the structure of these polytopes. Therefore we first prove 
some lemmas. 
LEMMA 2.2.2 Let {A, B) be an τη χ η btmatnx game and let S be a convex subset of 
E(A,B). Then there is a (p,q) € 5 such that S С Fx<™). 
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PROOF. Since χ(Α,Β) has only finitely many elements and x(x,y) G χ(Α,Β) for 
every (x,y) G S, we can find finitely many elements (¡r1 ,!/1), . . . , (x*,y*)of 5 such that 
и,'
= 1х(х',у·) = U (r>y)6sX(í,y)· Let (p,q) := }Е.-=і(^.У') · Then clearly C(p) = 
UJ
=1C(x,) Further, since S is convex, we have that for i,j G {1,. . . ,«}, i φ j , 
and 0 < A < 1, A(x',y·) + (1 — λ)(χ*, y1) is an equilibrium for (A,B). Hence 
C(x') U C{x>) = C(X Xх + (1 - λ) x') С РВ(Л, Ay* + (1 - λ) y>). So for к € С(х') we 
have 
\е
к
Ау
,
 + (1-Х)е
к
Ау
1
 = 
е*Л(Ау' + (1 - A)y>) = т м е
г
Л ( А у ' + (1 - А) у*) 
< Атахе
г
Лу' + (1 — A) max Cr-Ay7. 
г г 
Since еіцАу' = гпах
г
е
г
Лу', this implies that abo etAy1 = т а х
г
е
г
Л у
;
. We can 
deduce from this that C(x') С РВ(А,у*) for all i,j G {1 s}. Consequently 
C(p) С РВ(Л,у') for all i so that П?
=1Р£(Л,у*) φ 0. Further тах г е г ,4д = 
^max
r
(e
r
Ayl -\ \- e
r
Ay') = y(max
r
 eTAy
l
 Η \- max
r
 е
г
Лу*), which implies for 
j £ M that ejj4g = maxr erЛ? if and only if ejAy1 = т а х г е г Л у ' for every i. 
Hence PB(A,q) = П'
=1РВ(А,у'). Similarly C(q) = U?=1C(y.) and PB(B,p) = 
n
a
l=1PB(B,xt). Consequently x(p,q) = U't=1x(xi,y%) = U ( X i y ) €sx(x,y). This imphes 
that χ(χ,у) С x(p, q) for every (x, y) e 5. Hence S С F*^.«). α 
LEMMA 2.2.3 Let (А,В) be an τη x η bimairtx game, χ G χ(Α,Β) and (p,q) € 
E(A,B). Suppose x(p,q) = χ. Then {p,q) G reimt (F*). 
PROOF. Take an arbitrary (x,y) G -F* and define for μ > 1: 
ОЛс") :=(1-/*)(*, V)+MP, g). 
According to lemma 1.5.8 we have proved that (p, q) G relint ( F x ) if we can find a 
μ > 1 such that (p»,q") G Fx. 
Since χ(χ, у) С x(p, ç), we have C(x) С C(p) and C(y) С C(ï)· Hence for μ close to 1 
we have that (ρμ, ç") G Д
т
 χ Δ„ and moreover that C V ) = C(p) and C(j") = C(ç). 
In the following we assume μ > 1. 
Now let jo G Р-8(Л, ς) С РВ(А, у). Then for ¿ G M we have: 
ejBAq" - ejAq" = (1 - /і)(е,„Лу - e, Лу) + /і(е
І0Лд - e¡Aq). (2.2.1) 
Clearly if also j G РВ(Л,д) С PB(A,y), then the expression (2.2.1) is equal to zero 
for all μ > 1. If j G PS(A,y) \ ЯЛ(Л,с), then (2.2.1) is positive for all μ > 1. If 
j £ PB(A,y), then (2.2.1) is positive for all μ close enough to 1. In that case we 
find that PB(A,q") = PB(A,q). Similarly we find PB{B,p^) = PB(B,p) for all μ 
close to 1. So for μ close to 1 we have that x(p/ i,9/ i) = x(p,q), which implies that 
(p*,q")eFX. α 
THEOREM 2.2.4 Lei (A, B) be a bimatrtx game, χ G χ(Α, В) and F С E(A, В). Then 
F is a face of Fx if and only if there is α ζ С χ such that F = F^. 
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PROOF. First let С be a characteristic quartet such that С С χ. Then F^ С Fx. 
Since F ( is convex, theorem 1.5.12 says that there is a unique face G of F* such that 
F ( С G and F ( П relint (G) ^ 0. We prove that F ( is a face of F* by showing that 
G C f ( . 
Take (χ',ΐ/7) G F ( Drelint(G) and (x,y) G G. Then, by lemma 1.5.8 there exists a 
μ > 1 such that 
(r",y"):=/i(z',y ' ) + ( l -/ i ) (x ,y )GG. 
Hence (i ' .y') = ^(x^.y") + (1 - j¡)(x,y). This implies that C(x') = C(x") U 
G(x), P ^ A y 7 ) = РВ(А,у")ПРВ(А,у), C(y·) = C(y")UC(y) and PB(B,x') = 
PB(B, ζ") Π PB(B, χ). Hence χ(χ', у1) = χ(χμ, y") U χ(χ, y) and consequently 
x(*,y)Cx(x',y')CC.SoGcF<. 
Secondly let F be a face of Fx. Clearly, x(x,y) С χ for every (x, y) G F. Since F is 
convex, lemma 2.2.2 implies that there is an (x,y) G F such that F С Fx(x,i\ Since 
(x,y) G F x , the first part of this proof implies that Fx(-£·*) is a face of F x . Then, 
since F is a face of F x , theorem 1.5.3 implies that F is abo a face of Fx(x,v\ By 
lemma 2.2.3 we have that (x,y) G relint (Fx^·^). Hence FD relint (F*(f>*>) ^ 0. 
Then corollary 1.5.10 yields that F = F*^1^, which completes the proof. α 
In view of the last lemma we can define a characteristic set to be maximal if it is not 
a proper face of another characteristic set. Note that due to the fact that a polytope 
has only finitely many faces, such a maximal characteristic set always exists. The 
following lemma shows the equivalence of maximal characteristic sets and maximal 
Nash subsets (and hence also the existence of maximal Nash subsets). 
LEMMA 2.2.5 Let (A, B) be a bimatra game. Then each maximal characteristic set 
is a maximal Nash subset for (A, B) and conversely. 
PROOF. It suffices to show that each characteristic set is a Nash subset and that, 
conversely, each Nash subset is contained in a characteristic set. 
(a) It follows immediately from the definition of a characteristic set that it is a Nash 
subset. 
(b) Next we show that a Nash subset is contained in a characteristic set. Let Τ be 
a Nash subset. It suffices to show that conv (T) is a subset of E(A,B), since then 
lemma 2.2.2 implies that conv (T) is contained in some characteristic set. 
Take (x1 ,yl), (x 2 ,y 2 ) G Τ and a real number A such that 0 < λ < 1. Let (x,y) := 
\ix\y1) + (1 - A)(x2,y2). Then clearly C(x) = C{xl) U G(x2). Since Γ is a Nash 
subset we have that C{xl) С PB{A,yl), C{xl) С PB(A,y2), C(x 2) С PB(A,yl) 
and C(x2) С PB(A,y2). Hence C(x) С PB(A,y2) and G(x) С PB(A,y2). Con­
sequently C(x) С PB{A,yl) Π PB(A,y2) = PB(A,y). Similarly one shows that 
C{y) С PB(B, x). So (x, y) G E(A, B). This implies that conv (Г) С E(A, В). a 
With these lemmas at hand we can show some results on the structure of the set 
of equilibria for a bimatrix game. These results are summarized in theorem 2.2.6. 
However, first we define a correspondence between faces of maximal Nash subsets 
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and characteristic quartets: 
We say that a face F of a maximal Nash subset of a bimatrix game (A, B) corresponds 
to a characteristic quartet χ G χ(Α, В) if F = Fx. 
THEOREM 2.2.6 Let (A, В) be a bimatrix game. Then 
(i) E(A, B) consists of finitely many maximal Nash subsets, each of which is a 
product of polytopes, 
(it) The correspondence between the elements of\(A, B) and the faces of the maximal 
Nash subsets is one-to-one. 
(Hi) Let F be a face of a maximal Nash subset of (A, B), let χ G χ(Α, В) correspond 
to F and let (p,q) G E(A,B). Then x(p,q) = χ if and only if(p,q) G relint (F), 
(iv) If the intersection of two maximal Nash subsets is non-empty, then it is a face 
of both these sets. 
PROOF, (i) This follows immediately from lemma 2.2.5 and the fact that each char­
acteristic set is contained in a maximal characteristic set. 
(ii) If two faces correspond to the same characteristic quartet, then these two faces 
are equal by definition. 
Conversely let two characteristic quartets χ and ζ determine the same face F. Then 
Fx = F(. By definition of a characteristic quartet we can find (p, q) G E(A, В) such 
that χ(ρ, g) = χ. Then (p, q) G F x = F f and hence χ = x(p,ç) С ζ- Similarly one 
shows С С Χ· Consequently ζ = χ. 
(iii) In view of lemma 2.2.3 we only have to show that (p, q) G relint (F) implies 
x(p,q) = χ. So suppose (p,q) G relint (F). Then, in view of theorem 2.2.4, Fx^p·^ 
is a face of F = Fx. Since (p, q) lies in both relint (Fx) and Fx(p,*i the intersection 
relint (Fx) Π F x ( p ' J ) is non-empty. Hence by corollary 1.5.10, Fx = Fx^'q\ Now (ii) 
yields дс = х(р, 9). 
(iv) Suppose S and Τ are maximal Nash subsets for (A,B), corresponding to re­
spectively the characteristic quartets χ and ζ. Suppose S C\T φ 0. Then, since the 
intersection of two polytopes is again a polytope (which easily follows from theorem 
1.4.2), lemma 2.2.2 implies that there is a (p, q) G S П Г such that S Γ) Τ С Fx(-P'i\ 
Clearly χ(ρ, q) С χ and χ(ρ, q) С С· Now theorem 2.2.4 yields that Fx^p·^ is a face 
of both FX = S and F< = T. Hence F*^'«) С S П T. Consequently F ^ · « ) = S П Г. 
This completes the proof. • 
For the special case of maximal Nash subsets, theorem 2.2.6(ii) is already proved in 
Jansen (1987). 
With respect to maximal Nash subsets a simpler correspondence can be given: 
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COROLLARY 2.2.7 A maximal Nash subset is uniquely determined by the two carrien 
that occur in the characteristic quartet which corresponds to it. 
PROOF. Let S and Τ be two maximal Nash subsets for a bimatrix game. Take (p, q) € 
relint (5) and (x,y) € relint (T). Then by theorem 2.2.6(ii) we have that S uniquely 
corresponds to x(p,q) and Τ uniquely corresponds to \(х,у). Suppose C(p) = C(x) 
and C(q) = C{y). Then C(p) = C(x) С PB(A,y) and C(y) = C(q) С PB(B,q). 
So (p,y) is an equilibrium. Similarly one shows that (x,q) is an equilibrium. Hence 
S U {(χ, у)} is a Nash subset. Since S is maximal we find that (x,y) G S. Hence we 
have that x(x,y) С x(p,q) and consequently Τ С S. Since Τ is maximal we have 
T = S. t 
The following example shows that corollary 2.2.7 does in general not apply to proper 
faces of maximal Nash subsets. 
EXAMPLE 2.2.1 Consider the 3 x 3 bimatrix game 
"(0,1) (0,0) (2,0)" 
(A,B):= (1,0) (1,1) (1,0) 
(2,0) (2,0) (0,1). 
E(A, B) consists of the following three maximal Nash subsets, which are depicted in 
figure 2.2.1 as subsets of Δ3 χ Δ3: 
figure 2.2.1 
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c°nv{(i,±,±).(°.M)} * №Ш 
{ ( І . Ш * «mv{(0, $/*),(*,(),$)} 
c o n v « è , i , i ) , ( è . O , i ) } x {(І.О.І)}. 
We see that £(Л, Я) is connected, that the intersection of two maximal Nash subsets 
is a face of both. Further we see that the intersection of the first two maximal Nash 
subsets, ((5, 5, 5), (0,^,^)), has carriers {1,2,3} and {2,3}. This is not a unique pair 
for a face of a maximal nash subset, since the equilibria in the relative interior of the 
first maximal Nash subset have the same carriers. 
2.3 EXTREME EQUILIBRIA 
In the previous section we have seen that the set of equilibria for a bimatrix game is 
the union of finitely many maximal Nash subsets and that these sets are polytopes. 
Hence it makes sense to study the extreme points of maximal Nash subsets. 
We call the extreme points of maximal Nash subsets extreme equilibria. It is the aim 
of this section to give a characterization for extreme equilibria for a game in terms of 
polytopes associated to the matrices of the game. 
Our starting point is a characterization for extreme equilibria in Jansen (1981). For 
an m χ η game (A, B) Jansen defines the polyhedral sets: 
QA •= {(ç, a) G Δ„ χ IR I e¡Aq < a for all í € M] 
and 
Рв := {(P,ß) € Д
т
 χ IR|pBe, < β for all j G Ν}. 
Then he shows: 
THEOREM 2.3.1 Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and lei (p, q) £ A
m
 χ Δ„ 
be given. Then (p,q) is an extreme equilibrium for (A,B) if and only if there exist 
numbers a and β such thai (q,a) G ext(Q¿), (ρ, β) G ехі(Рв), pAq = a andpBq = β. 
Mills (1960) and Mangasarian and Stone (1964) gave a characterization for equilib­
ria which only differs from this characterization because (q,a) G ext(QA), (ρ,β) G 
ext(Pfl) are replaced by {q,a) G QA, (ρ,β) G PB-
Since E(A,B) is non-empty, theorem 2.3.1 implies that both ext(Q^) and ext(Pa) 
are non-empty and that these sets determine E(A,B). 
Note: 
In the rest of this section we confine ourselves 
to the study of the extreme points ofQ¿ only. 
All results we prove have their counterpart for 
Рв-
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Our first step that way is to simply apply lemma 1.4.3 to the polyhedral set Q¿. But 
first we give some definitions. We define the row polytope V(A) of the m χ η matrb 
A by 
V(A) := conv {aA,.... e
m
A] С IRn. 
Further for S С M and Τ С N we denote 
AS,T •= [a«i]»'6S,i6T, 
and for χ G IR", xT is the T-tupIe with coordinates (xT),· = Xi for each » G T. 
Further ГО. := {xT \ χ G ГО,"}. By 1т G ΠΙ we denote the vecor with all coordinates 
equal to 1. 
THEOREM 2.3.2 Let A be an m χ η matrix and let (q,a) G Ш," χ IR. Then (q,a) G 
exb(QA) if and only if dimf V(ApB(A,q),c(<¡))) = \C(q)\ - 1-
PROOF. First observe that 
QA = ГЪ
€
мЩ(е{А, -1), 0) Dj€N 7*((-е,·, 0), 0) П Я((1„, 0), 1). 
Let (ΐ,α) G IRn X IR. Then, by lemma 1.4.3, (q,a) G ext(QA) if and only if the 
dimension of the linear hull of 
(e,Л, -1 ) for which » G PB(A, q), 
(-e,·, 0) for which j €N\ C(q) and 
(ln,0) 
is equal to τ» + 1. 
од N\C((i) 
PB(A,q). A A (A, ,q)J4 
: -ι 
і«Хя)< 0 
figure 2.3.1 
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Suppose that (q, a) E ext(QA). Then we have found that the dimension of the linear 
hull of the row vectors of the matrix in figure 2.3.1 is η + 1. 
First we show that the last row vector of this matrix is linearly independent of the 
othei row vectors. Suppose that this is not the case. Then there are a λ € ш/> в( і 4·') χ 
JEL"\C(I)
 s u c h t h a t 
(l
n
,0)= Σ λ.(ε,Λ-1)+ £ АДеу.О). 
i£PB(A,q) j€N\C(,) 
With respect to (q, a) we then have: 
l = (ln,0) • ( * , * ) = Σ Ai(eM.-l) •(«.«)+ Σ A , ( e j .0 ) ( ç ,a ) = 0, 
¡€PB(A,q) j€N\C{q) 
which is a contradiction. Hence such a A does not exist. 
Hence we have found that the dimension of the linear hull of the row vectors of the 
matrix in figure 2.3.1 without the last row vector is n. Let d\ be the dimension of 
the linear hull of the row vectors of ^яв(д | ?),с(с) a °d d¡ the dimension of the linear 
hull of the vectors -e¡ , ji Ε N \ C(q). We show that dι + ¿2 = n. In view of 
the matrix in figure 2.3.1 we have that η < d\ + аг· If η < di + </г> then there is a 
λ E Шрв(А-<) x m"\c(»> such that 
Σ А,-(е,л,-і)+ Σ Ме;.о) = (о.о). 
içPB(A.q) J£N\C(q) 
while 
Σ
 XieiAPB(A,q),C{q) Φ О 
iePB(A.i) 
(clearly ΣίεΝ\σ(α) A/ejjv\c(») Φ ^). From figure 2.3.1 we obtain immediately that 
this is a contradiction. Hence η = di + d^. 
Clearly d2 = η — |C(ç)|. Hence di = |C(g)|. This is equivalent to the statement 
that the dimension of the affine hull of the row vectors of ApB<A,q),c<q) is equal to 
\C(q)\ - 1, or equivalent^ dim ( (А
РВ
(А
ІЧ
),С(
Я
))) = \C(q)\ - 1. • 
Theorem 2.3.2 has the following two consequences. 
COROLLARY 2.3.3 Let A be an m χ η matrix and let (q,a) E ext(QA). Then 
\PB{A,q)\>\C{q)\. 
COROLLARY 2.3.4 Let A be an m χ η matrix and let (q,a) E ext(Qji). Then 
(PB(A,y),C(y)) Φ (PB(A,q),C(q)) for all y e Δ„ \ {,}. 
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PROOF. By theorem 2.3.2 dim (V(ApB(A,q),c(q))) = l^(î)l — 1 which implies that 
there is exactly one hyperplane in Ш, "' that contains /P(ApB(A,q),c(q))· Hence there 
is exactly one solution (y,ß) in ^c(q) X IR of the equation ApB(A.q),C(q)1/ — ß^-C(q)· 
Clearly this is ( g c ( i ) l a ) . So if y is such that (PB(A,y),C(y)) = (PB(A,q)tC(q))t 
then (y,a) is a solution of the equation ApB{A,q),c(q)V — ß^c(q), ао that y = q
c
(q)- с 
The proof of theorem 2.3.2 also implies the following result which (in a slightly dif­
ferent form) was initially found by Vorob'ev (1958) and Kuhn (1961). 
COROLLARY 2.3.5 Let A be an m ж η matrix and (q,a) € ГО." x Ш» Then (q,a) € 
extfQ,^ if and only if there is a subset S of PB(A,q) with \S\ = \C(q)\ such that 
n.-\As.c(q) -!<:(,) 1 
'~ L l c ( f ) 0 J 
is nonsingular and (qc(t),<x) = D l(0,1). 
PROOF. From the proof of theorem 2.3.2 we obtain that (q, a) G ext(Q¿) if and only 
if the linear hull of the row vectors of Aps(A,q),c(q) bas dimension |C(?)|. The latter 
is true iff there is a subset S of PB(A,q) with \S\ = \C(q)\ such that the linear hull 
of the row vectors of Astc(q) has dimension |C(g)|. This is equivalent to saying that 
the linear hull of the row vectors of [ApB(A,q),c(q) ~^c(q)] has dimension |C(g)|. 
Evidently these vectors are linearly independent of (lc(q),0). Hence D as defined in 
the corollary is nonsingular. The rest of the proof follows immediately from the fact 
that D(qcW,a) = (0,1) α 
In view of corollary 2.3.4 an extreme point of QA is determined by a unique subset 
of (M, N). We now look for necessary and sufficient conditions for a subset (I, J) of 
(M, N) such that this subset determines an extreme point of QA- From theorem 2.3.2 
we obtain that the following condition is necessary: 
(CI) dim (V(AItJ)) = \J\ - 1. 
The following simple example, however, shows that (CI) is not sufficient. 
EXAMPLE 2.3.1 Consider the 2 x 3 matrix A := Then for (I, J) = 
2 2 
1 0 
({2,3}, {1,2}) we have that dim (V(A¡tj)) = 1 = "j\ - l7 However there is no q G Δ 2 
such that PB{A,q) — {2,3}. Hence in view of corollary 2.3.4 this pair (I, J) cannot 
correspond to an extreme point of QA-
The problem in example 2.3.1 arises because e\A > e^A and e\A > e$A so that e^A 
and e3A are dominated elements of the polytope V(A). 
Now in view of the problem in example 2.3.1 a good guess for a second condition is 
(C2) V(Ai j) is a maximal undominated subpolytope of V(AM.J)· 
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Indeed we have 
THEOREM 2.3.6 Let A be an m χ η matrix and ¡et (I, J) С (Μ, Ν). If (I, J) satisfies 
(CI) and (C2), then there is a (q, a) G ext(QA) such that I = PB(A, q) and J = C(q). 
PROOF. In view of lemma 1.5.5, (C2) implies the existence of a f G Δ„ with C(q) = J 
and a real number α such that H(q}, a) is a supporting hyperplane of the polytope 
~P(AM,J) containing the subpolytope V^Ajj). Hence 
eiAq = tiAjAjlj < c* for all ï G M 
and 
eiAq = e¡AM,jqj = a for all i G I. 
This implies I С PB(A,q). Since V(Aitj) is maximally undominated and 
V{ApB(Aiq),j) С V{AM,JT, we find I = PB(A,q). Then in view of (CI) and theorem 
2.3.2, we have that (ς,α) € ext(Q^). π 
Finally in this section we show: 
THEOREM 2.3.7 Let A be an m χ η matrix. Then there is one-to-one correspondence 
between the extreme points of QA and subsets of(M,N) that satisfy (CI) and (C2). 
PROOF. In view of corollary 2.3.4 and theorem 2.3.6 we only have to show that 
if (q,a) G ext(QA), then (PB(A,q),C(q)) satisfies (CI) and (C2). So let (q,a) G 
ext(QA). Then, by theorem 2.3.2, (PB(A,q),C(q)) satisfies (CI). Farther 
л л ί <a for all ¿ G M 
«А
м
,с{,)Чоы = е'АЧ \ =
 а
 for all г G PB(A, q) 
Hence V(A^PB(A,4),c{q))) С H(qciq),a) which is a supporting hyperplane of 
V(A(Mc(t)))· Consequently lemma 1.5.5 implies that V(A{PB(A,I),C{J))) i* *O un­
dominated subpolytope of V(AM,C(Ç)))· Take I С M such that PB(A,q) С I and 
^(•A(/,c(j))) is an undominated subpolytope of (Ам,с(с)))· Then lemma 1.5.5 im­
plies that there are a y G I R C ^ and a 7 G IR such that H(y,j) contains ^(^(/.CC«)))-
Since (PB(A,q),C(q)) satisfies (CI), we obtain that (ν,γ) = (g
c(g),or). However, 
then Р(Л(/,с(,))) С H(qCM,a), so that I С PB(A,q). Hence I = PB(A,q) and 
*P(A(PB(A,<I),C(<I))) is maximally undominated. This implies that (PB(A,q),C(q)) 
also satisfies (C2). • 
2.4 A METHOD FOR FINDING ALL EXTREME POINTS OF QA-
Theorem 2.3.6 in the previous section implicitly yields a method to find all extreme 
point of QA for an m χ η matrix A. From this theorem we obtain that the subsets 
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(I, J) of (M,N) that satisfy (CI) and (C2) determine all (q,a) G ext (QA). Here 
(qj,a) is the unique solution of Ajjy = y where (¡/,7) Ε Δ ; χ R, and qN^} — 0. 
Similarly all extieme points of Pg for an m χ η matrix В can be found. The algorithm 
of Winkels (1979) then tells how all equilibria of (A, B) can be determined. 
In this section we show that, if we modify condition (C2), then there is a third 
condition (C3) which (PB(A,q),C(q)) satisfies for every (q,a) G ext (QA) and that 
we may impose the three conditions, i.e. (CI), the modification of (C2) and (C3), 
upon subsets of (M,N) and still find all extreme points of QA- We first prove a 
lemma. 
LEMMA 2.4.1 Let A be an τη χ η matrix and let (I, J) С (Μ, Ν) satisfy (Cl) and 
(C2). If an element ofP(Ajiff) is dominated by some xA G ~P(A) with χ G Am, then 
xA G V(AIiN). 
PROOF. Since (I, J) satisfies (CI) and (C2), theorem 2.3.6 implies that there is 
(g, a) € ext(QA) such that I = PB(A, q) and J = C(q). Take ρ € Am with C(p) С /, 
so that pA G V^Aj^) (any element of V(Ajpf) can be writen like this). Suppose 
that χ G A
m
 is such that xA > pA and χ Α φ pA. Then xAq > pAq. However, since 
C(p) С I = PB(A,q), we find that xAq = pAq, and consequently C(x) С /· Hence 
xA G V(AIiN). a 
Now we can show: 
THEOREM 2.4.2 Let A be an m χ η matrix and let (q,ot) G CXÌ(QA)· Then there is 
an I С PB(A,q) such that (I,C(q)) satisfies (CI), 
(C2') V(Ajic(q)) is an undominated subpolytope ofV(AMc(i))i 
and 
(CS) V(AIIN) is an undominated subpolytope ofV{A). 
PROOF. In the proof of theorem 2.3.6 we showed that (q, a) G ext(Qyt) implies that 
{PB(A,q),C(q)) satisfies (CI) and (C2). 
It follows that (PB(A, q), C(q)) also satisfies (CI) and (C2 '). Hence if V(APB(A,q),N) 
is an undominated subpolytope of V(A), then (PB(A,q),C(q)) satisfies (Cl), (C2 ') 
and (C3) and we have finished the proof. So suppose V(APB(A,I),N) ІЗ no*· ^ u n " 
dominated subpolytope of V(A). 
Then we find that pA with ρ := \p¿h л\ ЛІСРВ(А a)е» *s dominated in T(A). By 
lemma 2.4.1, pA can only be dominated by an element of V(APB(A,I),N)> 8аУ χΑ, 
with χ G A
m
 and C{x) С PB(A,q). Without loss of generality we may suppose that 
xA lies in some maximal undominated polytope of V(APB(A,I),N)> 8аУ (Аі^), for 
some I С PB(A,q). We show that (I,C(q)) satisfies (CI), ( c V ) and (C3). 
Since / С PB(A,q), it is immediately clear that (I,C(q)) satisfies (C2 '). Further if 
an element oíV{A¡s) is dominated in P(A), then, by lemma 2.4.1, it is dominated 
by an element of "Ρ(ΑΡΒ(Α,Ι),Ν)· Since by definition all elements of V(A¡tN) are un-
dominated in (Арв(А a\ N). we find that they are also undominated in V(A). Hence 
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(I,C(q)) also satisfies (C3). 
Finally we show that (I, C(q)) also satisfies (CI). Suppose not. Then dim ("PiAic^))) 
< |C(j)| —1 so that there is a hyperplane #(у
с
( ? ) ,7 ) , with y G Hlm, C{y) С C(?) and 
7 G IR, containing V(Aitc(q)), such that у is linearly independent of q. The latter 
implies that without loss of generality we may suppose that y G A
m
 and C(y) = C(q). 
Clearly V{A¡tn) С # ( y , 7). Then, since ^ ( Л / ^ ) is a maximal undominated subpoly­
tope of V(ApB(Aq)tN), lemma 1.6.8 implies that H(y,y) is a supporting hyperplane 
of P(APB(A,I),N)- Consequently, since C(y) = C(q), Я(у
с
(,),т) is a supporting 
hyperplane ОІ {А
Р
В{А
Л
),С{Ч))· S i n c e ((PB(A<9),C(q)) satisfies (CI), #( j
c ( i ) ,or) 
is the only hyperplane in IR "' that contains (Арв(л,і),с(і))· Hence there is an 
1' € PB(A,q)\I such that е,Лм,с(,)У
с
(») < 7· This impUes that рЛм,с(,)У
с
(4) < 7· 
Earlier in this proof we have constructed χ such that xA > pA. However from xAq = 
pAq we obtain that хА
м<С(ч) =рАм,с(1)- Consequently xAMc^yc^ < 7. On the 
other hand, however, we have that XAM,C(J) G V(A¡tc(4)) implies *-^M,C(í)í/c(t) = 7-
So we have a contradiction. Hence dim {V{Ajtc(t))) = \C(q)\ — 1. a 
Conversely we have: 
THEOREM 2.4.3 Lei A be an m x η matrix and lei (I, J) С (Μ, Ν). If (I, J) satisfies 
(CI) and (C2 '), then there is a (q,a) e ext (QA) such that I С PB(A,q) and 
J = C(q) and (qj,oc) is the unique solution of A¡jy = у in Aj X IR and qN.¿ = 0. 
PROOF. We can copy the first part of the proof of theorem 2.3.6 to show that there is 
(q, a) G QA such that I С PB(A,q). Obviously V(APB(A,t),j) С H{qJta) in ffi/ so 
that dim (ν(Αρ
Β
(
Αί
)^)) < \J\ — 1. Hence the fact that (J, J) satisfies (CI) implies 
that (PB(A, q), J) satisfies (CI). So by theorem 2.3.2 we have that (q, a) S ext (QA). 
Since (ƒ, J) satisfies (CI), we find that Ajtjy = 7 with (y, 7) G Δ/ χ Ш. has only one 
solution. Since I С PB(A,q), this solution is (g^or). Since J = C(q), qNKJ = 0 . α 
Combining the theorems 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 we find that the subsets (I, J) of (M, N) that 
satisfy (CI), (C2 ') and (C3) determine all extreme points of QA. 
Next we discuss how these conditions can be checked for a subset (I, J) of (M, N). 
(CI) Since after all we are discussing bimatrix games and A is the first matrix of 
such a game, we may suppose, in view of proposition 1.3.2, that A > 0. Then 
it is clear that if (q,a) £ (QA), then also a > 0. Then (CI) is equivalent to 
the condition that the rank of A is equal to J. This can be checked by means 
of pivoting. 
(C2 ') For a subset (/, J) of (M, N) we consider the following linear program (which, 
in a more elaborate form, also can be found in van Damme (1989), p. 49): 
μ{1,3) := max{xAMijl\j\ -pAM,A\j\}, 
where χ G lRm satisfies the constraints: 
X[AM.J lm - lm] > {pAMj,1,-1), χ > 0, 
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and where ρ := 4r Σϊζΐ e¡- Clearly μ(Ι, J) > 0 for every (ƒ, J), since ρ satisfies 
all constraints. 
Let us suppose that ß(I,J) > 0 for some (I, J). Then there is an optimal x° 
satisfying the constraints such that X°AM,J > рАм^ and x°AMj φ pAu,j-
The fact that z° satisfies the constraints implies that x° ξ A
m
, so that pA\ftj £ 
V(AM,JY- Then (C2) does not hold. 
If μ(ϊ,J) = 0, then clearly pAMJ G V(AM,JY• It follows from this that 
РИл-г) c "P(AM.J)*- SO then (C2 ') does hold. Hence we obtain that (I, J) 
satisfies (C2 ') if and only if μ(Ι, J) = 0. 
(C3) See(C2') · 
Let L С N. We leave it to the reader to check that (y,a) G ext(QyiM L) if and only 
if (q, or) G ext(QA) and qL = y and g „ u = 0 . 
By applying theorem 2.4.2 to AM,L this implies that we can replace the condition 
(C3) for a subset (I, J) of (M, N) by 
(C3 ') V(A¡IL) is an undominated subpolytope of V(AM,L) for all L С N. 
Rather than providing a detailed algorithm derived from the conditions (C1),(C2 ') 
and (C3) (or (C3 ')), we conclude this chapter with an example where all extreme 
points of QA for a 4 χ 3 matrix A are found. 
EXAMPLE 2.4.1 
4b¿£~ 
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Consider the 4 x 3 matrix 
"6 0 01 
A:= 3 3 0 2 3 2 
0 3 3. 
According to figure 2.4.1 (a) the polytope V(A) С ΠΙ3 has two maximally undomi-
nated subpolytopes, namely 7>(>1{і,2,з},{і12,з}) (the speckled triangle) and 
Р(Л{3і4},{ 1,2,3}) (the bold piece of line). 
In order to find all extreme equilibria we check for all subsets (I, J) of 
({1,2,3,4}, {1,2,3}) whether they satisfy (CI), (C2') and (C3). In view of (C3) we 
only have to check those subsets for which I С {1,2,3} or ƒ С {3,4}. 
J = {1,2,3} : From figure 2.4.1 (a) we learn that the only undominated subpolytope 
of V(A) (C2') with dimension 2 (CI) is Р(Л{і,2,з},{і,2,з})· Hence the 
unique solution (q, a) e Δ 3 χ Ш, of -<4{і,2,з},{і,2,з}? = α ' s * n e 0 ШУ e x " 
treme point of QA with C(q) = {1,2,3}. This solution is ((§, f, \ ) , ψ). 
J = {1,3} : From figure 2.4.1 (a) we learn that Р ^ і . г . з ^ ^ і . з } ) has the following 
undominated subpolytopes (C2 '): 
(А{і,з,4},{і,з)), P0A{i,3},{i,3}), ^(^{1,4},{i,3}) and V(A{3i4}t{li3}). 
In view of (C3) we only have to consider Р(Ац3) ,{і,з}) a n ^ 
P(./4{3,4},{i,3})· Both have dimension 1 (CI). Hence both lead to 
an extreme point of QA- These correspond to the unique solutions 
(q,a) G Δ{ι,3} χ IR of Л{і,3}{і,з}д = a and of -А{з,4},{і,з}в = " · 
However, as can also be seen in figure 2.4.1 (b), these solutions are 
the same. One may check that the corresponding extreme point is 
(q,a) = ( ( ì , 0 , | ) , 2 ) . The only one with C(q) = {1,3}. 
J = {1,2} : From figure 2.4.1 (c) we learn that the only undominated subpolytope 
of Р(Л{і,2,з,4},{і,2}) (C2 ') with dimension 1 (CI) is V(A{li2},{1,2]). 
Hence the unique solution (q, a) G Δ{ι,2} x IR of J4{I,2},{I,2? = α is 
the only extreme point of QA with C(q) = {1,2}. This solution is 
( ( i i 0 ) , 3 ) . 
J = {j}: For j £ {1,2,3} we find that an undominated subpolytope always 
consists of one point only (CI). For example in the case that j = 2 
we find that the point 7>(>4{2,з|4},{2}) is a n undominated subpoly­
tope of T ,(J4{II2,3,4},{I})· The extreme point in that case is of course 
(c2,3),where 3 is the largest number in the second column of A. The 
other two extreme points (for j = 1 and 3) are (ei,6) and (ез,3). Ob­
viously the standard basis vectors always come back in the extreme 
points of QA (one can also deduce this from the fact that QA contains 
10 Chapter 2: The eet of equilibria 
Δ3, keeping in mind that the standard basis vectors are the extreme 
points of Δ3). 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONCEPT OF 
STRICTLY PERFECTNESS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we focus on the special subclasses of equilibria for a birnatrix game 
that come from the concept of (strictly) perfectness. 
The idea of perfectness originates from Selten (1975). Selten imposes an extra condi-
tion on equilibria in order to select the more stable among all equilibria. The extra 
condition he imposes implies that an equilibrium must be stable against at least some 
perturbations of the strategy spaces. The equilibria that satisfy this condition are 
called perfect. Selten shows that every birnatrix game possesses a perfect equilib-
rium. 
Okada (1981) introduces equilibria that are stable against all perturbations of the 
strategy spaces. He calls such equilibria strictly perfect. However, not every birnatrix 
game possesses a strictly perfect equilibrium (see van Damme, 1987). 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) also require stability against all perturbations of the 
strategy spaces, not of a single equilibrium, but of a closed subset of the set of equilib-
ria. They show that every game possesses such a subset (which on historical grounds 
we shall call a strictly perfect set) and, what is more, even possesses one that is min-
imal with respect to inclusion. They call these minimal subsets stable. 
Besides existence Kohlberg and Mertens show that every stable set consists of perfect 
equilibria only, that each stable set corresponds to a strictly perfect set in any game 
that is obtained bv deleting a dominated pure strategy (a dominated strategy for a 
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player is a strategy which leads to worse payoffs than another strategy no matt« 
what the other player does) and that for each game there is a stable set lying within 
a maximally connected subset of the set of equilibria. 
The following sections are mainly devoted to the study of these 'stable sets' for bi-
matrix games. However, since Mertens (1989, 1991) and Hillas (1990) both introduce 
a new concept of stability and also use the term 'stable set' in the new context, we 
shall speak here of 'minimal strictly perfect sets'. 
In section 3.2 we give alternative definitions for the concept of (strictly) perfectness 
based on perturbations of the matrices of a bimatrix game rather than of the strategy 
spaces. This leads to bimatrix games that are perturbed in a special way. These 
games serve as tools for the proofs in sections 3.4-3.6. 
In section 3.3 we give some properties of the games with the perturbed matrices that 
we encountered in section 3.2. 
In section 3.4 we give examples of strictly perfect sets and show existence of a minimal 
strictly perfect set for each bimatrix game. 
In section 3.5 we show that every minimal strictly perfect set is finite. 
In the meanwhile we will have proved some results which enable us to describe the 
structure of the set of (strictly) perfect equilibria and 'the set of all minimal strictly 
perfect sets' in section 3.6. 
Most results in this chapter are adopted from Jansen, Jurg and Borm (1993). 
3.2 OLD AND NEW DEFINITIONS 
It is the aim of this section to show that for a bimatrix game the definition of the 
(strictly) perfectness concept can not only be given in terms of perturbed strategy 
spaces, but also in terms of perturbed matrices of the bimatrix game. The latter 
has the advantage that the resulting perturbed games are still bimatrix games and 
hence more manageable than games with perturbed strategy spaces which need not 
be bimatrix games. 
We start with the definitions as they appear in literature. 
First we define so-called 'mistake vectors' that determine the perturbation of the 
strategy spaces'. 
Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game. 
the name 'mistake vector' is widely spread in literature as Selten (1975) interpretes the 
perturbations of the strategy spaces as mistakes which the players could make 
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An element (e, 5) G Ш.т x ГО-" is called a mistake vector if 
m η 
e > 0 , 5 3 £j < 1 and Í > 0 ,53¿¿ < 1-
1=1 j = l 
For a mistake vector (c, δ) G Hlm χ IRn the game (A, B, e, 6) is defined to be the game 
which only differs from (A, B) in the sense that the strategy spaces are restricted to 
Δ « ( 0 := {Ρ G A
m
| p > e} and Δ
η
( ί ) := {q G Δ
η
| ς > δ). 
Now an equilibrium (p, g) for (A, B) is called 
perfect if there are a sequence {(ffc, ifc)}fcgM of mistake vectors converg­
ing 
Selten (1975) to zero and a sequence {(р*,?*)}*ем converging to (p,q) such 
that (p fc,qk) is an equilibrium of (A,B,ík,6k) for every jfc G IN. 
strictly perfect if for every sequence {(£*,А*)}*еГ4 of mistake vectors converging 
Okada (1981) to zero there is a sequence {(p*,Ç*)}*gN with (p, q) as a limit 
point, such that (pk,qk) is an equilibrium for (A,B,ek,6k) foi 
every ifc G IN. 
A subset S of E(A, B) is called 
strictly perfect if it is closed and if for any open set V D S there exists a neigh-
Kohlberg and bourhood U of zero in ГО,т χ Ш," such that for each mistake vector 
Mertens (1986) (f, δ) in U there exists a Nash equilibrium for (A, B, e, δ) that also 
lies in V. 
A strictly perfect set that does not properly contain another strictly perfect set is 
called minima/. 
Note that all three definitions are meaningless if a game with perturbed strategy 
spaces does not possess an equilibrium. For general strategic games where the strategy 
spaces and payoff functions are restricted by some conditions, the existence of an 
equilibrium can be shown using Brouwer's fixed point theorem. In our situation 
however (bimatrix games), we can simply apply lemma 3.2.2 below. 
The definition of a strictly perfect set can also be given in terms of sequences, as the 
following proposition shows. Note that it follows immediately from this proposition 
that all elements of a minimal strictly perfect set are perfect. 
PROPOSITION 3.2.1 Let (A,B) be an τη χ η bimatrix game and let S be a closed 
subset of the set of equilibria for (A,B). Then S is strictly perfect if and only >J 
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for every sequence {{ek, 6k)} ьс-ц of mistake vectors converging to zero there is a se­
quence {(pk, ç*)}teN W,'A a limit point in S such that (pk,qk) is an equilibrium fot 
(A, B, ek,6k) for every к £ IN. 
PROOF. First we show the 'only if' part. Let {(f',i')};»n be a sequence of mistake 
vectors converging to zero. Further, for Jb 6 IN, let Bi(p,q) be the open ball in 
IRm χ Ш," with center (p, q) and radius j and let 
Vk := {(x,y) G A
m
 χ Δ„ | (x,y) G Я А ( Р , ? ) for some (p,ç) G S}. 
Since S is strictly perfect we can find, for every Jb G IN, a neighbourhood Í/* of zero in 
IRm χ Ш" such that for all mistake vectors in t/jt there is an equilibrium for the game 
with the accordingly perturbed strategy spaces that abo lies in V¿. Obviously, for 
every jfc, there is an l(k) G IN such that (c'(*),i'(*)) G f/* and there is an equilibrium 
(¡r'COyC*)) for (v4,S,f'(*),¿'(*)) that also lies in Vk. Note that we can make sure 
that l(k + 1) > /(Jfc) for every Jfc. Further, by definition of Vt, there is an equilibrium 
(P*.9*) G S such that (i'(*),y'(*)) G Bi(pk,qk). Moreover, the fact that S is compact 
yields that the sequence {(pk, 5*)}itgM a n ^ hence also the sequence {(x'(k\ y'^)}kçl·^ 
has a limit point in 5 . Then we can construct a sequence {(z\y')}ieN which has a 
limit point in S and is such that (xl,yl) is an equilibrium for (A,B,tl,δ1) for every 
/GIN. 
Now we assume the statement after 'if and only if'. Suppose S is not strictly perfect. 
Then there is an open neighbourhood V of S such that in all open neihgbourhoods U 
of zero in IRm x E " there is a mistake vector (f, Ä) so that no equilibrium for (A, B, e, 6) 
lies in V. As above we define B\ (0,0) for A; G IN. Then for all Jfc G IN we can find a 
mistake vector (e*,¿*) G BA(0,0) such that no equilibrium for (A,B,ek,Sk) lies in V. 
For every Jfc we can take some arbitrary equilibrium (pk,qk) for (A,B,ek,6k). Since 
V is an open neighbourhood of the closed set S, {(pk,9*)}jfcglsi cannot have a limit 
point in 5 . This contradicts our assumption. Consequently S is strictly perfect. • 
Let (e,6) be a mistake vector. Then the game (A,B,c,6) is not a bimatrix game, 
since it has the wrong strategy spaces. However, it is equivalent to a bimatrix game 
(cf. theorem 2.4.3 in van Damme, 1987). In order to show this, we define the m χ η 
matrix A(6) by 
η 
eiA(6) := (1 -^26j)e¡A + (e¿,45)l„ for ζ G M 
i=i 
and the m χ η matrix B(t) by 
m 
B(e)e,· := (1 - £ > ) £ e , - + ( е В е , ) 1
т
 for j G Ν. 
1 = 1 
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We call the game (A(6),B(()) the (e,6)- perturbed game corresponding to (A, B). For 
(p, q) € Am x Δ
η
 we define the corresponding perturbed strategies 
PÍO- ( l -E£ i« )P+c €Д
т
(0, 
*(*):= ( 1 - E ; = I * Í ) Í + * €Δ„(ί). (3.2.1) 
The correspondence described in (3.2.1) yields in fact a one-to-one correspondence 
between strategy pairs in A
m
 x Δ„ and strategy pairs in A
m
(f) χ Δ
η
(<5). Moreover 
LEMMA 3.2.2 Let (A,B) be an τη χ η bimatrix game and let (c,¿) € IRTO x JRn be 
a mistake vector. Then (p(0iî(*)) '5 an equilibrium for the game (Α,Β,ε,δ) if and 
onlyif(p,q)€E{A(6),B{()). 
PROOF. The proof follows immediately from the equalities 
p(e)Aq{6) = p(e)A(6)q = (1 - ΣΤ= ι u)pA(6)q + eA(6)q and 
p(e)B«(¿) = pB(c)q(S) = (1 - Σ ; = Ι «і)рЯ(0в + РЯ(С)«. 
for (p,q)eA
m
 Χ Δ„. о 
Now let {(**ιδ*)}*€Μ be a sequence of mistake vectors converging to zero and let 
{(ρ*>ΐ*)}*εΝ be a sequence such that (pk,qk) is an equilibrium for (A,B,ek,6k) 
for every Jb € IN. Then {(ƒ>*,Ç*)}t€Ni uniquely determined by (p*(c*),í*(¿fc)) := 
(ρ*>?*) f°r every it, has the same limit points as {(р*,0*Жс1Ч, while (pk,qk) € 
E(A(6k),B(€k)) for every Jfe € IN by lemma 3.2.2. Hence in the definitions of a 
(strictly) perfect equilibrium and a strictly perfect set for (A, B) we can replace 
the game with the perturbed strategy spaces (A,B,€k,6k) by the perturbed game 
(A(6k),B(ek)) for every Jb £ IN. Hence we obtain: 
An equilibrium (p,q) for (A,B) is called 
perfect if there are a sequence {(e*, ¿*)}tgM of mistake vectors converg-
ing to zero and a sequence {(p*, ç*)}tgM converging to (p, q) such 
that (p\?*) G E{A(6k),B(ck)) for every * G IN. 
strictly perfect if for every sequence {(f*,Ä*)}jt£i4 of mistake vectors converging 
to zero there is a sequence {(p*,7*)}ieN with (Pi?) ω a limit 
point, such that (pk,qk) € E(A(6k), B(ek)) for every Jb € IN. 
A subset S of E(A, B) is called 
strictly perfect if 5 is closed and if for every sequence {(f*i¿*)}teM of mistake 
vectors converging to zero there is a sequence {(p*,9*)}*gN with 
a limit point in 5 such that (pk,qk) G E(A(6k),B(tk)) for every 
Jfc€lN. 
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Э.Э PROPERTIES OF PERTURBED GAMES 
For a bimatrix game and a mistake vector which is close enough to zero, the accord­
ingly perturbed game possesses some nice properties. This section is devoted to tw< 
of these properties. In order to show the first one we use a result of van Damm« 
(1987), but first we need a definition. 
Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game. An equilibrium (p, q) for (A, B) is called undominatti 
if pA G V(A)* and Bq G V(B)*. Recall that V(A) := conv {eyA,... ,emA} and 
analoguously P(B) := conv {Bei, . . . , Be„] (cf. section 2.3). Then we have 
THEOREM 3.3.1 [van Damme (1987)] An equilibrium for a bimatrix game is perfect ij 
and only if it is undominated. 
The first property we want to give is 
THEOREM 3.3.2 Let (A,B) be an τη χ η bimatrix game and let (e,6) be a mistakt 
vector. If (e,6) is close to zero, then all equilibria for (A(6),B(e)) are perfect. 
PROOF. In view of theorem 3.3.1 it suffices to show that every equilibrium (p,q) foi 
(A(6),B(t)) has the property pA(6) G V{A(6))* and B(e)q G V(B(c))*. In two steps 
we show pA(6) G V(A(6))*. 
(a) Let (p,q) be an equilibrium for (A(6),B(()). By definition q(6) G Δ„ and hence 
xA > pA and xA φ pA for some χ G A
m
 imply xAq{6) > pAq(6), or equivalently 
xA(6)q > pA(6)q. This contradicts the fact that (p,q) is an equilibrium. Hence there 
is no such χ G A
m
 which means pA G V(A)*. 
(b) Let U(A) := {I С M \ V(A,)N) С V(A)*}. By lemma 1.6.6, we can find for 
each I G U{Ä) a supporting hyperplane H{qI,a¡) of P(A) such that q1 G Δ
η
 and 
Р(Л/,Лг) С H(qI,aI). Now take 6 such that 
maxi. < min qi. 
Then for I G U(A) we have that 
y' :=(i-E¿;)~V-í) 
is an element of Δ
η
, q1 = ¡/(б) and 
e¡A(6)yl = СіАуЧб) = etAq' j | a j for i £ I 
a¡ for ϊ G /. 
The latter combined with lemma 1.6.6 implies that V(A(6)IiN) С V(A{6))*. Now for 
(P. «) € E(A(6), B(()) part (a) implies that pA G V(A)*. Consequently pA G V(A¡iN) 
for some I G U(A) so that pA(6) G V(A(6)rN) С V(A(6))*. о 
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Another property of a perturbed game is given in the lemma below, which helps 
to prove (in theorem 3.4.4) a relation between strictly perfect sets and persistent 
equilibria. Before we prove the lemma, we give some definitions. 
For an m χ η bimatrix game (A,B) a closed and convex set Л С A
m
 χ Δ
η
 is called 
an absorbing retract if there exists an open neighbourhood V of R such that for all 
(p> ϊ) £ V there exists a pair (p, ?) G Ä where ρ is a best reply to q and q is a best reply 
to p. An absorbing retract which does not properly contain another absorbing retract 
is called a persistent rttract. Kalai and Samet (1984) showed that every bimatrix 
game possesses a persistent retract and that every persistent retract contains an 
equilibrium. Equilibria contained in a persistent retract are called persistent equilibria. 
LEMMA 3.3.3 Let (A, B) be an m ж η bimatrix game and let R be an absorbing retract 
for (A, B). Then R is also an absorbing retract for (A(6), B(c)) for all mistake vectors 
(e, 6) close to zero. 
PROOF. Since R is an absorbing retract for (A,B), there is an open neighbourhood 
V of R such that R absorbs V in the game (A, B), i.e. for all (p, q) G V there is a pair 
(p,q) G R such that C(p) С PB(A,q) and C(q) С ΡΒ(Β,ρ). Let d be the metric on 
A
m
 χ Δ
η
 defined by the supremum norm and let for a positive real p, 
B,(R) := {(x, y) G A
m
 χ Δ
η
 | int · , ,^
 д
 {d((x, y), (p, q))} < ρ}. 
Since R is compact, we can choose ρ such that BP(R) С V. 
Let (c,6) be a mistake vector small enough such that m a x { ^ i l i f;, Σ?=ι fy) ^ \ρ 
and V(e,6) := {(ρ,g) e V |(p(e),«(¿)) € V} φ 0. Then, for (ρ,9) G R, (p(e),í(*)) e 
BP(R) С V. This implies (p,q) G V(e,6) and consequently R С V[e,6). 
Let ƒ be the continuous map from lRm χ E " into itself defined by f(x,y) := ((1 — 
Σ?=ι ei)x+{>(!-Σ)"=ι *»)»+*)• T h e n w e obtain that V(c, 6) is open, since V(e, δ) = 
Vnf-l(V). So if we show that R absorbs V(e,6) in the game (A(6), B(e)), the proof 
is complete. 
Take (p,q) G V(e,6). Then (p(e).«(<*)) G V. Since R absorbs V in the game {A,B), 
there is a pair (p,q) G R with C(p) С РЯ(Л,?(5)) and C(q) С ΡΒ(Β,ρ{ε)). Since 
е,Лд(5) = e,-i4(i)g for all » G M and р(с)Яе^ = pB(e)ej for all j ' G # , this implies 
C(p) С P S ( A ( 5 ) , Î ) and C(q) С РБ(В(е),р). So Я absorbs V(e,6) in the game 
(A(6),B(e)). 
3.4 EXAMPLES OF STRICTLY PERFECT SETS 
In this section we show that there are some particular strictly perfect sets that exist 
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for every bimatrix game. We also show that one of these includes a minimal strictlj 
perfect set that is finite. First we show 
LEMMA 3.4.1 Let (A, B) be anmxn bimatrix game. Let {(e l , ¿*)}*gi4 be a sequenct 
of mistake vectors converging io zero and let (p*, qk) G E(A(6k), S(e*)) for all І 6 І 
Then all limit points of {(p*,ì*)}*eN are equilibria for (A,B). 
PROOF. Without loss of generality we suppose that {(pk, ç*)}igN converges to (p, q). 
Since A m χ Δ„ is compact, we have (p, q) G Д
т
 χ Δ „ . Then, for large к, C(p) С 
C(pk) С PB{A(6k),qk) С PB(A,q) and C(q) С C(qk) С PB(B{ek),pk) С PB(B,p). 
Eence(p,q)eE(A,B). с 
From this lemma we obtain that each bimatrix game has a perfect equilibrium and 
that for each bimatrix game the set of equilibria is a strictly perfect set. Next we 
show that the set of extreme equilibria (as defined in section 2.3.) is strictly perfect. 
For a bimatrix game (A, B) we denote this set by £(A,B). 
THEOREM 3.4.2 The set of extreme equilibria for a bimatrix game is strictly perfect. 
PROOF. Let (A,B) be an m χ η bimatrix game. Let {(e*,^*)}*^ be a sequence of 
mistake vectors converging to zero and let (pk,qk) G S(A{6k),B(ek)) for all A G IN. 
Without loss of generality we suppose that {(pfc,?*)}teN converges to (p, q) G A
m
 χ 
Δ„. We show (p,q) G S (A, В). 
Throughout this proof we have multiplied, for convenience, the entries of A{6) by 
(i - 27=1 ij·)"1 a n d t h e e n t r i e s o f s ( f ) by (i - ΣΤ=ι£··)-1· 
In view of lemma 3.4.1 we have (p, q) £ E(A,B). Suppose (p, q) £ £(A,B). Then, 
since an extreme equilibrium is a zero dimensional face of a maximal Nash subset, 
theorem 2.2.6(ii) yields that there exists a strategy pair (ρ, q) φ (ρ, q) such that 
χ(ρ,ί) = x(p,q)· 
Then we can take p G conv {ρ, ρ} close enough to ρ such that 
max \pi - pi | < ¿ min i e c ( p ) p,·. 
Note that C(p) = C(p) and PB(B,p) = PB(B,p). Define 
Pk-=pk + (p-p)-
Then {p*}tgN converges to p. 
For t £ C(p) we find pk = p*. For i G C(p) and for large к we have pk > 
^min l ec(p)P/ > 0» a n d 3° Pi > 0· Hence C(pk) = C(pk) and pk G Д т for large 
Jfc. Consider for j G N 
p*S(e*) C i = р*В(е*)е,- + {p-p)B{ek)ej 
= р
к
В(€к)е, + (р-р)Ве^. 
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Since PB(B,p) = PB(B,p) D PB(B(ek),pk) for large k, we have that p*B(€*)er = 
pkB(tk)e, for all r,* € PB(B((k),pk). We show that, for large k, j $ PB(B((k),pk) 
implies j $ PB(B((k),pk). Let j 0 G PB(B(ck),pk) and j $ PB(B{ek),pk). We 
consider two cases, 
(i) j G PB(B,p) = PB(B,p). Then 
pkB(tk)e¡ - pkB((k)eh = р*Я(е*)е, + (ρ -р )Ве, - pkB(ck)ejo - ( ρ - р)Яе;-0 
= р
і
Я ( е к ) е
і
- р * Я ( е * ) е > І ) < 0 . 
(ii) j g ΡΒ(Β,ρ) = ΡΒ(Β,ρ). Then, for large Jfc, 
р
к
В(ек)е; -p*ß(e*)e>0 = р*В(<*)е, + (p-p)Se,· -р*Я(е*)е
І 0 
= (pBe,- - p ß e i o ) + (р*В(е*)е,· -рЯе,·) 
+ ( р Я
е
,
о
- р * Я ( £ * ) е ,
о
) < 0 , 
since the last two terms converge to zero as к goes to infinity. Hence (i) and (ii) imply 
PB(B(ck),pk) = PB(B(ek),pk). 
Similarly we construct a sequence { 5 * } *
Ε
Ν converging to q G conv {7,?}, such that 
qk G Δ„, C(qk) = C(qk), PB(A(6k),qk) = PB(A{Sk),qk) for large Jfc. Consequently 
we find that for Jfc large enough (pk,qk) is an equilibrium for (A(6k), B(ck)) and 
x(pk,qk) = x(pk,qk)· However, by construction (pk,qk) φ (pk,qk)· Therefore, using 
theorem 2.2.6 (ii) again, this contradicts the fact that (pk,qk) G £(A(6k),B(ck)). a 
Theorem 2.2.1 implies that the set of extreme equilibria is finite. Hence this set 
contains a minimal strictly perfect set, so that 
COROLLARY 3.4.3 Every bimatrix game possesses a minimal strictly perfect set. 
In view of lemma 3.4.1 there is at least one equilibrium for a bimatrix game that is 
perfect. According to theorem 3.3.1 an equilibrium is perfect iff it is undominated. 
The last property can be checked with help of the linear program in section 2.4 (in 
order to check condition (C2')). Since in that section we give a method to determine 
all extreme equilibria, we now abo have a method to determine all extreme equilibria 
that are perfect. 
The following example illustrates the results above. 
EXAMPLE 3.4.1 Consider the 2 x 5 bimatrix game (A,B) given by 
(A R\-\(1·-8) (°.°) (°·4) M (°·8) 
И ,
^ - 1 ( 0 , 8 ) (0,6) (1,4) (0,0) (1,-8) 
The maximal Nash subsets for this game are 
conv {±e
v
 + | e 2 > | e i + | e a } χ {e 2} and conv {§«i + \e2, | c i + \e2} x {e 4 }. 
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The minimal strictly perfect sets are 
Щ'
1 +
 f c 2> e 2) . ( | e i + | с 2.ег ) } . Ufa + f e
a
, e 2 ) , ( § e i + £ε 2 ,ε 4 )} and {(Ьі + le2-c2),(|ei + |e 2 (e 4)}. 
So every minimal strictly perfect set is a subset of £(A, B). Moreover, note that ever] 
minimal strictly perfect set contains the extreme equilibrium (£ei + f «2,^2) Clearlj 
this equilibrium is perfect. Note that (A, B) has no strictly perfect equilibrium. 
Next we show that the set of equilibria contained in an absorbing retract is strict!] 
perfect. A consequence of this is that a persistent retract always contains a minima 
strictly perfect set (remember that we show in the next section that the latter exists) 
THEOREM 3.4.4 For a bimairix game the set of equilibria in an absorbing retract i¡ 
strictly perfect. 
PROOF. Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and let R be an absorbing retrac! 
for (A,B). Let {((*,6*)}ιεΜ be a sequence of mistake vectors converging to zero 
For large к lemma 3.3.3 yields that Л is an absorbing retract for (A(6k),B(ek)} 
and hence R Π E(A(6k),B(ck)) φ 0. For large к take an equilibrium (pk,qk) foi 
(A(6k),B(ek)) that also lies in R. Then, since R is compact, we can construct г 
sequence {(p*,ï*)}*gN tb at has a limit point in R. By lemma 3.4.1 this limit point 
also lies in E(A,B). с 
For the game in example 3.4.1 every minimal strictly perfect set is contained in the 
set of extreme equilibria. In the next example the situation is different. Moreover il 
shows that the set of extreme equilibria in an absorbing retract need not be strict!) 
perfect. 
EXAMPLE 3.4.2 Consider the 3 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) given by 
(A,B) = 
(1,1) (0,1) (0,1) 
(1,0) (0,1) (0,2) 
(0,0) (1,0) (0,0) 
The maximal Nash subsets for this game are 
conv { ( e b ei), fa, e3), (ei, fa + fa)}, conv {(e3, ea), (e 3, e3), (e 3, fa + fa)}, 
conv {(ei, e3), ( e b fa + fa), (e 3, e3), (e 3, fa + fa)} 
and conv{(ci,e 3 ),(e 2 ,e 3 ),(e 3 ,e 3 )}. 
All minimal strictly perfect sets are 
{(Р.ез),(с 3,е 3)} with ρ € conv{e b e 2 } . 
A persistent retract for this game is 
conv{( |ei + | e 2 , e 3 ) , ( e 3 , e 3 ) } . 
Since this persistent retract is contained in the set of equilibria, it is strictly perfect by 
theorem 3.4.4. However, the intersection of this set with the set of extreme equilibria 
is ((ез. e3)), which is not a strictly perfect set, since it is a proper subset of a minimal 
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strictly perfect set. The only minimal strictly perfect set contained in the persistent 
retract consists of the two extreme points of the persistent retract. 
The next example of a strictly perfect set for a general bimatrix game is an essential 
set. The concept of essential equilibrium was one of the first refinements of the 
equilibrium concept. Wu Wen-tsiin and Jiang Jia-he (1962) define it as follows: 
On the class Λί^,χη of all m ж η bimatrix games a metric ρ can be defined by 
p((A, B), (A', B')) ~ max{||A - A'lU ЦЯ - B' | |„ } 
for two m χ η bimatrix games (A, B) and (Α',Β'). With respect to this metric open 
sets are defined. Now an equilibrium (p, q) for an m χ η bimatrix game (A, B) is called 
essential if for every open neighbourhood V of (p,q) there is an open neighbourhood 
U of (A, B) in the class of all m χ η bimatrix games so that E(A', В') П V ƒ 0 for all 
(Α',Β') e U. 
One can check that the 2 x 2 bimatrix game for which both payoff matrices have only 
zero entries does not possess an essential equilibrium. 
As for strictly perfectness also for this concept the set valued equivalent helps if one 
requires existence. Jiang Jia-he (1964) investigated the essentiality of closed subsets 
of the set of equilibria and showed that every bimatrix game possesses a connected 
subset of the set of equilibria that is essential (an essential set is defined in an obvious 
way). The same result is proved again by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and they 
use it to show existence of a strictly perfect set. This latter conclusion is easily 
understood if one notes that for a bimatrix game (A, B) and a mistake vector (e, 6) 
the game (A,B,c,6) corresponds to (A(6),B(c)) (according to lemma 3.2.2), which 
is a game with perturbed payoff matrices. Then following the definition of Kohlberg 
and Mertens for a strictly perfect set, it will be clear that an essential set is also 
strictly perfect. The converse is generally not true, since the perturbations of the 
strategy spaces do not cover all the perturbations of the matrices. So we have: 
THEOREM 2.4.5 For a bimatrix game an essential set is strictly perfect. 
In case of the 2 x 2 bimatrix game mentioned above (with the zero payoff matrices) 
the only essential set is the set of equilibria itself which is equal to Δ2 x Δ2. Further 
every single equilibrium for this game is strictly perfect (and hence a minimal strictly 
perfect set). 
3.5 FINITENESS OF MINIMAL STRICTLY PERFECT SETS 
In the previous section we found that each bimatrix game possesses a strictly perfect 
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set that is finite (theorem 3.4.2). In this section we show that each strictly perfect 
set contains a strictly perfect set which is finite. In particular this implies that foi 
bimatrix games every strictly perfect set contains a minimal strictly perfect set and 
that such a set is finite. 
Let (A, B) be an m Χ η bimatrix game. Let С be a strictly perfect set for (Л, B). 
For every face F of л maximal Nash subset for (A,B) such that relint(.F)nC φ 0 
we select a single equilibrium in relint(F). A set of equilibria selected in this way 
is called a selection for C. Since there are only finitely many faces for (A, B), each 
selection for С is finite. 
Using the techniques of the previous section we show that each selection for С is a 
strictly perfect set for (A, B). First we need a result on the convergence of faces for 
the perturbed games corresponding to (A,B). 
We start with the set Τ of nonempty closed subsets of A
m
 χ Δ
η
. Let d denote the 
metric on A
m
 χ Δ„ corresponding to the supremum norm. Then we can define the 
Hausdorff metric d¡¡ on Τ and since ( A
m
 χ Δ
η
, d) is a compact metric space, also 
(Ffdji) is a compact metric space (Hildenbrand (1974)). Furthermore 
LEMMA 3.5.1 [Hildenbrand (1974)] Lei the sequence {F*}jtçN converge to F in 
(ƒ",df{). Then (x,y) 6 F if and only if there is a sequence {{xk,yk)}ketit Ш*Л 
(χ*, ¡Λ) 6 Fk for every к € IN, that converges to (x,y). 
Now we prove a lemma for faces that is similar to theorem 3.4.2. 
LEMMA 3.5.2 Let (A,B) be anmxn bimatrix game. Let {(tk,6k)}heTi ¿e a sequence 
of mistake vectors converging to zero, and for all к £ IN, let Fk be a face of a maximal 
Nash subset for (A(6k),B(ek)). Suppose {Fk}kçfi converges in {Т,ац) to F. Then 
F is a face of a maximal Nash subset for (A, B). 
PROOF. Take (p,q) € F. By lemma 3.5.1 there is a sequence {(pfciî*)}tgHi such 
that (pk,qk) € Fk С E(A(6k),5(ek)) for all Jb, that converges to (p,q). By lemma 
3.4.1 we have (p,q) € E(A,B). Hence F С E(A,B). 
Since Fk is convex for all Jb, it is, using lemma 3.5.1, straightforward to show that 
F is convex. Consequently, by theorem 1.5.12 we can find a face F of a maximal 
Nash subset for (A, B) such that F С F and relint(F) П F φ 0. If we can show that 
relint(F)\.F = 0, then F = F and the proof is complete. 
So suppose Tt\mt{F)\F φ 0 and take \p,q) GreIint(F)\F and (x,y) £relint(F)ПF. 
Then coav{(x,y),(p,q)} Crehnt(F). Since F is closed and convex we can find a 
(p,q) € conv{(i ,y),(p,f)} such that conv {(p,q),(p,q)} П F = {(p,q)}. Since (p,q), 
(Р,ч) € relint (F), theorem 2.2.6(iii) implies x(p,q) = x(p,q)- In view of lemma 3.5.1 
we can find a sequence {(ρ*,ΐ*)}4€Ν with (pk,qk) € Fk for all k, converging to 
(p, q). Then, exactly as in the proof of theorem 3.4.2, we can construct (p,q) 6 
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conv{(p,9),(p,g)} —l\f H /lUnlVJl {(Р*.?*)}*еІЧ i n A m Χ Δ η converging to (p,q). 
Similarly we find that x(pk,qk) = x(pk,qk) for large Jt. Using theorem 2.2.6(iii), we 
then find (pk,qk) G Fk for large it and hence lemma 3.5.1 yields (p,q) E F. However, 
by construction (p,q) $ F. So we have a contradiction. α 
We need lemma 3.5.2 for the proof of the following result. 
THEOREM 3.5.3 Let С be a strictly perfect set for a bimatrix game and let Σ be a 
selection for C. Then Σ is a strictly perfect set. 
PROOF. Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and let С be a strictly perfect set 
for (A, B). Let Σ be a selection for С and let {(f*, 5fc)}fc
€
N be a sequence of mistake 
vectors converging to zero. Then there is a sequence {(p*, Ç*)}igi4 with a limit point 
(p,q) in С such that (pk,qk) G E(A(6k),B(ek)) for every к G IN. For every it 6 IN, 
let Fk be the face of a maximal Nash subset for (A(6k), B(ek)) such that (pk,qk) £ 
relint(.F*). Since (Τ,αΉ) is compact, we may suppose without loss of generality that 
Fk converges in (T,d¡j) to a closed subset F of Д
т
 χ Δ„. By lemma 3.5.2, F is a 
face of a maximal Nash subset for (A, B) and, by lemma 3.5.1, (p, q) G F. Let F be 
the face of a maximal Nash subset for (A, B) with (p, q) Grelint(F). Then F С F. 
This implies that 
{(P. $)} := relint (F) П Σ С F. (3.5.1) 
Hence, by lemma 3.5.1, there exists a sequence {(pk,qk))tçt*> 9 U c n that, for all k, 
{vkЛк) € Fk, which converges to (p, q). a 
Theorem 3.5.3 implies that for a bimatrix game every strictly perfect set contains a 
finite strictly perfect set. Hence 
THEOREM 3.5.4 For a bimatrix game every minimal strictly perfect sei is finite. 
We can abo use the lemmas 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 in order to decribe the structure of the 
set of perfect equilibria for a bimatrix game. 
THEOREM 3.5.5 For a bimatrix game the set of perfect equilibria is the union of 
(finitely many) faces of maximal Nash subsets. 
PROOF. Let (p, q) be a perfect equilibrium for a bimatrix game (A,B) and let F 
be the unique face of a maximal Nash subset for (A, B) such that (p, q) € relint(F) 
(corollary 1.5.13). We show that all elements of F are perfect equilibria. 
Since (p, q) is a perfect equilibrium, there are sequences {(с*,^*)}*см of mistake 
vectors converging to zero and {(p*,i*)}teN converging to (p, q) such that (p*,ç*) € 
E(A(6k),B(ek)) for every Jt € IN. For it G IN, let Fk be the face of a maximal Nash 
subset for (A(6k),B((k)) such that (pk,qk) G reUnt(#"fc). In view of lemma 3.5.2 
and the fact that (F,dji) is compact we may suppose without loss of generality that 
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{ F * } t e u converges in (T,du) to a face F of a maximal Nash subset for (A, B). Also 
by lemma 3.5.1 we have (p,q) € F and hence that F С F. This implies that for 
every (x,y) € f there exists a sequence {(x*,y*)}*gi4 converging to (x,y) such that 
(xk,yk) е Г С E(A(6k),B(ek)) for every k. Hence all equilibria contained in F are 
perfect. α 
Theorem 3.5.5 is first proved in Borm et al. (1993) using the equivalence between 
perfect and undominated equilibria (theorem 3.3.1). They introduce maximal Sellen 
subsets. A maximal Selten subset coincides with a face, consisting of perfect equilibria, 
and not properly contained in another face consisting of perfect equilibria. 
If ІРіЧ) is a strictly perfect equilibrium for a bimatrix game (A,B) and (p,q) G 
relint(F), where F is a face for (A,B), then by selecting (p, q) G F in (3.5.1) of the 
proof of theorem 3.5.3, one can show (similarly to the proof of theorem 3.5.3) that all 
elements of F are strictly perfect equilibria. Hence 
THEOREM 3.5.6 For a bimatrix game the set of strictly perfect equilibria, if non­
empty, is the finite union of faces of a maximal Nash subsets. 
An enthusiastic reader of this section might be tempted to introduce maximal Okada 
subsets. 
3.6 CARRIERS OF MINIMAL STRICTLY PERFECT SETS 
In this section we show that, although a bimatrix game may possess infinitely many 
minimal strictly perfect sets, one can distinguish only a finite number of essentially 
different minimal strictly perfect sets. 
Let 5 be a minimal strictly perfect set for a bimatrix game (A,B). If F is a face 
of a maximal Nash subset for (A, B) such that (z 1 , y1), (χ2, y2) e relint(F) Π S and 
(χ1,y1) φ {χ2, y2), then S\ {(x1,!/1)} is a selection for S, and hence, by theorem 
3.5.3, a strictly perfect set. Since this contradicts the assumption that 5 is a minimal 
strictly perfect set, for all faces F of a maximal Nash subset for (A, B) we have 
| re l int(F)nS|G{0, l} . 
We call the set Φ(5) of those faces for which the relative interior has exactly one point 
in common with S the carrier of S. 
LEMMA 3.6.1 Let S be a minimal strictly perfect set for a bimatrix game. If Σ is a 
selection for S, then Σ is a minimal strictly perfect set and Φ(Σ) = Φ(5). 
PROOF. Bv theorem 3.5.3, Σ is a strictly perfect set. Hence Σ contains a minimal 
Chapter 3: The concept of strictly perfectnet» 55 
strictly perfect set Σ'. Let 5 ' consist of those elements of S that he in the relative 
interior of a face F € Φ(Σ'). Then \S'\ = |Σ'| < |Σ| = |5 | . By definition 5' is a 
selection for Σ' and, in view of theorem 3.5.3, a strictly perfect set. Since S is a 
minimal strictly perfect set, we obtain S' = S. Hence Σ' = Σ and Σ is a minimal 
strictly perfect set. Evidently Φ(Σ) = Φ(5). D 
Since two minimal strictly perfect sets S and Τ are essentially the same if their carriers 
coincide, we say that 5 is equivalent with Τ and denote 5 ~ T, if $(S) = Φ(Τ). One 
easily checks that the relation ~ is an equivalence relation for minimal strictly perfect 
sets. Since there are finitely many faces for a bimatrix game, there are also finitely 
many carriers for minimal strictly perfect sets. Hence 
THEOREM 3.6.2 For a bimatrix game there are finitely many equivalence classes of 
minimal strictly perfect sets. 
In the following example we give all the carriers for a 3 x 3 bimatrix game. 
EXAMPLE 3.6.1 Consider the 3 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) given by 
(A,B) = 
(1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 
(2,0) (0,1) (0,2) 
(0,2) (2,1) (0,0) 
The maximal Nash subsets for this game are 
{
e i } χ conv{e3, - e i + - e 2 , - с г + - e 3 , - c 2 + - e 3 } 
and 
r 1 1 ì r i l i 
conv{ei, - e 2 + - e 3 } χ { - C l + - e 2 } . 
The minimal strictly perfect sets are all contained in the first maximal Nash subset 
which is of the type {ci} χ F (F is the dashed area in figure 3.6.1 (a)). The finitely 
many carriers of minimal strictly perfect sets are depicted in figures 3.6.1(b)-3.6.1(h). 
They are: 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(О 
¡g) 
[h) 
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In figure 3.6.1 one can see that some carriers are contained in other carriers: The 
carriers of figures 3.6.1.(b) and (d) contain all others. There is a general property 
which explains this: 
Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game, let F\,..., F, be faces of maximal Nash subsets for 
this game such that Φ := {F\,..., F,} is a carrier of a minimal strictly perfect set for 
(A,B). Then any set {( i i .y i ) , . . . , ( * „ J/,)}, where (*,·,»,·) G F< for i G {1, . . . ,β}, is 
strictly perfect (not necessarily minimal). 
This property follows from the fact that if we drop in the definition of a selection (see 
section 3.5) the restriction to choose an element in the relative interior of a face and 
just choose an arbitrary element of a face, theorem 3.5.3 still holds. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REFINEMENTS OF THE CONCEPTS OF 
PERFECT AND PROPER EQUILIBRIA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS 
The concept of perfect equilibrium (Selten (1975)) as defined in the previous section 
was refined by Myerson (1978) in the definition of proper equilibria. Whereas in 
the definition of perfect equilibrium the strategy spaces of the players are perturbed 
arbitrarily, the concept of proper equilibrium assumes a particular ordering of the 
perturbations'. 
By definition every proper equilibrium is also perfect. It is an open question whether 
a strictly perfect equilibrium, when it exists, is also proper. It is known, however, 
that not every minimal strictly perfect set contains a proper equilibrium (cf. example 
4.3.3). Myerson showed that every game possesses a proper equilibrium. 
Recently Garcia Jurado and Prada Sanchez (1989) defined equalized proper equilibria 
and gave a proof of existence. In this concept Myerson's definition is pushed further 
in the sense that further ordering of the perturbations is assumed. Besides the proper-
ness features it is assumed that each player puts equal probability on any two pure 
strategies that yield the same payoff, regardless of the actions of the opponent. 
whereas Selten interpretes the perturbations of the strategy spaces as mistakes which the 
players could make, Myerson assumes that more costly mistakes are made with less proba-
bility 
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In this chapter we study the latter assumption more generally. First we provide an­
other equivalent definition of a perfect equilibrium (cf. section 3.2). 
PROPOSITION 4.1.1 Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and let (p, q) G A
m
 χ Δ
η 
Then (p,q) is a perfect equilibrium for (A,B) if and only if there exist a sequena 
{ck}kçti of positive real numbers converging to zero and a sequence {(pk, qk)} kçH 1 
pairs of completely mixed strategies converging to (p, q), such that (pk, qk) is tk-perfec 
for (A, B) for all к G IN. Here, with e > 0, a pair (p, q) G Á m χ Δ„ is called e-perfec, 
for (A, B) if for all i,r £ M and j,s Ε N 
{ e¡Aq < erAq =• ρ,- < e pBej < рВе, => q, < е. 
A proof of proposition 4.1.1 can be found in van Damme (1987) (theorem 2.2.5), but 
one may also adjust the proof of lemma 4.3.5 in this chapter to obtain the result 
above. 
Proper equilibria are defined as follows: 
An equilibrium (p, q) for (A, B) is called proper if there exist a sequence {e*}igN 
of positive real numbers converging to zero and a sequence {(p*,5*)}tgivj of pairs ol 
completely mixed strategies converging to (p,q), such that (pk,qk) is c*-proper foi 
(A, B) for all к € IN. Here, with e > 0, a pair (p,q) G Á m χ Δ„ is called t-proper for 
(A, B) if for all ¿, r G M and j,s£N 
ƒ tiAq < erAq => p,- < cpr 
\ pBej < pBe, => qj < cq, 
In addition to the definition of an equalized proper equilibrium of Garcia Jurado and 
Prada Sanchez we give here also a definition of an equalized perfect equilibrium. 
Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game. A strategy pair (p, q) G A
m
 χ A„ is called 
equalized perfect (equalized proper) for (A, B), or shortly e-perfect (e-proper), if there 
sxist a sequence {c*}tgN of positive real numbers converging to zero and a sequence 
{(p*i9fc)}jteM of pairs of completely mixed strategies converging to (p, q), such that 
[pk,qk) is c*-perfect (e*-proper) and equalized for all fc G IN. Here, a pair (p,q) G 
A
m
 χ Δ
η
 is called equalized if 
e,i4 = е
г
Л =• p,· = p
r
 (i,r e M) (лц\ 
Btj = Be, =• qj = q, (j, s G Ν). 
Prom this definition it is immediately clear that e-proper implies e-perfect and that 
г-proper (e-perfect) implies proper (perfect). 
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Garcia Jurado and Prada Sanchez showed existence of e-proper equilibria. In the 
next section we provide a new proof of this fact. 
The following example shows that a proper equilibrium need not be e-perfect. 
EXAMPLE 4.1.1 Consider the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) given by 
М
о
Ь
[ ( 3 , 6 ) (0,6) (5,5)" 
И
· ^ - 1(0,0) (2,0) (5,5). 
Defining ck = T^j,qk = îqh-ез + r h ( | e i + | e 2 ) and pk = ^ e j + χ ^ ι , it is 
easily checked that (pk,qk) is f'-proper for all к > 1. Hence, (ег.ез) is a proper 
equilibrium for (A,B). However, ( e 2 ) e 3 ) is not e-perfect because all equalized and 
e-perfect strategy pairs (p, q) 6 Δ2 x Δ 3 must satisfy qi = 92» which implies that 
e2Aq < t\Aq and so pi < e. In fact the unique e-perfect (e-proper) equilibrium for 
(А,В)ів(е1,^е1 + \еі). 
In section 4.2 we assign to each bimatrix game a so-called 'equalized game' and prove 
that the perfect and proper equilibria for this game correspond to the e-perfect and 
e-proper equilibria for the original game. In view of the results of Selten (1975) 
and Myerson (1978) this settles existence for both new concepts. In section 4.3 the 
equalized game also helps to show thete always exists a persistent equilibrium that is 
e-proper. 
In section 4.2 we also define a stronger and a weaker version of e- proper and e-
perfect equilibria, respectively called 'iterated' e- proper and e- perfect equilibria and 
'weakly' e- proper and e- perfect equilibria. In section 4.3 we show that the stronger 
version does not nicely relate to persistent equilibria, but that the weaker version has 
an additional relation with respect to minimal strictly perfect sets. 
Finally in section 4.4 some remarks concerning structure are made. 
Most results in this chapter are based upon Jurg, Garcia Jurado and Borm (1989). 
4.2 EQUALIZED GAMES 
We begin this section with some definitions. 
For S С {1, · · ·, t} the vector e s € Ш* is defined by 
if kes 
0 otherwise. 
Ήί 
Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game. In this game two pure strategies e¿, er G Δ
η 
are called payoff equivalent for player I if е,Л = e
r
A (cf. (4.1.1)). The equivalence 
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classes of payoff equivalent pure strategies induce a partition {Μχ, M2, • • •, Мщ-} of 
the set M. Similarly one defines payoff equivalent pure strategies for player II and 
a partition {N1,JVj, ···, N„} of N. Furthermore, the m χ ñ equalized game (A, B) 
corresponding to (A, B) is defined by A = [apv]J¡Li "=i and В = [Ь^ «»]™=і "=i> where 
\Μμ\ μν„| " \Μμ\ \Ν„\ 
for all μ G {1, • · ·, m}_and ι/ G {1, • • • ,ñ} . Note that the pure strategy εμ G &m of 
the equalized game (A,B) corresponds to the barycentre of the equivalence class of 
pure strategies corresponding to Μμ. 
Let the mapping ƒ : A
m
 χ Δ
η
 —» Am x Ад- be defined by 
f(p,9) = (( Σ Л),е{і,-,й}.( Σ »)-е{і.-.ві)· ( 4 · 2 2 ) 
<€*f„ je;v„ 
Obviously ƒ is continuous. Further we introduce the sets Am С Am and Δ η С Δ η 
by 
_ е
м
' — e
N
" 
A
m
 := conv ( { — - } μ 6 { 1 ι •· ,m}) a11«1 Δη := conv ( { _ } „ e { l i . . . i H } ) (4.2.3) 
so that all e-perfect equilibria for (A,B) are contained in A
m
 χ Δ
η
. It is clear that 
the restriction ƒ of ƒ to Δ„, χ Δ„ is a bijection and has a continuous inverse ƒ 
With respect to Nash equilibria we now can formulate 
THEOREM 4.2.1 Lei (A,B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and ¡et f : Am Χ Δ„ —• 
Δτη x Δ η be defined asjnj4.2.2). Let (p,q) £Äm χ Δ
η
. Then (p,q) G E(A,B) if 
andonlyiff(p,q)eE(A,B). 
PROOF. Let ρ = Σ™=ι слЩ~Т ""* q = Σ"=ι ^"\Щ-
Define (χ, y) G Δ ^ χ Δ η by (ι, y) := f (ρ, q). Let μ G {1, · · ·, m} be fixed. Then 
« Λ = Σ"=ιΐί&Α№Σ,-€ΛΓ.ίί) 
= р^уЛд = e,Ac for all i G Afp. (4.2.4) 
It follows that μ G PB(A,y) if and only if Μμ С PB(A, q). Furthermore, since 
χμ = Σ ί 6 Α ί P¿ = εμ we have that μ G C(x) if and only if Μμ С C*(p). 
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This proves that C(p) С PB(A,q) if and only if C(i)_C PB(A~,y). Similarly one 
shows that C(q) С PB(B, p) if and only if C(y) С PB(B, z). a 
The requirement in theorem 4.2.1 that (p,q) G A
m
 χ Δ
η
 is a necessary one as the 
following example shows. 
EXAMPLE 4.2.1 Consider the 2 x 2 bimatrix game 
(A,B) = (1,0) (0,0) (1,0) (1.0) 
, it is also Clearly (^ci + ^ e 2,ei) is an equilibrium for (Л, Я). Since (A, B) = /?'0л 
clear that Εβ,Έ) = {(e 2 ,ei)}. Then / ( ( ^ ι + ^ , β χ ) ) = (fa + fa, e{) 0 E{A~, B). 
With respect to e-perfect and e-proper equilibria we have 
THEOREM 4.2.2 Lei (A, B) be an m χ η Ытаігіх дате. Let f : A
m
 χ Δ„ —• Δ ^ χ Δ^· 
be defined as in (4-2.2). Lei (p,q) G A
m
 x Δ„. Then 
(i) (p,q) із e-perfect for (A, B) if and only if f(p,q) if perfect for (A, B), 
(ii) (p,q) is e-proper for (A, B) if and only if f(p,q) is proper for (A, B). 
PROOF. We only prove (ii). First we demonstrate the 'only if'-part. Let (p, q) be 
e-proper for (A, B). Then we can find sequences {t*}fcçN of positive reals converging 
to zero and {(pk,qk))keN of pairs of completely mixed strategies converging to (p, q) 
such that (p*,?*) is e*-proper and equalized for all к G IN. Defining (x,y) := f{p,q) 
and (хк,ук) := f(pk,qk) for all Jb E Ш, it follows that (xk,yk) Ε Δ ^ Χ Δ ; for all 
Jb G IN and, by continuity of ƒ, (x k , yk) converges to (x, y). Let, for all к € IN, 
i*:=e fcmax{ max_ \Μμ\, max |7V„|} (4.2.5) 
/ í € { l , - , m } V6{ l , - ,ñ} 
We are finished if we can show that (x*, y*)_is improper for (A, B) for all Jt G IN. Let 
μ,p G {1, · • ·, m} be such that tliAyk < epAyk. Then eiAqk < erAqk for all i € Μμ 
and г G Mp (cf. (4.2.4)). Hence, pk < e*p* for all » G Μμ and г G Mp. Consequently, 
*î = Σ rf ^ f t i^i Σ ρ" = (k\M»\xì < *'*Ϊ· 
»€М„ r€Af, 
Similarly one finds that xkBe„ < xkBea implies that y* < 6ky* for all A G IN and 
ί/,σ G {1,·•·,»»}. _ 
Secondly we prove the 'if-part. Let (x,y) := f(p,q) be proper for (Л,В). Let 
{ f * b e N a n ( i {(ік>У*)}*бМ С Δητ x Δ η be sequences as required for the properness 
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of (z,y)· Defining (p*,î*) := ƒ (х*,У*) € Àm χ Δ
η
, the continuity of f implies 
that (ρ*, qk) converges to J~ (x, y) = (p, q). 
Let ¿* be defined as in (4.2.5). By definition (pk,qk) is equalized, so it suffices to 
show that (p*, qk) is improper for all Jb G IN. 
Let i, r G {1, • · •, m} be such that е.-Лд* < erAí*. For μ,ρ G {1, · · · ,m} with t' G Μμ 
and г € Л/,,, (4.5) implies that eMAyk < epAyk so i* < t*xj. Consequently, 
|Μ μ | |Λίμ| |Μ μ | ΙΜ,Ι 
Similarly one finds that ркВе, < pkBe, implies that qf < 6kqk for all Jk G IN and 
j,seN. a 
The existence of proper equilibria (Myerson (1978)) immediately implies the following 
COROLLARY 4.2.3 Every bimatrix game has at least one e-proper (and hence e-perfect) 
equilibrium. 
The results so far are illustrated in 
EXAMPLE 4.2.2 Consider the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A,B) of example 4.1.1. Then 
Tñ_=_ñ = 2,Λ/ι = {1},M 2 = {2},Ni = {1,2} and N2 = {3}. The equalized game 
(A, B) is given by 
-(4,6) (5,5)" 
L (LO) (5,5). (A,B) = 
It is easily checked that the unique perfect (proper) equilibrium for (A,~B) is (βχ,βι). 
Hence, ƒ (ei.ei) = (ej.^ei + ^e2) G Δ 2 χ Δ3 is the unique e-perfect (e-proper) 
equilibrium for (A,B). 
In example 4.1.1 it was shown that (е2,ез) is a proper equilibrium for (A,B). By 
theorem 4.2.1 we have /(e 2 ,e 3 ) = (e 2 ,e 2 ) G E(A,B). However, (e 2 ,e 2 ) is not proper. 
Theorem 4.2.2 makes it possible to further refine the concepts of e-proper and e-perfect 
equilibria. This is shown in the following 
EXAMPLE 4.2.3 Consider the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) given by 
1
 *
 ;
" 1(0,-1) (1,1) (2,0) 
The 1 x 3 equalized game (A, B) is given by 
( 3 , 5 ) = [(0,0) (1,0) (2,0)]. 
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Note that in (A,~B) player II has three equivalent pure strategies. So one might 
consider the l x l equalized game (A,~B) corresponding to (A,B) given by 
(ä,B) = [(i,o)]. 
Obviously {A, B) has only one (perfect and proper) equilibrium which corresponds 
to the e-proper equilibrium (^ei + ^ег, ^ei + §ег + ^ез) for (А, В). However, using 
theorem 4.2.2, one finds that (^e
x
 + \e2,q) is e-proper for (A,B) for all q G Δ 3 . 
Example 4.2.3 motivates the following definitions. Let g be the map that assigns to a 
bimatrix game the equalized game corresponding to it. As we have seen in example 
4.2.3 the map g can be applied iteratively more than once for a bimatrix game. If g 
is applied η times, then we denote this by gn. Clearly for each bimatrix game (A, B) 
there exists a number i such that д*(А, В) = gt+1(A, В). Then we call g*{A, B) the 
iterated equalized game corresponding to (A,B). Strategy pairs in the original game 
(A, B) will be called iterated e-perfect {iterated e-proper) if they correspond to perfect 
(proper) equilibria for the iterated equalized game. 
By definition, the existence of these equilibrium concepts is guaranteed and, clearly, 
iterated e-perfect (iterated e-proper) implies e-perfect (e-proper). However, example 
4.2.3 shows that converse of the last statement need not hold. Examples in the next 
section will show that for iterated e-proper and even iterated e-perfect equilibria there 
is not a nice relaton with persistent equilibria. 
Garcia Jurado (1989) introduced another modification of the properness concept, 
which can also be transfered to the perfectness concept: 
Let (A,B) be an m χ η bimatrix game. Then (p,q) € Am χ Δ„ is called weakly e-
proper (weakly e-perfect) for (A,B) if there exist sequences {e*}*gM of positive real 
numbers converging to zero and {(p*,i*)}ifceN of pairs of completely mixed strategies 
converging to (p,q) such that (pk,qk) is t*-proper (f*-perfect) and weakly-equalized 
for all к G IN. 
Here a pair (p, q) G A
m
 χ Δ„ is called weakly-equalized if for all i, г G M\PB(A, q) 
and all j,s G N\PB(B,p) we have 
e¡A = erA=> p, = pr 
Be, = Be, =» qj = q, 
By definition every e- perfect (e- proper) equilibrium is also weakly e- perfect (e-
proper). 
In the next we will see that there is a nice relation between minima] strictly perfect 
sets and weakly e- perfect equilibria which does not hold for e- perfect equilibria. 
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4.Э RELATIONS WITH OTHER REFINEMENTS 
In this section we use equalized games to show relations between e -proper and persie 
tent equilibria. Further we show a relation between weakly e-perfect equilibria anc 
minimal strictly perfect sets. 
Persistent equilibria were introduced by Kalai and Samet (1984). These are equilibri; 
contained in a persistent retract which, in turn, is a minimal absorbing retract. Foi 
definitions of these notions we refer to section 3.3. Here we include two results fron 
Kalai and Samet. 
LEMMA 4.3.1 [Kalai and Samet (1984)] 
(i) Every absorbing retract contains a persistent retract, 
(ii) Every persistent retract contains a proper equilibrium. 
For our purposes we abo need 
LEMMA 4.3.2 Let (A,B) be anmxn bimatrixgame and let ƒ : A
m
 χ Δ
η
 —• Δ^τΧΔ„ 
be defined as in (4-2.2). Let A C A
m
 χ Δ„ be an absorbing retract for (A,B). Then 
f(R) is an absorbing retract for (A, B). 
PROOF. It is easily checked that f(R) = T\ χ T¡ for two convex and closed sets 
T\ С Δτη" and Τι С Δ„- Since Л is an absorbing retract for (A, B) there exists an 
open neighbourhood V С Δ„, χ Δ
η
, V D R, such that for all (ρ, q) G V there existe 
a pair (p, q) G R with C(p) С PB(A, q)_aiidC(q) С ΡΒ(Β,ρ). 
Define V := V П (A
m
 χ Δ
η
) . Then /(V) = f(V) is an open set in Δ „ x Δ^- becaus« 
7 _ 1 is continuous. Since V D R we have f(V) D f(R). Let (x,y) £ f(y). Defining 
(Pi Ч) '•= f (Х>У) G V, there exists a pair (p,q) € R such that C(p) С PB(A, q) and 
C(q) С ΡΒ(Β,ρ). 
With (χ,у) j= fip.q) £ f(R) this implies (cf. (4.2.4)) that_(7(i) С PB(A,y) and 
C(y) С PB(B, x) . Hence, f(R) is an absorbing retract for (А, В). с 
Now we can provide a new proof for the following theorem of Garcia Jurado (1989). 
THEOREM 4.3.3 For a bimatrix game there is a persistent retract which contains an 
e-proper equilibrium. 
PROOF. Let (A,B) be an m χ η bimatrix game. Let R := Δ„, χ Δ
η
. Clearly R is 
an absorbing retract for (A,B). Using lemma 4.3.l(i), R contains a persistent retract 
Ρ for (A,B) and so, by lemma 4.3.2, f(P) is an absorbing retract for the equaUzed 
game (A, B). Lemma 4.3.1(ii) implies that f(P) contains a proper equilibrium (x,y) 
for (A~,B~). Since Ρ С Δ„, χ Δ~„ we have that ~f~ (χ,y) G Ρ and, by theorem 4.2.2, 
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~f~ (г, y) is an e-proper equilibrium for (A,B). a 
In some cases theorem 4.3.3 helps to find a proper and persistent equilibrium. For 
example in 
EXAMPLE 4.3.1 Consider the 3 x 3 bimatrix game 
(A,B):= 
(1,1) (0,2) (2,2) 
(1,3) (0,0) (2,0) 
L(1,0) (2,1) (1,1) 
Then 
(A,B) = (1,2) (1,1)1 (1.0) (§,1)J 
and the only undominated and hence only perfect equilibrium (cf. proposition 3.4) 
for this game is (e 2 ,e 2 ) . So the unique e-perfect and e-proper equilibrium for (A, B) 
is (e 3 ,^e 2 + ^сз)· By theorem 4.3.3 the uniqueness of this equilibrium implies that 
it is persistent. 
A direct consequence of theorem 4.3.3 is 
COROLLARY 4.3.4 Each bimatrix game has a persistent equilibrium which is also e-
proper 
The following example shows there need not be a persistent retract which contains 
an iterated e-proper, or even iterated e- perfect equilibrium. 
EXAMPLE 4.3.2 Consider the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) of example 4.2.3. The 
unique iterated ε-proper and unique itetated e- perfect equilibrium for this game is 
(г е і + 2e2> 3 e i + з е 2 + зез)> whereas the persistent retracts for (A,B) are the sets 
conv {e2, k i + U2) x {e2} \ { ( i e ! + j e 2 , e 2 ) } 
соп {е і , іе і + | е 2 } χ {ελ}\ { ( | е і + § е 2 , е 2 ) } 
and 
{è e i + èe2} * conv {e i ,е 2 }. 
Garcia Jurado (1989) showed that every persistent retract contains a weakly e- proper 
equilibrium. 
We now turn to examining the relations with minimal strictly perfect sets. Lemma 
4.3.1(H) and theorem 3.4.4 may give hope for the following result to be true: 'Every 
minimal strictly perfect set contains a proper equilibrium'. The following example 
shows that this is not the case. 
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EXAMPLE 4.3.3 Consider the 2 x 3 bimatrix game 
(A BÌ- \(2·-4) (°-2) (°-4) 1 
^
A
'
a>-[ (0,4) (0,2) (2,-4) J 
Then (^ei + j e 2 , e2) is the only proper equilibrium for (A, B) and the unique minima 
strictly perfect set is {(±ex + f e 2 , e 2 ) , ( f e i + £e2 ,e2)}. 
This example also rules out a nice relation between e- proper, iterated and weakly e-
proper equilibria on one side and persistent equilibria on the other side. However, is 
section 3.2 we already noted that every equilibrium contained in a minimal strictlj 
perfect set is perfect, so that one may wonder whether every minimal strictly perfect 
set contains an e- perfect equilibrium. The following example gives a negative answer, 
EXAMPLE 4.3.4 Consider the 2 x 5 bimatrix game 
KA,V)- | д 0 ) 3 ) ( 0 1 ) ( 0 _ 2 ) ( 0 2 ) ( 4 2 ) 
Then E(A,B) is the union of the maximal Nash subsets 
Ту := {\e
x
 + ¿ e 2 } x conv {±ex + £e5 , | e 2 + £е5,§е4 + | e 5 } 
and 
T2 := conv { f e i 4- \e2,ei} χ { e 3 } . 
All minimal strictly perfect sets consist of one point and lie within 7Ί. Since 
K
 ' >~ 1(0,3) (0,1) (0,-2) (2,2) 
every e- perfect equilibrium for (A, B) lies in T2. 
In order to prove a relation between weakly e-perfect equilibria and minimal strictly 
perfect sets we first show that there is an alternative definition for these equilibria in 
terms of mistake vectors. 
LEMMA 4.3.5 Let (A,B) be an m χ η bimairix game. Then (p,q) is a weakly e-
perfect equilibrium for (A, B) if and only if there are a sequence of mistake vectors 
{(e t ,Ä f c)} t eisj converging to zero and a sequence {(pk,qk)}kçTi converging to (p,q) 
such that, for every к G IN, (pk,qk) G E(A(6k),B({k)) and moreover for t,rG M and 
j,s£N 
ƒ e¡A = e rA => ek = c* 
\ Bej = Be, => Sf = 6k. 
PROOF, (a) Suppose (p, q) is a weakly e-perfect equilibrium for (A, B). Then there 
is a sequence {»7*}*εΓί °f positive real numbers converging to zero and a sequence 
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{(р'»$*)}*€М С Â m χ Δ„ converging to (p,q) such that, for every k G IN, (p*,?*) is 
j^-perfect and weakly equalized. For Jb G IN define (ек,6к) G ffl.m x ПГ by 
ek._ÌFÌ if i ¿РВ(А,чк) 
4
 ~ \ m i n r e M p í iíi€PB(A,qk) 
¿ t . = / í ? ÎÎJÏPB(B,pk) 
1 -
 \ min.gjv qk if j G PB(B,pk) ' 
Then the ij*-perfectness of (p*,î*) implies that (c*,¿*) is a mistake vector for large 
к and that {(f*,£*)}jfceN converges to zero. Moreover, since (pk,qk) is also weakly 
equalized for every к G IN, we find that c* = c* whenever e¡A = erA for i,r 6 M 
and 6j = ¿* whenever Bej = Be, for j , s £ N. So we are left with the construction 
of a sequence {(р*,9*)}*
е
м such that (pk,qk) G E(A(6k),B(ek)) (where (A(6k) and 
B(e*) are defined as in section 3.2) for every Jfc G IN which converges to (p,q). In 
order to achieve this we define, for к G IN, (pk, qk) by 
р*:=(1-5>Т -<*) 
r 
and 
ί*-(ΐ-Σ«Ϊ)"ν-«*)· 
Clearly {(p*,7*)KeN ·* a subset of A
m
 χ Δ
η
 and converges to (p,q). Let ife G IN 
and take t G C(p*). Then pk > 0, so that, by definition of pfc, pf > ek. By the 
definition of ek this implies that t G PB(A, qk). One easily checks that the definition 
of ς* implies that PB{A(6k),qk) = PB{A,qk). Hence we find i G PB(A(6k),qk). 
So we have proved that C(pk) С PB(A(6k),qk). Similarly one shows that C(qk) С 
PB(B(ek),pk). 
(b) Now suppose that we can find sequences {(с*,^*)}*еіч of mistake vectors con­
verging to zero and {(ρ*, ΐ*)}*6Ν satisfying all conditions in the theorem. For Jfc G IN 
let nk := max{maxígAf cf .maXjgjv^}. Then {»7*}jbeM is a sequence of positive real 
numbers converging to zero. Moreover, for it G IN, let pk := pk(ek) and qk := qk(6k). 
Then {(ρ*,9*)}*
€
Ν С À m x Δ„ converges to (p,q). 
Now let Jb G IN. Suppose for ¿,r G M we have е.Лд* < e
r
Aqk. By the defini­
tion of qk this is equivalent to e¡A(6k)qk < erA(6k)qk. Hence pk = 0, so that 
P¡ = Pk(tk)¡ = ek < 77*. Similarly if e¡Aqk = erAqk and i,r $ PB(A,qk), then 
# = « ? = « ? = # • 
The other implications needed for the rç'-perfectness of (pk,qk) follow similarly. α 
THEOREM 4.3.6 For a Ытаігіі game every minimal strictly perfect set contains a 
weakly e-perfect equilibrium. 
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PROOF. Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and let S be minimal strictly per­
fect set for (A,B). We can construct a sequence {(f*,¿*)}t€]N °f mistake vectors 
converging to zero such that for ¿ G IN for i,г G M and j,s £ Ν 
et A = e
r
A :*· e¡ = ek and Be,· = Be, =*6k =6k. 
Since Am χ Δ„ is compact, any sequence {(p*,î*)}tgM such that (pk,qk) € 
E(A(6k), B(ek)) for every к G IN has a limit point in Д
т
 χ Δ„. By lemma 4.3.5 such 
a limit point is a weakly e-perfect equilibrium and since 5 is a minimal strictly perfect 
set, at least one of these limit points is an element of S. a 
4.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE SETS OF e-PERFECT, ITERATED AND 
WEAKLY e-PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
We end this chapter with some remarks on structure problems. With respect to the 
structure of the set of e-perfect equilibria we obtain from theorem 4.2.2(i) and theorem 
3.5.5 the following result. 
THEOREM 4.1.1 The set of e-perfect equilibria for a bimatrix game is the union of 
finitely many polytopes. 
The reader should note that the set of e-perfect equilibria is generally not the finite 
union of faces of maximal Nash subsets. Examples confirming this are e.g. examples 
4.1.1, 4.2.1 and 4.3.1. It will be clear that theorem 4.4.1 abo holds if 'e- perfect' is 
replaced by 'iterated e-perfect'. The set of iterated e- perfect equilibria is contained 
in the set of e- perfect equilibria. 
The set of e-perfect equilibria is contained in the set of weakly e-perfect equilibria. The 
latter set has a stucture that resembles the structure of the set of perfect equilibria. 
Using lemma 4.3.5 and following, mutatis mutandis, the proof of theorem 3.5.5 one 
can show the following result. 
THEOREM 4.3.9 The set of weakly e-perfect equilibria is the union of finitely many 
faces of maximal Nash subsets. 
A consequence of theorem 4.3.9 is that, since e- perfectness implies weakly e- perfect-
ness, all equilibria in a face of a maximal Nash subset of which the relative interior 
contains an e-perfect equilibrium, are weakly e-perfect. 
CHAPTER 5 
COMPETELY MIXED AND PURE EQUILIBRIA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
ID this chapter we are concerned with two extreme types of equilibria for bimatrix 
games: completely mixed and pure equilibria. The investigations with respect to 
either type have a historical background in the theory of matrix games. 
In the theory of matrix games much attention is paid to games for which all equilibria 
are completeley mixed, i.e. completely mixed games . Kaplansky (1945) determined 
the value of an arbitrary matrix game by considering completely mixed subgames. 
Blackwell (1961) gave an alternative proof of the Perron-Frobenius theorem (cf. 
Gantmacher (1959)) by constructing special completely mixed games. Several authors 
studied the relationship between completely mixed matrix games and the eigenval-
ues of the involved matrix (e.g. Raghavan (1965), Weil (1968), Thompson and Weil 
(1969), Raghavan (1979)). Further Raghavan (1978) showed that many of the char-
acterizations of M-matrices mentioned in literature can be deduced from the theory 
of completely mixed matrix games and the Perron-Frobenius theorem. 
These results for completely mixed matrix games are a good motivation to consider 
completely mixed equilibria for bimatrix games. Raghavan (1970) extended the def-
inition of completely mixed matrix games to bimatrix games and found that a com-
pletely mixed bimatrix game possesses a unique equilibrium (see also Heuer (1975) 
and Parthasarathy and Raghavan (1971)). Earlier Kaplansky (1945) had proved sim-
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ilar results for matrix games. However, completely mixed bimatrix games do nol 
inherit all the properties of completely mixed matrix games. For example it is easy tc 
verify that if a matrix game A is completely mixed, then also the game —A is com-
pletely mixed. The following example shows that this need not be true for completer) 
mixed bimatrix games. 
EXAMPLE 5.1.1 Consider the 3 x 3 bimatrix game 
(A,B) = 
(1,0) (0,0) (0,1) 
(0,1) (1,0) (0,0) 
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) 
The game (A, B) is completely mixed, since the only equilibrium for this game ü 
((à> 5> з")>(зі a· h))· This strategy pair is also an equilibrium for (—A, —B), but it is 
not the only one. E.g. (еі.сг) is also an equilibrium for (—A,— B). 
In section 5.2 we define 'weakly completely mixed' bimatrix games. This definition 
is also an extension of the definition of 'completely mixed' for matrix games, but 
the games that result from this definition inherit more of the properties of com­
pletely mixed matrix games. In section 5.3 we consider the problem of constructing 
a (weakly) completely mixed bimatrix game if the completely mixed equilibrium is 
given. In section 5.4 we study topoligical properties of the class of weakly completely 
mixed bimatrix games. In section 5.5 we compare for some special weakly completely 
mixed games payoffs due to the completely mixed equilibrium with those due to other 
equilibria and with the eigenvalues of the matrices involved. 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to (the absence of) pure equilibria for bimatrix 
games. In Shapley (1964) conditions are given for the existence of pure equilibria for 
matrix games. Each of these conditions requires that every submatrix of some fixed 
size has a pure equilibrium. These conditions can easily be extended to bimatrix 
games, but what can be said about the existence of pure equilibria? One of Shapley's 
conditions is that every 2 x 2 subgame of an m χ η matrix game A, obtained by delet­
ing m — 2 pure strategies for player 1 and η — 2 pure strategies for player 2, has a pure 
equilibrium. The bimatrix game (A, B) in example 5.1.1 has no pure equilibrium, but 
every 2 x 2 subgame of (A, B) has a pure equilibrium. So this condition of Shapley is 
not sufficient for bimatrix games. 
In section 5.6 we recall some other results on pure equilibria for matrix games ap­
pearing in Shapley (1964). Furthermore we determine what remains of Shapley's 
conditions, when we consider bimatrix games. In section 5.7 we look at bimatrix 
games without a pure equilibrium. Such bimatrix games have a particular subgame 
which is called a fundamental subgame. We also consider a simplification of a bi­
matrix game, the so-called binary game and a graph that represents the profitable 
unilateral deviation of the players in the original bimatrix game. We will see that a 
Fundamental subgame of the binary game has to do with a cycle in that graph. In 
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section 5.8 we study the shape of fundamental subgames of (binary) games. We show 
that such a fundamental subgame of a binary game is (minimally) completely mixed 
and can be characterized as such. 
The results in this chapter are based upon Jurg et al. (1990) and Jurg et al. (1993). 
5.2 WEAKLY COMPLETELY MIXED ВІМЛТВЛХ GAMES 
As we have mentioned in section 5.1 a bimatrix game is called completely mixed if all 
equilibria for this game are completely mixed. We recall that an equilibrium (p, q) for 
an m χ η bimatrix game [A,B) is called completely mixed if (p, q) G Ä m χ Δ„. 
A bimatrix game is called weakly completely mixed if there is a maximal Nash subset 
for this game that consists of completely mixed equilibria only. 
Raghavan (1970) found that a completely mixed τη χ η bimatrix game (A, B) has 
the properties: m = n, гапк(А), гапк(Д) G {η — Ι,η} and \Ε(Α,Β)\ = 1. So a 
completely mixed bimatrix game has exactly one equilibrium, and hence one maximal 
Nash subset. This implies that a completely mixed bimatrix game is also weakly 
completely mixed. 
Translated in the terminology we use for bimatrix games, von Neumann (1928) showed 
that every matrix game has only one maximal Nash subset. This implies that a matrix 
game is weakly completely mixed if and only if it is completely mixed. 
In the following lemmas we prove some properties of weakly completely mixed bima­
trix games. 
LEMMA 5.2.1 A weakly completely mixed btmatnx game has exactly one completely 
mixed equilibrium 
PROOF. Let (p, q) be a completely mixed equilibrium for the weakly completely 
mixed m χ η bimatrix game (А, В). Then C(p) = M and C(q) = N. Hence also 
PB{A,q) = M and PB(B,p) = N, so that
 X(p,q) = (Μ,Ν,Ν,Μ). So all completely 
mixed equilibria for (A, B) have the same characteristic quartet. In view of theorem 
2.2.6 (iii) this implies that all completely mixed equilibria lie in the relative interior 
of the same face F of a maximal Nash subset for (A,B). Since (A, B) is weakly 
completely mixed, F is a maximal Nash subset and relint(F) = F. Hence |F | = 1. a 
LEMMA 5.2.2 Lei (A,B) be anmxn btmatnx game thai is weakly completely mixed. 
Then m = n. If moreover all entries of A and В are nonnegative, then A and В are 
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nonsingular. 
PROOF. By lemma 5.2.1, the game (A,B) has a unique completely mixed equilib-
rium, say (p,q). By the definition of a weakly completely mixed game, {(p,q)} is a 
maximal Nash subset and hence (p,q) is an extreme equilibrium for (A,B). Then 
the characterization of extreme equilibria in theorem 2.3.1 yields (q,pAq) G ext(Q¿). 
Since PB(A,q) = M and C(q) = N, theorem 2.3.2 implies that dim( V(A)) = η - 1. 
This implies m>n. Similarly one can obtain n>m. Hence m = n. 
Actually dim( V(A)) = η — 1 means that there is only one hyperplane in IR" that 
contains V(A). Obviously this is H(q,pAq). If A is singular, then there is an y E Ш.п, 
у φ 0, such that Ay = 0. Consequently V(A) С H(y, 0), so that у = q and 0 = pAq. 
Suppose A has only nonnegative entries. Then not all entries of A can be zero, since 
this would imply dim( P(A)) — 0. Hence, since (p, q) is completely mixed, we obtain 
pAq > 0. Consequently A is nonsingular. Similarly, if В has only nonnegative entries, 
then В is nonsingular. • 
Results similar to lemmas 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 for matrix games can be found in Karlin 
(1959). 
With respect to lemma 5.2.2 it is noteworthy that, in view of proposition 1.3.2, we 
may always assume that both matrices of a (weakly completely mixed) bimatrix game 
have only nonnegative entries. 
Suppose (A, B) is a weakly completely mixed η ж η bimatrix game and that A and 
В have nonnegative entries. Let (p, q) be the unique completely mixed equilibrium 
for (A,B). Then Aq = (j>Aq)l
n
 and pB = (pBq)l„. Hence A^l» = (pAq)~lq and 
ІпА-Чп = (pAq)-l(ln • q) = {pAq)-\ so that q = ^ - ^ „ ( l , , ^ - 1 ^ ) - 1 . Similarly 
р = і
п
в-
1(і
п
в-
1
і
п
)-1. 
In view of these remarks and lemmas 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 we have 
THEOREM 5.2.3 Let (A, B) be a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game. Suppose all 
entries of A and В are nonnegative. Then 
(i) A and В are square, say η χ η, 
(it) A and В are nonsingular, 
(iii) all entries of both Ι , ,Β-^Ι,,Β- 1 ! , , )- 1 and Α^Ι^ΙηΑ-1^)-1 are positive. 
On the other hand we have 
THEOREM 5.2.4 Let A and В be matrices satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) of theorem 5.2.3. 
Then (A,B) is a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game. 
PROOF. Let ç := UB-^UB-1!*)-1 and let q := ^ - ^ „ ( l , , ^ - 1 ^ ) - 1 . Then 
(P.Q) € Δ„ χ Δ„. Further aAa = ( 1 „ Л _ 1 1
П
) _ 1 for all i G N and 
Chapter S: Completely mixed and pure equilibria 73 
pBej = ( 1
η
Β
- 1 1 „ ) - 1 for all j G N. Hence (p, q) is a completely mixed equilibrium 
for the game (A,B). Since A and В are nonsingular, and ΣΓ=ιΡ· = ΣΓ=ι ?· = li 
(p, ç) is the only completely mixed equilibrium. Moreover, (p, q) is isolated or else 
other completely mixed equilibria exist. So we obtain that {(p, q)} is a maximal Nash 
subset. Hence (A, B) is weakly completely mixed. с 
Theorems 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 together form a characterization of weakly completely mixed 
bimatrix games. Note that both theorems also hold if (iii) is replaced by 'all entries 
of both l
n
S - 1 and Л - 1 1 „ are positive'. 
Next we sum up some consequences of the two theorems above. 
COROLLARY 5.2.5 If (A, B) is a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game, then also 
(—A,—B) is weakly completely mixed. 
PROOF. Let {A, B) be a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game. We add to both A 
and В a matrix С of the same size of which all entries are equal to the same positive 
real number and which makes that the resulting matrices are nonnegative. Then, by 
proposition 1.3.2, the game (A + C,B + C) has the same equilibrium set as (A, B) and 
hence is weakly completely mixed. This implies that A + С and В + C satisfy (i), (ii) 
and (iii) of theorem 5.2.3. Consequently also — A — С and — В — С satisfy (i), (ii) and 
(iii) of theorem 5.2.3, so that, by theorem 5.2.4, (—А—С, —B—C) is weakly completely 
mixed. Then proposition 1.3.2 implies that (—A, —B) is also weakly completely mixed 
• 
COROLLARY 5.2.6 [Karlin (1959)] If A is a completely mixed matrix game, then also 
A* is a completely mixed matrix game. 
PROOF. Let A be a completely mixed matrix game. Then (A,— A) is weakly com­
pletely mixed. If we let the players exchange roles we obtain the weakly completely 
mixed game (—A*,Af). By corollary 5.2.5 then also (A*,—A*) is weakly completely 
mixed, which proves the result. • 
For the next corollary we need a definition. 
An η χ η matrix Ρ obtained from the η χ π identity matrix by permuting its columns 
is called a permutation matrix. 
COROLLARY 5.2.7 If (А, В) is a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game, then the 
permuted game (P1AP2, P3BP4) is also weakly completely mixed, where P¡ is a per-
mutation matrix for all i. 
PROOF. We add to both A and В a matrix С of the same size, for which all entries 
are eaual to the same positive real number α and which makes that the resultine 
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matrices are nonnegative. Then, by proposition 1.3.2, the game (A + С, В + С) is 
weakly completely mixed. Consequently theorem 5.2.4 implies that A + C and В + C 
satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii) of theorem 5.2.3. 
Since for every t the matrix Pi is nonsingular, it is clear that Pi(A + C)P2 and 
Рз(В + C)P* are nonsingular. Let (p, q) be the completely mixed equilibrium for 
(A,B). Then 
Pi(A + C)P2(P2 _ 1c) = PiAq + PiCq = (PAq)Plln + t»Pil„ = (pAq + a)ln. 
This implies that (Pi(A + C)P2)~l\n = (pAq + a)~1P2~1q > 0, since q > 0 and a is 
larger than or equal to the absolute value of the smallest entry of A. Similarly one 
proves that (P3(B+C)P4)~1 > 0. 
Hence Pi(A + C)P2 and P3(B + C)PA satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii) of theorem 5.2.3. So, 
by theorem 5.2.4, the game (P\(A + C)P2,P3(B + C)P<) = (PiAP2 + С,P3BP4 + C) 
is weakly completely mixed. Then proposition 1.3.2 implies that (РіАР2,РзВР4) is 
weakly completely mixed. о 
The last property is in general not a property of completely mixed games, as the 
following example shows. 
EXAMPLE 5.2.1 Consider again the 3 x 3 bimatrix game (A,B) of example 5.1.1. 
Clearly A(= I the 3 x 3 identity matrix) and В themselves are permutation matrices. 
We let Л = P2 = I and P3 = PA = B. Then (ΙΑΙ,ΒΒΒ) = (I, I). Clearly (1,1) is 
not completely mixed, since (ei,ei) is an equilibrium for this game. 
Finally in this section we discuss perfect equilibria and (minimal) strictly perfect sets 
for weakly completely mixed games. First we show 
THEOREM 5.2.8 For a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game all equilibria are per­
fect. 
PROOF. Let (A, B) be an η χ η bimatrix game that is weakly completely mixed. Let 
(p, q) be the completely mixed equilibrium for (A, B). Then, since PB(A, q) = N, we 
obtain that V(A) С H(q,pAq). Since q > 0, lemma 1.6.6 implies that P(A) С V(A)'. 
Hence V(A) = V(A)*. Similarly we have V(B) = V(B)'. So for (p,q) G E(A,B) we 
have рЛ G V(A)' and Bq G V(B)* so that (p,q) is an undominated equilibrium. By 
proposition 3.3.1 this is equivalent to being perfect. • 
In theorem 5.2.8 the word 'perfect' cannot be replaced by 'strictly perfect', nor is 
every equilibrium for a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game an element of some 
minimal strictly perfect set. This is shown in 
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EXAMPLE 5.2.2 Consider the 3 ж 3 bimatrix game 
(A,B) = 
(4,4) (4,4) (0,2) 
(2,4) (3,0) (3,3) 
(4,0) (0,4) (4,3) 
Then£?(^o) = { ( ( ì ) ì , ì ) ) ( ì , ì , ì ) ) } U { ( ( 0 , i f ) , ( 0 , i f ) ) } U { c 1 } x conv{ C l ,e 2 } . 
Clearly (A, B) is weakly completely mixed. The two isolated equilibria are the only 
strictly perfect sets. These form also the only minimal strictly perfect sets. 
5.3 CONSTRUCTION OF WEAKLY COMPLETELY MIXED BIMATRIX GAMES 
From the previous section we learn that weakly completely mixed bimatrix games have 
square matrices and possess a unique completely mixed equilibrium. Furthermore 
completely mixed bimatrix games are weakly completely mixed games. It is then 
natural to ask the following questions. Given a pair (p, q) G Δ
η
 χ Δ „ , can we construct 
a weakly completely mixed η χ η bimatrix game for which (p, q) is an equilibrium? 
If we can do this, then under what conditions is the game completely mixed? We 
answer these questions in theorem 5.3.1 by constructing a special class of bimatrix 
games. Therefore we need the following definition. 
For t G IN a bijection JT : {1, ...,<}—» {1, . . . ,<} is called irreducible if there exists no 
proper subset I of { 1 , . . . ,r) such that τ(Ι) = I. 
THEOREM 5.3.1 Lei (p,q) G Δ„ χ A
n
 be given. Let w.N —* N be a bijeciton. Let A 
and В be the η χ η matrices defined by 
for all j , and 
Be, = pj xe, 
e,A = ΐ , ^ ε , φ ) 
for all i. Then the btmatnz game (A, B) is weakly completely mixed. It is completely 
mixed if and only if τ is irreducible. For all btjections τ the unique completely mixed 
equilibrium is {p,q). 
PROOF, (a) First we prove that (A, B) is weakly completely mixed. Note that A and 
В are nonsingular. In fact l„B~1e, = p¡ > 0 for all j , and e, i4 _ 1 ln = q, > 0 for all 
i. Then, by theorem 5.2.4 the game (A,B) is weakly completely mixed, 
(b) Secondly we show that (p,q) G E(A,B), or equivalently that (p,q) is the unique 
completely mixed equilibrium for (A, B). We have pBe¡ = 1 for all j and e¡Aq = 1 for 
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all ». Hence C{p) = PB(A,q) and C(q) = PB(B,p). Consequently (p,q) G E(A,B). 
(c) In the third step we prove that (A, B) is completely mixed for every irreducible 
•к. Let (x,y) € E(A,B). Then C(y) С ΡΒ(Β,χ) and C(x) С PB(A,y). Moreover 
PB(B,x) = {j £N | xBej = тяххВе
к
} 
= { j G ЛГ | x i P y 1 = maxxtpt *} 
and 
PB(A.y) = {ieN \ e¡Ay = maxekAy) 
= {«' e AT | у,м$) = m«№,(»)»;£)} 
с{»еі |т(0ес(у)}. 
Hence C(y) С {i G JV | JT(I') G C(y)} = {π_ 1(ι') G N\ i G C(y)}. Since π is a bijection 
we find ir(C(y)) = C(y). Now if π is irreducible this means C(y) = N. Thus we 
obtain N = C(y) С ΡΒ(Β,χ) С C(x). Or equivalently, (x,y) is completely mixed. 
Then, in view of part (a) and (b), we find (x,y) = (p,q)-
(d) Finally we have to prove that if (A, B) is a completely mixed game, then τ is 
irreducible. Suppose ir is not. Then there is a proper subset I oí N such that 
π(Ι) = I. Define (x, y) e A„ χ Δ„ by 
10 otherw ise 
and 
We obtain 
у
.
 =
 [(Е*6/9*)-Ч if ie / 
10 otherwise. 
10 otherwise 
and 
e¡Ay = ^2(eiAe,)q¡(^2qk) λ 
i€i tei 
ie/ t€/ 
= ( ( Σ * 6 / » ) ' 1 tfl'€J 
10 otherwise. 
And we see that C(x) = PB(A,y) and C(y) = PB(B,x), or equivalently, that 
(x>y) G E(A,B). By construction (*,y) is not completely mixed. This contradicts 
our assurrmtion. Hence τ must be irreducible. α 
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Note that in the proof of theorem 5.3.1 we have showed that for every equilibrium 
(x, y) for the game (A, B) defined in that theorem it holds that C(x) = PB(A, y) and 
C(y) = PB(B,x). In general an equilibrium for a bimatrix game with this property 
is called quasi-strong (Harsanyi, 1973). A bimatrix game for which all equilibria arc 
quasi-strong is called a quasi-strong bimatrix game (Jansen, 1987b). 
The game of theorem 5.3.1 is a quasi-strong bimatrix game. Such a bimatrix game 
has only finitely many equilibria. For let (x, y),(p,q) € E(A,B), where (A,B) is 
quasi-strong, be such that x(z,y) С x(p,q). Then C(x) С C(p) С PB(A,q) С 
PB(A,y) and C(y) С C{q) С ΡΒ(Β,ρ) С ΡΒ(Β,χ). Since C(x) = PB(A,y) and 
С (у) = ΡΒ(Β,χ), this implies that x(x,y) = x(p,q)· Then theorem 2.2.6 (iii) implies 
that (x,y) and (p, q) lie in the relative interior of the same face of a maximal Nash 
subset. This implies that every maximal Nash subset consists of one point. In view 
of theorem 2.2.6 (i) this proves our statement. 
Clearly all equilibria for a quasi-strong bimatrix game are isolated. Okada (1984) 
showed that an equilibrium that is quasi-strong and isolated is also strictly perfect. 
Hence 
PROPOSITION 5.3.2 The bimatrix games defined in theorem 5.3.1 have finitely many 
equilibria which are all strictly perfect. 
Example 5.2.2 shows that proposition 5.3.2 is generally invalid for weakly completely 
mixed bimatrix games. 
S.4 TOPOLOGICAL PROPERTIES 
In this section we will look at some topological aspects of the class of weakly com­
pletely mixed η χ η bimatrix games, denoted by W
n X n , as a subclass of the class 
M
nKn °f all η χ η bimatrix games. On MnXn we define the same metric d as in 
section 3.4. With respect to this metric we show 
THEOREM 5.4.1 Wnxn ÍS Open ІП Μηχη-
PROOF. Let (A, B) 6 Wnxn· We add to both A and В an η χ η matrix С of which all 
entries are equal to the same positive real number and which makes that the resulting 
matrices are nonnegative. From proposition 1.3.2 we obtain that (A + С, В + С) is 
weakly completely mixed. Then, by theorem 5.2.3, A + C and В +C are nonsingular. 
Then, since for any (Α',Β') eM
nxn
 we have that d((A,B),(A',B')) 
= d((A + C,B + C),(A' + C, B' + C)), we can find a positive real number e such that 
for all (Α',Β') e A ( L „ for which d((A,B),(A',B')) < e we have that A' + С and 
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B' + C are nonsingular. We have already seen that for the completely mixed equilib 
r ium(p, q) for (A,B) and hence for (A + C.B + C) we have ρ = l
n
B-1(l
n
B-1l
n
)-] 
and q = Л - 1 1 „ ( 1 „ Л - 1 1 „ ) - 1 . Since both vectors have only positive entries, we cai 
adjust e such that for all (Α',Β') £ Λ 4 2
χ η
 for which d((A, B), (A', B')) < € the vec 
tors 1„B'~ (1„B'~ 1„) and A'~ ln(lnA'~ 1„) also have only positive entries 
Hence, for such e theorem 5.2.4 implies that (A' + C,B' + C) and hence {A', B') ii 
weakly completely mixed for all (A', B') with d((A, B), (A', B')) < t. ι 
W
n X n is not dense in Λ ί
2
Χ η
, which follows from 
EXAMPLE 5.4.1 Consider the η χ η game 
(A,B) = 
(2,2) (1,1) 
(1,1) (0,0) 
(1,1) (0,0) 
(1.1) 
(0,0) 
(0,O)J 
{A,B) £ Wnxn> since E(A,B) = {(ci,ei)} and for a sufficiently small perturbation 
of this game the set of equilibria will not be changed. Hence there is a neighbourhood 
of (A, B) in which there exists no weakly completely mixed game. 
Now let ^
Х П
 be the class of all weakly completely mixed bimatrix games of which 
both matrices have only positive entries. For (A, B) £ VV "^xo and (p, q) the unique 
completely mixed equilibrium for (A,B), the strategies p, q and the payoffs are all 
infinitely many times continuously differentiable functions of A and B. Suppose that 
we choose e > 0 sufficiently small so that for F,G G M\xn with ||F||oo, UGH«, < с we 
have (A + F, В + G) € W^ x n . Then the Taylor expansion of the functions mentioned 
above yields the following formula's, where (p',q') is the unique completely mixed 
equilibrium of (A + F, В + G): 
Ρ' =P+(pGB-1l
n
)p-pGB-1 + 0 ( Í 2 ) , 
q' = q + (lnA-lFq)q - A~XFq + 0(e2), 
p\A + F)q' = pAq(l + \nA-lFq) + 0(62) , 
p'(B + G)q' = pBq{l + pGB~lln) + 0 ( t 2 ) . 
These expressions were already obtained for completely mixed matrix and bimatrix 
games in respectively Cohen (1986) and Cohen et al. (1989). 
and 
It is clear now that every η χ η bimatrix game sufficiently close to a weakly com­
pletely mixed к а т е of the same size has an equilibrium close to the completely mixed 
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equilibrium for the latter game (if necessary use proposition 1.3.2). This implies (cf. 
section 3.4) 
COROLLARY 5.4.2 For a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game the completely mixed 
equilibrium is essential (and hence strictly perfect). 
5.5 PAYOFFS AND EIGENVALUES 
In this section we compare the payoffs due to the completely mixed equilibrium for a 
special weakly completely mixed bimatrix game to those due to other equilibria and 
to the absolute values of the eigenvalues of the payoff matrices. 
In order to designate one of the special subclasses about which theorem 5.5.1 states 
some things, we need the following definition. 
A square matrix A is called reducible if there is a permutation matrix Ρ such that 
Г в Ol 
PAP = _
 n
 , where В and D are square matrices and 0 is a matrix with only 
zero entries. Otherwise A is called irreducible. 
Further in the proof of the following theorem we use the Perron-Frobenius theorem 
which says: "Every nonnegative irreducible η χ η matrix A has a positive eigenvalue 
Λ0 which is at least as large as the absolute value of any other eigenvalue. This 
eigenvalue is simple, and its eigenvector has all coordinates strictly of the same sign." 
(e.g. see Gantmacher (1959), ρ 53). 
THEOREM 5.5.1 Let A and В be two nonsingular η χ η matrices. 
If all entries of A-1 and B-1 are nonnegative, then (A,B) is weakly completely mixed 
and for both players the payoff due to the completely mixed equilibrium is smaller than 
the payoff due to any other equilibrium. 
If moreover A-1 and B~l are irreducible, then for both players the payoff due to the 
completely mixed equilibrium is smaller than the absolute value of any eigenvalue of 
the payoff matrix of the player in question. 
PROOF. Suppose A-1 and B'1 are nonnegative. Since both are nonsingular they 
cannot have a row or column with only zero entries. Hence J 4 _ 1 1 „ > 0 and l „ ö - 1 > 0 
so that in view of theorem 5.2.4 (A,B) is a weakly completely mixed bimatrix 
game. Let (p, q) be the completely mixed equilibrium for (A, B) and let (p, q) be 
another equilibrium. If PB(A,q) = N, then C(p) С PB(A,q), while obviously 
C(q) С N = ΡΒ(Β,ρ), so that (p,q) is an equilibrium for (A,B). Since this would 
imply that (p, q) is not the only completely mixed equilibrium for (A, B), we have 
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PB(A, q) φ N and pAq—e¡Aq > 0 for at least one i £ N. Hence for α := l„(pAq)—A<¡ 
we have α > 0 and α φ 0. Since A is nonsingular we find that A~la = A~lln(pAq)—<¡ 
and 1 „ J 4 - 1 > 0. Hence 0 < l„A~la = lnA~l\n(pAq) — 1. By a remark preceding 
theorem 5.2.3 we have pAq = ( 1 „ Λ - 1 1 „ ) - 1 so that (pAq)(pAq)~x > 1. Similarly on« 
shows (pBq^pBq)-1 > 1. 
Now moreover suppose that A-1 and B~l are irreducible. Let Л - 1 have «+1 eigenval­
ues denoted by Ao, λ ι , . . . , λ,. By the Perron-Frobenius theorem these can be ordered 
such that Ao > |Ai| > • · • > |A(|, where Ao is a positive real number. Let χ be a left 
eigenvector of A~l for the eigenvalue Ao- By the Perron-Frobenius theorem we may 
suppose χ > 0. So without loss of generality we may suppose that χ 6 Δ
η
. Then, foi 
ι' € { 0 , 1 , . . . , s), the Af1 are the eigenvalues for A with ordering AQ"1 < \X'^1\ < • • • < 
¡A"1! and xA = AQ"1!. Hence xAq = A0"1(i -q) < AQ"1, while on the other hand the 
fact that PB(A, q) = N implies that xAq = Σ?=ι xiei^9 = Ί2ΐ=ι X¡(P^4) = PAq. 
Hence pAq < XQ1 < |A^-ж| < •·• < |A~X|. Similarly one shows that pBq is smaller 
than the absolute value of any eigenvalue of В. с 
In the following example we show that the results of theorem 5.5.1 generally do not 
hold for weakly completely mixed games. 
EXAMPLE 5.5.1 Consider the 2 x 2 bimatrix game 
This game has three equilibria: ( ( j , | ) , ( j , j)), (c2iCi) and (еі.ег) with respective 
payoffs 2, 5 and 0 for both players. The eigenvalues of Л as well as В are 4 and —1. 
In the last example of this section we consider again the games of theorem 5.3.1. 
EXAMPLE 5.5.2 The η χ π bimatrix games of theorem 5.3.1 are defined by a completely 
mixed pair (p,q) € Δ„ χ Δ
η
 and a permutation η on N. Clearly the matrices of 
these games are nonsingular. The inverse matrices are equal to the transposed of the 
original ones where the ç,_1 are replaced by q¡ and the pjl by p,. Evidently these 
inverse matrices are nonnegative. By theorem 5.5.1 this implies that the games are 
weakly completely mixed and that for both players the payoff due to the completely 
mixed equilibrium is smaller than the payoff due to any other equilibrium. If it is 
irreducible, then the latter statement is trivially true. If τ is not irreducible, then 
we obtain from part (d) of the proof of theorem 5.3.1 that there is an equilibrium 
(x,y) φ (p,q) for (A,B) as defined over there. The payoffs due to this equilibrium 
are xAy = ( £ * £ ƒ Ç*)-1 > 1 = pAq and xBy = ( Σ έ 6 / Ρ * ) - 1 > 1 = pBq. So at least 
for this equilibrium the latter statement is true. 
Although A and В are not irreducible, the second statement of theorem 5.5.1 also 
holds for these games. Indeed the eigenvalues of A are the g,_1 and for В the p~l for 
all i, while pAq = 1 < q^1 and pBq = 1 < p,"1. 
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5.6 SHAPLEY'S PUKE SADDLE POINT THEOREMS 
In Shapley (1964) three results concerning pure saddle points ( pure equilibria) for 
matrix games are presented. In this section we investigate what remains of these 
results if we look at bimatrix games instead. First we define subgames. 
Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game. For non-empty subsets I of M and J of N 
we denote by (A, B)itj the subgame of (A, B) in which player 1 chooses an element 
ρ £ A
m
 with C(p) С I and player 2 chooses an element q 6 Δ„ with C(q) С J. 
For 1 < г < m and l < j < n a n r x s subgame of (A, B) is a subgame (A, B)jtj with 
\I\ = г and |J | = s. 
Shapley's results are condensed in the following two theorems. Before we present 
these we define detached rows and columns of a matrix A. A row of a matrix A is 
called detached if max;- a¡aj < max,^,0 min; a¿;·. A column jo of A is called detached 
if min,· а,-у0 > miiij¿j0 max,· a,j. 
THEOREM 5.6.1 Let A be an m χ η matrix game with m, η > 2. If every 2 x 2 subgame 
of A has a pure saddle point, then 
(i) A has a pure saddlepoint 
(it) A has at least one detached row or column. 
THEOREM 5.6.2 Let A be an τη χ η matrix game with m, η > 2 and with the property 
that no two collinear entries are equal. Let 2 < r < m and 2 < s < п. Then A has a 
pure saddle point if every r χ s subgame of A has a pure saddle point. 
Note that theorem 5.6.2 can be seen as a collection ofm — l x n — 1 theorems. 
We shall see in the following example that neither theorem 5.6.1 nor theorem 5.6.2 
can be extended for bimatrix games. 
EXAMPLE 5.6.1 Consider the 3 x 3 bimatrix game 
"(2, è) ( i 5) ( 1 , 1 ) 
(A,B)= ( U ) (3.Ì) (Ì.6) 
\7>') V ï ï ' ï â ) (*>4) -
With respect to theorem 5.6.1 first note that every 2 x 2 subgame of (A,B) has 
a pure equilibrium, where (A,B) itself has not. Further, (A,B) has no detached 
row or column, where in this case a column jo is called detached if тах,-
е
м 6, j0 < 
maxj¿,-0 тіп,
е
д/ b¡j (and where the definition of a detached row can be found above). 
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With respect to theorem 5.6.2 we note that all entries of A and В are different and 
that all 2 χ 3 and 3 x 2 subgames have a pure equilibrium. 
It may seem that the counter example of the previous section exhausts all possibilities 
of finding, for bimatrix games, a result of the type of theorems 5.6.1 and 5.6.2. How­
ever, the example above concerns a square game (m = π = 3), so that there remain 
some cases of theorem 5.6.2 still to be examined: if m < n, those are the cases where 
r = m and m < s < η. In theorem 5.6.3 we show that in those cases we can extend 
theorem 5.6.2 and even in such a way that the entries in the same row or column can 
be the same. 
We recall that a pure equilibrium for an m χ η bimatrix game (A, B) is a pair (e,·, e ; ) 
for some i G M and j G TV such that С(е.) С РВ(А,е
л
) and С(е>) С РВ(В,е{). 
This is equivalent to 
a.·,· = esAe¿ = таяхе^Ае: = max en, 
and 
6,·,· = e¡Be¡ = maxe¿5e; = тахб.-і 1
 ' íew UN 
THEOREM 5.6.3 Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game with m < n. Let m < s < η. 
Then (А, В) has a pure equilibrium if every τη χ s subgame of (A, В) has a pure 
equilibrium. 
PROOF. We show that if (A, B) has no pure equilibrium, then there is an m χ « 
subgame of {А, В) that has abo no pure equilibrium. So suppose (A, B) has no pure 
equilibrium. Then we can find for each i G M a j G N such that 6,¿ = max;ejv Ьц. 
Let J be the subset of Af consisting of these columns. Then |7 | < τη. If necessary we 
add to J arbitrary columns in order to have s columns. By J we denote the subset 
of N we have obtained in this way. Then (A,B)M,J is an m χ β subgame of (A, В). 
Suppose that (е<,е;) is an equilibrium for (A,B)M,J- Then a,-j = тах^€д/ a-kj and 
bij = maxi g j 6,-j = тахі6лг6,і since J С J. Hence (е,-,е7) is also an equilibrium for 
(A,B). a 
5.7 BIMATRIX GAMES WITHOUT A PURE EQUILIBRIUM 
The game in example 5.6.1 has a peculiar property: although the game itself has 
no pure equilibrium, every subgame of it does possess a pure equilibrium. More 
generally we call a (eub)game with this property fundamental : Let (A, B) be an 
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m ж η bimatrix game and let ƒ С M and J С N. We call the subgame (A, B)¡¿ 
of (A, B) fundamental, if firstly (A, B)¡tj has no pure equilibrium and secondly if foi 
every I' С I and J' С J with Ι' φ I or J' φ J the subgame (.A, B)/',j' does possess 
a pure equilibrium. 
Clearly a game without a pure equilibrium which is not fundamental has a subgame 
without a pure equilibrium. If this subgame again is not fundamental, then there if 
a subgame of this subgame whithout an equilibrium. Since bimatrix games have only 
finitely many subgames and a 2 χ 2 subgame without an equilibrium is fundamental 
by definition, continuing this line of reasoning leads to: 
THEOREM 5.7.1 Every bimatrix game without a pure equilibrium has a subgame thai 
is fundamental 
In this section we study fundamental subgames, but rather than looking at such 
subgames of a bimatrix game itself, we consider fundamental subgames of a simplified 
version of the bimatrix game, which we call, for obvious reasons, the binary game. 
To this binary game we will associate a graph. We show that particular cycles in this 
graph nicely relate to fundamental subgames. 
For an m χ η bimatrix game (A,B) the binary game (A*,B*) is defined by A* = 
№ i ?=i and B- = [б?,]^ ?
=1 with 
Í 1 if a{j = max akj 0 otherwise 
and (5.7.1) 
{ 1 if bij = max 6,/ 0 otherwise. 
Clearly (A*,B*) is a bimatrix game and an entry of (A*,B*) is either (0,0), (1,0), 
(0,1) or (1,1). Let ι € M and j € N. Then (e,-,e¿) is an equilibrium for (A, B) 
iff a¡j = max* α*j and b¡¡ = maxi¿,|. This holds iff (α*;-,6*;·) = (1,1). Due to the 
definition of A* and B* the latter is true iff (e,,e ;) is an equilibrium for (A*,B*). 
Hence 
THEOREM 5.7.2 Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game. Then a pure equilibrium for (A, B) 
is a pure equilibrium for (A*, B') and conversely. 
We associate to the binary game of the m χ η bimatrix game (A, B) a directed graph 
G(A*, B*). The points of this graph are the elements of Μ χ N. An arc in G(A*,B*) 
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is an ordered pair of points {{i,j),(i',j')) with the property 
e.Tj = 0, a¡.j, = 1 and j = j ' 
or (5.7.2) 
b¡j;=0,6^·, = l a n d t = t'. 
We say that the arc ((t, j), (»',ƒ)) fe""« (»Ί j) and entera (»',ƒ)· Clearly an arc either 
reflects a unilateral deviation of player 1 in order to increase his payoff (from 0 to 1 in 
the binary game, and from some value to the maximum possible value in the original 
bimatrix game) or a unilateral deviation of player 2 with a similar purpose. 
A sequence С := ((«'i,Ji),(»2іІ2)>·• -ι(ù,jt)) of ί > 1 points is called a cycle 
in G(A*,B*) if, for each s e { l , . . . , t - 1}, ((i,,j,),(i,+i,j,+i)) is an arc and 
((h,jt), (»l.ji)) is a n a1 0· We say that these arcs are arcs in С and for « G {1, . . . ,<} 
we call (i,,jt) a point of C. The thus defined graph can be represented by a picture 
of the entries of the binary game, with an arrow pointed from one entry to another if 
there exists an arc that leaves the first of these two entries and enters the second one. 
EXAMPLE 5.7.1 The binary game for the game of example 5.6.1 is 
(1,0) (0,1) (0,0) 
(0,0) (1,0) (0,1) 
(0,1) (0,0) (1,0) 
A representation of the graph associated to this game is: 
•C1,0) — • ( 0 , 1 ) -4 (0 ,0 ) 
figure 5.7.1 
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The black arrows in figure 3.1 represent the only cycle in the graph. 
For a cycle С we define 1(C) := {«| («', j) is a point of С for some j} and J(C) := 
{ІІ ('ι І) ' s a point of С for some »"}. Next we give some properties of cycles that help 
in the proof of theorem 5.7.5. 
LEMMA 5.7.3 Lei (A, B) be a bimatrix game and lei С be a cycle in G(A*,B*). Then 
(i) if(i,j) is a point ofC, ihen «,-,6*,.) e {(0,1),(1,0)}, 
(ii) for every i G 1(C) there is aje J (С) such that (а*,,6*,·) = (0,1), 
(tii) for every j G J (С) there is an i G 1(C) such that (a*,, 6*,·) = (1,0). 
PROOF. We only prove (i) and (ii). 
(i) Suppose that (i,j) is a point of С Then there is an arc that enters (i,j) and an 
arc that leaves (i,j). If (a*¿,i¿j) = (1.1), there is no arc that leaves (i,j) and if or 
(a*j,b*j) = (0,0), there is no arc that enters (i,j). 
(ii) Take i G 1(C). Then there is a j G J (С) such that (», j) is a point in C. According 
to (i), then either (α^-,ο*·) = (1,0) or (a*j,b*j) = (0,1). In the latter case the proof is 
completed. So suppose (oy.oy) = (1,0). Since (i,j) is a point of C, there is an arc 
in С that leaves (i, j). By definition of an arc this implies that there is j ' such that 
((i,j),(i,j')) is this arc and b*-, = 1. Since («',ƒ) is a point of C, (i) tells us that 
then a*j, = 0 . α 
The following lemma answers the question when we can expect a cycle. 
LEMMA 5.7.4 Let (A,B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and let I С M and J С N be 
nonempty. If(A*,B*)itj has no pure equilibrium, then there is a cycle С in G(A*, B*) 
such thai 1(C) С / and J(C) С J. 
PROOF. Let (A*,B*)¡tj have no pure equilibrium. Assume that there is no cycle 
С in G(A*,B·) such that /(С) С I and J(C) С J. Then there exists a point (i,j) 
with ¡ £ i and j £ J such that there is no arc which leaves (i,j) and enters some 
other point (i',j') with i' G I and j ' G J. Then, by the definition of an arc, α*;- = 0 
implies aj;· = 0 for all к G / and 6*^ · = 0 implies ft*, = 0 for all / G J. Hence, if 
a*j = 6*;· = 0, then α*;· = max l ç / ajy and b*j = maxje/t*,. Clearly these equalities 
also hold if a*j = 1 or b*j = 1. So (e,-,e¿) is an equilibrium for (A*,B*)itj. This 
contradicts our assumption. Hence there is a cycle С in G(A*,B*) with 1(C) С / 
and J(C) С J. a 
Let (A,B) be a bimatrix game. A cycle is С in G(A*,B*) called minima/ if for 
every cycle C' with 1(C) С 1(C) and J(C') С J(C) we have I(C') = 1(C) and 
J(C') = J(C). 
We now have: 
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THEOREM 5.7.5 Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game without an equilibrium ana 
let I С M and J С N be nonempty. Then (Α*,Β*)ι^ is a fundamental subgamt 
of (A*,B*) if and only if I = 1(C) and J — 3(C) for some minimal cycle С in 
G(A',B*). 
PROOF. First let (A*,B*)¡tj be a fundamental subgame of (A*,B*). Then 
(Л* , # * ) / , / has no pure equilibrium. Hence, by lemma 5.7.4, there is a cycle С in 
G(A*,B") such that /(С) С / and J(C) С J. Let С be a cycle in G(A*,B') such 
that I(C') С 1(C) and J(C') С J(C). Since (A*,B")Itj has no pure equilibrium, 
it has no entry (1,1). According to lemma 5.7.3 (ii) and (iii) if (A*,B*)¡^ci),j{c·) 
has a pure equilibrium, then it must correspond to an entry (1,1). Consequently 
( J 4 * , . B * ) / ( C ' ) , J ( C ) has no pure equilibrium. Since (A*,B*)itj is fundamental, this 
implies 1(C) = I and J(C') = J. Hence /(C) = 7 and J(C) = J and С is minimal. 
Secondly, let С be a minimal cycle in G(A*,B*). From lemma 5.7.3 (ii) and (iii) it 
follows that if (A*, S*)/(c),/(C) has a pure equilibrium, then it must correspond to 
an entry (1,1). Since, due to our assumption and theorem 5.7.2, (A*,B*) does not 
possess a pure equilibrium, an entry (1,1) does not occur. Hence (A*, B*)jrc),J(c) has 
no pure equilibrium. Now let I С 1(C), J С J(C) and Ι φ 1(C) and/or J φ J(C). 
Suppose (A*,B*)jtj has no pure equilibrium. Then, by lemma 5.7.4, there is a cycle 
C' in G(A*,B*) such that I(C') С I and J(C') С J. Since С is minimal, this is a 
contradiction. So (A*,B*)jtj has a pure equilibrium for every I С 1(C) and J С J(C) 
with Ι φ 1(C) от J φ J(C). This implies that (A*,B*)¡(C),j(c) и a fundamental 
subgame. • 
In the second part of the proof of theorem 5.7.5 we explicitly use the assumption that 
(A, B) has no pure equilibrium. The following example shows that this assumption 
is essential. 
EXAMPLE 5.7.2 Consider the 3 x 3 bimatrix game 
(A,B) = 
(1.0) (0,1) (0,0) 
(1.1) (1,0) (0,1) 
(0,1) (0,0) (1,0) 
Then (A*,B*) = (A,B) and the representation of G(A*,B*) is 
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( i .o) — • • (0,1) - 4 — ( 0 , 0 ) ^ ^ 
( I . I ) • * — (I.O) — • (0.1) 
Î t Ü 
(0,1) +— (0,0) u.oi*-^ 
figure 5.7.2 
Clearly С := ((1,1),(1,2),(2,2),(2,3),(3,3),(3,1)) is a minimal cycle in G(A*,B") 
(represented by the black arrows) and (A*,B*)j(C),j(c) = (A* ,B*). However, since 
(e2,ei) is an equilibrium for (A*,B*), this game is not a fundamental subgame. 
The following theorem tells something about the equivalent in the original game of a 
fundamental subgame of a binary game. 
THEOREM5.7.6 Lei (A,B) be anmxn bimatnx game without apure equilibrium and 
let I С M and J С N. If(A*,B')ilj is a fundamental subgame of (Α',Β*), then 
(A, B)¡tj has no pure equilibrium. 
PROOF. Let (A*,B*)itj be a fundamental subgame of (A*,B*). Then by theorem 
5.7.5 there is a minimal cycle С in G(A*,B*) such that 1(C) = I and J(C) = J. 
Then lemma 5.7.3 (ii) implies that for every i £ I there is a j £ J such that 6*· = 1. 
From (5.7.2) we find that this implies that for every i £ I there is a j € J such 
that bij = maxjçjv Ьц. Similarly we find that for every j € J there is an x' 6 I such 
that a,j = max*
€
Af ajtj• So if (A,B)ij has a pure equilibrium, then it is also a 
pure equilibrium for (A, B). Hence such an equilibrium would correspond to an entry 
(1,1) in the binary game. Since this entry would also be an entry of (A*, B*)jtj, the 
fundamental subgame would have an equilibrium, which is a contradiction. Hence 
(A, B)JJ does not possess a pure equilibrium. α 
Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and let J С M and J С N. Then (A, B)¡tj 
is called a primary fundamental subgame of (A,B) if (A,B)¡j is a fundamental 
subgame of (A, B) and moreover 
for j £ J : maxa,, = max a,,, 
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for i € / : max 6;,· = max 6,,. 
Then we have: 
THEOREM 5.7.7 Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game without a pure equilibrium 
and let I С M and J С N. Then 
(i) if (A,B)itj is a primary fundamental subgame of (А,В), then (A*,B*)itj is a 
fundamental subgame of (A*, В*), 
(ti) if (A*,B*)jtj is a fundamental subgame of (А*,В*) and (A,B)jtj is a funda­
mental subgame of (А, В), then (Α,Β)ι^ is a primary fundamental subgame. 
PROOF, (i) Let (A, B)r_j be a primary fundamental subgame of (A,B). Then by 
(5.7.1), for each j G J there is an t £ / such that α*;· = 1 and for each i £ / there 
is an j £ J such that 6*;- = 1. Hence if (A*,B*)jtj has a pure equilibrium, then its 
entry is equal to (1,1). Then (5.7.1) implies that (A,B)itj has a pure equilibrium 
which contradicts the fact that (A, B)¡tj is fundamental. Hence (A*, B*)¡j does not 
have a pure equilibrium. By theorem 5.7.1 this implies that there exist I' С I and 
J' С J such that (A*,B*)¡>tj> is a fundamental subgame of (A*, В*). Then theorem 
5.7.6 implies that (A, B)[itj· does not have a pure equilibrium. Since (A, B)itj is 
fundamental this implies that I' = I and J' = J. 
(ii) The proof of this fact follows immediately from the definitions. α 
Although every bimatrix game without an equilibrium has a fundamental subgame, 
not every bimatrix game without an equilibrium possesses a primary fundamental 
subgame: 
EXAMPLE 5.7.3 Consider t 
(A,B) = 
ie 5 χ 5 
г (M) 
(0,0) 
(è-?) 
(o,è) 
L(o,i) 
bimatr 
(0,1) 
(1,0) 
(o,|) 
α.ο) 
(ο,ο) 
ix game 
(0,0) (0,0) 
(0,1) (0,0) 
(1,0) (0,1) 
(0,0) (1,0) 
(0,0) (0,0) 
(0,0) 
(0,0) 
(0,0) 
(ο,ΐ) 
(ΐ,ο) 
The only fundamental subgame of this game the one with / = {3,4} and J = {1,2}, 
which is not primary. 
Combining lemma 5.7.3, theorem 5.7.5 and the definition of a primary fundamental 
subgame, we find that each fundamental subgame of a binary game of a bimatrix 
game is primary. This is a good reason to consider fundamental subgames of binary 
games rather than of general bimatrix games. 
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5.8 THE FUNDAMENTAL SUBGAME 
In this section we we take a closer look at the particular shape of a fundamental 
subgame. We do this using minimal cycles. 
Let (A, B) be an m χ η bimatrix game without a pure equilibrium and let ƒ С M 
and J С N be such that (A*,B*)itj is a fundamental subgame of (A*,B*). Then 
by theorem 5.7.5 there is a minimal cycle С in G(A*,B*) such that I = 1(C) and 
J = J(C). 
Take »Ι € 1(C). Then by the definition of a cycle, there is a j \ 6 J(C) such that 
(¿i, ji) is a point of C. In view of lemma 5.7.3(i) then either (α*
ι;·,,δ*,.·,) = (0,1) 
о г
 К;,. 6 Г,і і ) = ί 1 · 0 ) · Suppose that « , , Λ ^ ) = (0,1), then/in view of the 
definition of an arc, there is j ' e J(C) such that ((»i,j'),(i'i,ji)) is an arc in 
С and (a* ji,b*
 ; < ) = (1,0). So without loss of generality we may suppose that 
К л , О = (і,0). _ 
Again from the definitions we obtain that there is a ji such that ((i'i,Ji)i(>iij2)) 
is an arc in С and (ai¡j3>Kij3) = (Οι 1)· Subsequently there is ij £ 1(C) such that 
((*bj'a),(»2,j2)) is an arc in С and «,;,.&*«,) = (1.0). 
Extrapolation of this reasoning leads to the conclusion that we can write: 
С := ((»i,ii),(«'i,j2),(«2,j2),...,(«<-i,«t),(«'í,«'i),(»i,««)) for some t G IN, 
and that С can be represented by the 'diagonal' entries and the black arrows in figure 
5.8.1 below. 
J i ¡z J . 
'k*1 
( 1 , 0 ) 
a 
' - • ( 0 ,1 ) · * · -
k- l 
i 
( 1 , 0 ) . ( 0 , 1 ) 
( 1 , 0 ) 
i 
(θ', I ) I 
( ΐ , ο ) , χ ο , ι ) 
( 0 , 1 ) · « -
(0,1) 
-о To) 
figure 5.8.1 
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Now suppose that two rows in / (C) are equal. For convenience let us assume that 
there is a row it that is equal to ¿i. Then we obtain from figure 5.8.1 that Jfc > 
3 and moreover that ((»*-i,Ji),(*i, jfc)) is an arc. Hence we have found a cycle 
C' := ((ii,J2)>(Ì2,h),--,(ik-i,jj),(ii,jk))· Since С is minimal we must have that 
I(C') = /(C) and J(C') = J(C). The only thing is that С uses some rows and 
columns more than once. The fact that we are able to construct а С as above in this 
case makes that we may suppose without loss of generality that all rows », and i,< 
with s φ s' are different. Similarly we can suppose that all columns j , and j,> with 
β φ s' are different. 
Hence we can draw the conclusion that |/(C)| = |J(C)| = t, which means that a 
fundamental subgame of a binary game is square! 
So we have found that (A*, ö*)/(c),/(C) 's square and we have already filled in some 
of the entries: for s, s' G { 1 , . . . ,t — 1} we have found that (a¡j ,,Ь*
т} ,) = (1,0) if 
s' = s and (α* · ,,b¡j ,) = (0,1) if s' = s + 1 or s = t and s' = 1. But what about 
the other entries? 
Suppose there is an entry (1,0) elsewhere. For convenience let us place this entry in 
the row t'i. Let the column of this entry be jk- Then we arrive again at the situation of 
figure 5.8.1. And again C' as defined above is a cycle. Only this time we have agreed 
that all rows in /(C) and all columns in J(C) are different, so that / ( С ) С /(C) 
and J(C') С /(C) while /(C) φ /(C) and J(C') φ J (С). This contradicts С being 
minimal. Hence the assumed entry (1,0) cannot exist. 
More generally we have that (a*j
 t, 6*#J·, ) = (0,0) if s' φ s, s + 1 and а' = 1 if s = t. 
Summarizing we have: 
THEOREM 5.8.1 Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game without a pure equilibrium. Then a 
fundamental subgame of(A*,B*) is a square game with the following form (if neces­
sary after some permutations of rows and columns of A* and B* simultaneously): 
r(l,0) (0,1) (0,0)-! 
• (1,0) (0,1) 
(0,1) · ' 
(1,0) (0,1) 
L(o,i) · (l.o) J 
where all entries that are not indicated are equal to (0,0). 
We immediately obtain from theorem 5.7.7 (i): 
COROLLARY 5.8.2 A primary fundamental subgame of a bimatrix game is square. 
Using the techniques of the proof of theorem 5.3.1, it is now straightforward to show 
that a fundamental subgame of binary game is completely mixed. We can say more if 
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we also define minima/ completely mixed games : a bimatrix game is called minimally 
completely mixed if it is completely mixed and no proper subgame of it, of size at 
least 2 χ 2, is completely mixed. 
THEOREM 5.8.3 Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game. A subgame of {A*, B*) is fundamen­
tal if and only if it is minimally completely mixed. 
PROOF. Let (A*,B*)itj be a fundamental subgame of (A*,B*). Then (A*,B*)itj 
is completely mixed. If it is not minimally completely mixed, then it has a proper 
subgame without a pure equilibrium which contradicts the fact that (A*,B*)itj is 
fundamental. 
Now let (A',B*)¡tj be a subgame of (A*,B*) that is minimally completely mixed. 
Then it has no pure equilibrium. So if it is not fundamental, then it contains a proper 
subgame that is fundamental. As we have seen above this implies that this proper 
subgame contains a completely mixed game, which contradicts the fact that {A*, B*) 
is minimally completely mixed. a 

CHAPTER 6 
A SYMMETRIZATION METHOD FOR 
BIMATRIX GAMES 
β.Ι INTRODUCTION 
This section is devoted to a symmetrization method for bimatrix games, which origi­
nates from a method for matrix games by Gale Kuhn and Tucker (1950). 
Already in the fundamental paper of von Neumann (1928) attention is paid to sym­
metric matrix games and it is observed that these games have value zero. Brown and 
von Neumann (1950) gave a new proof of existence of a value for symmetric matrix 
games using a differential equation. By referring to a symmetrization method of Gale, 
Kuhn and Tucker (1950) they showed that their proof also applies to non-symmetric 
matrix games. 
In a symmetric game both players have the same strategic possibilities and there is 
no discrimination in the payoffs. Therefore a symmetrization of a game is an exten­
sion to fair play. In fact, where in real-life situations people play games, they tend to 
symmetrize by means of tossing, exchanging roles in a second play, etc. This moti­
vates the study of symmetrizations for finite two-person games that are not zero-sum. 
Furthermore symmetric games play an important role in the new field of sociobiology, 
founded by Maynard Smith (1982), where evolutionary stable strategies correspond 
to special symmetric equilibria. 
Griesmer, Hoffman and Robinson (1963) propose a symmetrization method for bi-
94 Chapter 6: A symmetrization for bimatrix games 
matrix games. This method and a method of Brown and von Neumann (1950) are 
extensively studied in a paper of Jansen, Potters and Tijs (1986). Correspondences 
between equilibria and some refinements of equilibria for a bimatrix game and foi 
its symmetrization are given with respect to either type. In this paper we deal with 
a similar correspondence, but now concerning the symmetrization method of Gale, 
Kuhn and Tucker. In section 6.2 we extend this method to the case of bimatrix games 
and we give a correspondence with respect to equilibria. In section 6.3 we test three 
types of refinements, i.e. quasi-strong, regular and perfect equilibria with respect to 
their behavior under the symmetrization. The results in this chapter are based upon 
Jurg et al. (1991). 
The method described in this paper yields a one-to-one correspondence between pairs 
of equilibria for a game and pairs of equilibria for its symmetrization. A similar 
statement holds for each of the three refinements discussed here. Jansen, Potters and 
Tijs showed that such a nice correspondence does not exist for the method of Griesmer, 
Hoffman and Robinson. However, the method of Brown and von Neumann implies a 
similar one-to-one correspondence. But in this case the 'size' of the symmetrization 
of a game with m and η pure strategies for the players, respectively, is large: In this 
symmetrization both players have m • η pure strategies. For the symmetrization of 
Gale, Kuhn and Tucker this number is m + n + 1 (and m + η for the symmetrization of 
Griesmer, Hoffman and Robinson). This makes the symmetrization that is discussed 
here more interesting for computational purposes. 
6.2 THE GALE, KUHN AND TUCKER SYMMETRIZATION 
METHOD FOR BIMATRIX GAMES 
In this section we extend the method of Gale, Kuhn and Tucker for symmetrizing 
a matrix game to the case of a bimatrix game. We consider an m χ η bimatrix 
game (A, B) such that A > 0 and В < 0. In view of proposition 1.2.2 this is not 
a restriction. We will call the symmetric bimatrix game (C,C(), where С is the 
(m + η + 1) χ (m + η + 1) matrix 
" 0 А - 1
и 
C = В* 0 1„ 
lm -1„ 0 
the Gale, Kuhn and Tucker symmetrization of (A, В), in short GKT-symmetrization. 
In order to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between pairs of equilibria 
for the game (A, B) and pairs of equilibria for the game (C,C), we first describe 
how an equilibrium for (C, C") yields two equilibria for (A, B). Therefore we need a 
lemma and some notation. 
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For a strategy r G A
m + n + i we let r„ := (п,...,тт), r„ := (r m + 1 , . . . ,r r o + „) and 
TZ ••= T-m+n+i· Then τ = (τ,,η,,τ,). 
LEMMA 6.2.1 Let (С, С*) be the GKT-symmetrixation of an τη χ η bimairix gami 
(А, В) with A > 0 and В < 0. Let (ρ, σ) £ E(C, C ) . Then p
x
 φ0, py φ 0, рж φ 0, 
σ
χ
 φ 0, (Ту φ 0 and σ, φ 0. 
PROOF. We prove the lemma by following the scheme below. 
pt φ 0 Ш σνφ0 Μ- ρ, φ 0 
σ, φ 0 <Ш= />
у
 ^ 0 4 ^ σ* φ 0 
Note that, since ρ, σ 6 Д
т
+ „ + і , we already have /) > 0, σ > 0 and ρ φ 0, σ ^ 0. 
We start at the upper left corner of the scheme: (a) Assume p
x
 φ 0. Then there is 
an »о G {l,...,m} such that 
max e;Aa
v
 — σ, 
<6{i m} y 
e,·
n
Cσ = e,„Aff„ — σ, > I max cxBe¡ + σ
ζ 
- » J6{l,...,n} 
(f f
r
, l
m
)-(a y , l„) . 
Suppose σ
ν
 = 0. Then е;0С<г = e¿0.Affy — σζ — —σζ < 0. This yields 0 > (σΓ, l m ) — 
{σ
ν
, l
n
) = (σ
χ
, l
m
) . So σ
Γ
 = 0. This again implies 0 > maxj
e
{i „} a
x
Bej + a, = σ
ζ
. 
So σ
ζ
 = 0. Consequently σ = 0, which is a contradiction. Hence σ
ν
 φ 0. 
(b) Assume σ
ν
 φ 0. Then there is a jo G {"» 4-1,..., πι + η} such that 
max e¡Apy — pz 
•€{ l , . . ,m} 
/ ^ S O = PxBtia-m +pz> { max р
г
6е7· + ρ, 
J€{1, ·..,"} 
(^хДт)-(/>у,1п)· 
Suppose р
г
 = p
x
 = 0. Then 0 > max,-^..
 > m } е,Л/>у. Since A > 0 this implies 
/>y = 0. Consequently ρ = 0, which is a contradiction. Now suppose pz — 0, 
p
x
 φ 0. Then, since В > 0, we have 0 > p
x
BtjB^m > max i e { l i m j e,\A/>y — pz — 
maxjg^. .
ro
j eiApy. This contradicts .A > 0. Consequently />, ^ 0. 
(c) Assume pz φ 0. Then 
e
m+n+iCa = (σ«, lm) - (<ry, l n ) > · 
max ti Ac у — σ
ζ í e { i , . . , m } 
max axBe¡ +σ
ζ
. 
. І€{1 η} 
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Suppose σ
χ
 = 0. Then 0 > — (<ry, 1„) > m a x , ^ „y axBe¡ +σΜ = σ,. Hence σ, = 0 
Consequently 0 > (—σ
ν
, 1„) > max.g^
 m
} e,Aay. Since A > 0, this implies ay = 0 
Consequently σ = 0, which is a contradiction. Hence σ
χ
 φ 0. 
The implications (d), (e) and (f) can be proved in a similar way. Since ρ φ 0(σ φ 0), 
at least one of the vectors p
x
,py and ρ, (σχ,σν and σζ) has a positive coordinate. Sc 
we are in the situation of the scheme. с 
In view of lemma 6.2 1, for an equilibrium (ρ,σ) for (C,C*), p
x
 and py can be nor­
malized so that they become strategies in A
m
 and Δ
η
 respectively. These strategies 
are important in 
THEOREM 6.2.2 Let (C,C*) be the GKT-symmetrtzaiton of an m ж η btmatnx game 
(Л, В) wtth A > 0 and В < 0. Let (/>, σ) G E(C, С*). Then 
{рАРтЛт)-\^
у
{а ,\
п
)-1) G E(A,B) and (σ
χ
(σ
χ
, l
m
)-\py(py, In)"1) € Ε(Α,Β). 
PROOF. Since (ρ, σ) G Е(С,С*) we have 
( ε,Ασν — σζ for i e {1,..., m} 
<rx.öe,_m + <r, for i G {m + 1, ...,m + n} (6.2.1) 
і^тЛт)-(о-
у
Лп) fori = m + n + l 
and { e,Apy-pt for j G{l,...,m} 
p
x
Be,-
m
+pt for j G { m + l , . . . , m + n} (6.2.2) 
(/»x, lm) - (Py, l
n
) for j ' = m + η + 1. 
By lemma 6.2.1, p
x
 φ Ό and <ry ^ 0. 
Suppose (p
x
)i > 0. Then, since C(p) С PB(C,a), we obtain 
ε,Λσ„ - <r
r
 = max f c e { 1 > m){ekAay - at}. Hence е,Лгу = max f c 6 { 1 | m^eKAay. 
Similarly, if (o-y)¡ > 0, then pxBe} = max/g^ nj pxBei. 
This implies C(px(px, 1
т
) _ 1 ) С PB(A,ay(ay,l„)~l), and 
СЫ' , In)"1) С PB(B,p
x
(Px, l m ) - i ) . 
Hence (/>*(/>„ l
m
)-1,iTy,(ffy, l n ) - 1 ) G Я ( Д Д). 
Similarly one shows (σ
χ
(σ
Γ
, lm)-1,/»y(/>y, In) - 1 ) G £(Λ, Я). α 
[f (ρ,σ) G E Í C С ) , then also (σ,ρ) G ^(C.C"). According to theorem 6.2.2 these 
two equilibria of (C, C*) yield the same two equilibria for (A, B). We now concern 
Durselves with a converse statement. Therefore we need the following definition. 
F°r (p, q), (β, q) G £ ( A θ), the GKT-product (p, ç) * (p, g) is defined as 
(r_E L_ ι Î 1 _ \ 
^2-рЯс> 2+ρΛί' l 2-pBq 2+pAjJ' ( Ê Î 1 Î 1 "Λ V2-pBg' 2+pAi' 2-pBq 2+pAq'J' 
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Note that the GKT-product * is well-defined since A > О ала В < 0. 
In fact we have (p,q) * (p,q) € Д
т + п + і x A m + „ + i . Furthermore, if (ρ,σ) := (p,q) * 
(p, ?), then (<r,p) = (p,q) * (p, q)- The next theorem shows the relevance of the 
GKT-product. 
THEOREM 6.2.3 Let (CtC*) be the GKT-symmetrization of an m χ η bimatrix game 
(А,В) with A > 0 and В < 0. Let (p,?),(p, ?) G E(A,B). Then (p,q) *(p,q) G 
E{C,C) and {p,q) * (p,ç) G Е(С,С*). 
PROOF. Let, for (ρ,ΐ),(ρ,?) G £ ( Л , £ ) , (ρ,σ) := (ρ, g) * (ρ,g). Then (ρ,σ) 6 
A
m + n + i χ Д т + „ + і and pt φ 0,py φ Ο,ρ, φ 0, and σχ φ 0,σν φ Ο,σ, φ 0 by 
construction. 
(a) For i G {l,...,m} such that p¡ > 0 we originally had ρ,- > 0. From C(p) С 
PB(A,q) it then follows that e¡Aq = max^g^
 m j е*.Ад. Then we obtain from the 
GKT-product 
e . O = aAq(2 + pAq)~l - (l - (2 - pBq)-1 - (2 + рЛ?)"1) 
= max e^Ca. 
k£{l,...,m} 
Since maxj-cix
 m) e^Aq = рЛд, the last expression also equals (2 — pBq)~l — (2 + 
pAq)-1. 
(b) Similarly, for a j e {m + 1,..., m + η} with p¡ > 0 
e , C a = max e ¿ 0 = (2 - pBq)~l - (2 + рЛс)"1. 
(c) Since e
m + n + iC<r = (2 - pBq)-1 — (2 -f-p-Aç)-1, it follows from (a) and (b) that 
maxjt^i,. , m + n + i } tkCa = (2 - рЯд)"1 - (2 + pAq)~l. 
(d) Combining (a), (b) and (c) we obtain C(p) С PB(C,a). Similarly one shows 
C(a) С PB{C*,p). Hence (ρ,σ) G Е(С,С*), or equivalently (р,?)*(р,?) G Е(С,С). 
Similarly one proves 
(р,ч)*(р,ч)еЕ(с,с*). α 
The next theorem shows that each equilibrium for the GKT-symmetrization of a 
bimatrix game is the GKT-product of two equilibria for this bimatrix game. 
THEOREM 6.2.4 Let (C, C ) be the GKT-symmetrization of an m χ η bimatrix game 
(А, В) with A > 0 and В < 0. Let (ρ,σ) G E(C,Cl). Then there are equilibria 
(P. Я), (Ρ, ?) € E(A, B) such that (ρ,σ) = (ρ,q) * (ρ, q). 
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PROOF. From lemma 6.2.1 we obtain p
x
 > 0. So pCa = (σ
Γ11„,) - (σ„,1η) and 
ρ&σ = (pr, l
m
) - (py.ln). 
Let ρ = (р
х
,1т)~1Рх,Я = (<r
v
,ln)~l<ry,p = (σχ,1τη)-1σχ and ξ = (py,ln)~lPv-
From lemma 1 we obtain p,p G A
m
 and q,q G A„. By theorem 1, (p,q),(p,q) £ 
E(A,B). Furthermore maxi€<i, .,„} pxBe¡ + р
г
 = ( p
r
, l
m
) - (p y , l„) (cf.(6.2.2)). 
Consequently 
max pBej = (p
s
,l
m
)-1[(p
x
,l
m
)-(py,l„)-p,}. 
}€{l,...,n} 
Since ρ G Д
т + п + і , we have (px, l m ) + (p„, l n ) + />, = 1. Hence 
. max pBej = (р
х
,1тГЧЦр*, lm) - 4· 
í 6 { l , . . , n } 
Since (p, g) G £(.Α, Β), pßg = max^g^ „j pSe;·. Hence p ö j = 
(p*,lm) = ( 2 - p S ? ) - 1 . (6.2.3) 
Similarly one obtains 
(σ
ν
,1
η
) = (2 + ρ ^ ) - 1 (6.2.4) 
( ^ , l
m
) = ( 2 - p ß g ) - 1 (6.2.5) 
(py,ln) = (2 + pAq)-1. (6.2.6) 
Now, if we use (6.2.3)-(6.2.6) in the definition of the GKT-product of the strategy 
pairs (p, 9) and (p, q), we find (p, q) * (p, ?) = (ρ,σ). a 
Theorems 6.2.2 - 6.2.4 yield a one-to-one correspondence between pairs of equilibria 
for a bimatrix game, and (symmetric) pairs of equilibria for the GKT-symmetrization 
of this bimatrix game. In the last theorem of this section we show that there is a 
similar correspondence with respect to maximal Nash subsets for the two games. 
In order to describe this correspondence, we define the GKT-product also for maximal 
Nash subsets. 
Let (A,B) be an m χ η bimatrix game and let (C7,C*) be the GKT-symmetrization 
of (A, B). Let 5 and Τ be maximal Nash subsets for (A, B). Then the GKT-product 
of S and Τ is defined as 
S*T := {(p,q)*(r,s) | (P l î ) G 5 and (г,*) G Τ}. 
THEOREM 6.2.5 Let (С, С*) be the GKT-symmetrization of an m χ η bimatrix game 
(А, В) with A > 0 and В < 0. 
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(i) If S and Τ are maximal Nash subsets for (A, B), then S *T and Τ * S art 
maximal Nash subsets for (C, C*). 
(ii) If U is a maximal Nash subset for (С,С*), then U = S *T for some maximal 
Nash subsets S and Τ for (A, B). 
PROOF. Let S and Τ be maximal Nash subsets for (A, B). We only show that 5 * 7 
is a maximal Nash subset for (С, C*). 
(¡a) First we show that S * Τ is a Nash subset. Take (рі,0і),(р2і<гз) € S * Г. 
By definition 0>і,<гі) = (pi.ft) * (ft,ft) for some (ft,ft) 6 S and (ft,ft) € Γ and 
(Р2,^г) = (Р2,Ы * (p2,h) f o r some 
(pa.ia) G 5 and (p2,g2) € T. 
By theorem 6.2.3, (ρι,σ
ι
),(ρ2,σ2) e E(C,C*). 
If we show that (ft, <r2) € S * Γ and (p2, σι) € S * Τ, it follows that 5 * Τ is a Nash 
subset. We only show (ρι,σ·2) G 5 *T. 
By construction 
"
= ( rk ' ñk ' H I - № r ' - ( ! + , , ' * r ' ) · 
Since (pi,ft) and (ft,52) are elements of 5, we find PiBft = PiBq2 = т а х с € д в p\Bq 
and p2Aq2 = ρι-Α?2· 
Similarly ft./4ft = ρ2Αξ\ and p2Bq2 = p2Bq~\ · 
Consequently we find (ρι,σ 2) = (рьСг) * (P2>ft) € S *T. Hence 5 * Γ is a Nash 
subset. 
(16) Now suppose U is a maximal Nash subset for (C,C*) containing S *T. Let 
(τϊ,ωι),(τ2,ω2) e U. 
Prom theorem 6.2.4 we obtain for t = 1,2 that (ъ,иц) = (г,·, «,·) * (r¡, s,·), where 
{rUMi),(fi,êi)eE(A,B). 
Evidently also (τι,ω2) and (τ2ιω\) are elements of U. From the expression for the 
GKT-products (r;,*,·) * (r¡, S{) for t' = 1,2, we find 
•
>
-(г^йГ-і+Ь*-І-<,- ,4в, , )" ,-р+'"и' )М)· 
« • ЫЫі· «ras· ' -
(2
 - « w
1
 -<2+•^)"') • 
Since (τχ,ω2) € E(C,Cl), we obtain from theorem 3 that there are (p,q),(p,q) € 
E(A,B) such that (η,ω2) = (ρ,ϊ) *(p,?)· 
Иепсе we have e.g. ^ щ =
 2_Γ
Γ
ι
ι
ή > ι • Using Σ ^ ρ , = Σ,™ι(Γι)< = 1, we find 
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і=$Щ = 2-ГІВ.,' а л а consequently ρ = г
ь 
Similarly q = а2,р = f2 and q = ¡χ. So (ri,a2) = (ρ>?) € Я(Л,В) and (f2,«i) = 
(ρ,ξ)ΕΕ(Α,Β). 
By considering (г2,а>і) in a similar way, we obtain (г2,«і),(гі,в2) G E(A,B). This 
implies that {(г1,5і),(г2,в2),(гі,в2),(г2 )ві)} and {(гі І5і),(г2 )*2),(гі,в2) )(г2,*і)} 
are Nash subsets for (A,B). Since the (ту,и><) are chosen arbitrary in U, we obtain 
that U is the GKT-product of two Nash subsets for (A,B). So in view of (ia) we 
obtain U = S *T and hence 5 f Τ is a maximal Nash subset. 
(ii) Let U be a maximal Nash subset for (С, C*). Similar to the proof above, we obtain 
that U is the GKT-product of two Nash subsets for (A, B). Each of these Nash subsets 
is contained in a maximal Nash subset for (A,B), and from (i) we obtain that the 
GKT-product of these maximal Nash subsets is a maximal Nash subset U for (С, C ) . 
Evidently U С U. However, this implies U = U and U is the GKT-product of two 
maximal Nash subsets for (C, C*). a 
6.3 BEHAVIOUR OF REFINEMENTS 
In this section we investigate how three refinements of equilibria behave in the proce­
dure of the GKT-symmetrization. First we deal with quasi-strong equilibria, which 
were introduced by Harsanyi (1973) (cf. section 5.3). 
THEOREM 6.3.1 Let (¿7,(7*) be the GKT-symmetrization of an m χ η bimatrix game 
(A, B) with A > 0 and В < 0. 
(i) If {ρ, a), (p,q) G E(A,B) are quasi-strong, then both (p,q) * (p,q) G E(C,C*) 
and (p,q) * (p,q) G E(C,C*) are quasi-strong, 
(ii) If (ρ,σ) G Е(С,С*) is quasi-strong, then both (р*(р*,1т)-1іОу(<Гу, 1„) _ 1 ) € 
E(A,B) and (ax(ax,lm)~1,py(py,ln)~l) £ E(A,B) are quasi-strong. 
PROOF, (i) Let (p,q),(p,q) G E(A,B) both be quasi-strong and define (ρ,σ) := 
(ρ, q) * (ρ, q). Since, by theorem 6.2.3, (ρ, σ) G E(C, С ) , we obtain for » G {1,..., m + 
η -г 1} that pi > 0 implies e.Cff = maxJfee^1> m + n + 1 j e\¡Ca. 
Suppose that for t G {l , . . . ,m + n + 1} 
e,-(7(7 = max eKCo. (6.3.1) 
k£{l,...,m+n+l} 
Since px = 2-pËa' w e fiQ<* t n a t (P*)»o > 0 f°r a t l e a s t o n e 'o £ {!> ·••>m)· 
Hence maxfcg^.. , m + n + i } e^Ca = max^^ mj ekCc. 
For ife G i l , ...,m} we have ε*(7σ = ekAq(2 + pAq)~1 — at. Consequently, if (6.3.1) is 
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satisfied for an i G {1, ···, m}, then 
e;Aq(2 +pAq)~1 — a, = e¡Ca = max esCa 
fce{l m+n+l} 
= max eiCff = max etAq(2 + pAq)-1 — σ.. 
*e{i m} *е{і,..,т} ' 
So t{Aq = maxjfcf!
 m
j etAq. Since C(p) = PB(A,q), we obtain that p,· > 0, and 
consequently p,- > 0. 
Similarly one proves that if (6.3.1) is satisfied for an i G {m + 1 m+n}, then also 
Pi > o. 
Finally, by lemma 1, />
m
+
n
+i > 0. Hence we have that for i € {l , . . . ,m -f η + 1}, 
(6.3.1) implies p¡ > 0. This implies C(p) = ΡΒ(0,σ). Similarly one shows C{a) = 
PB(C*,p). Therefore (ρ, σ) is a quasi-strong equilibrium for (C,C*). 
Similar arguments show that (σ, ρ) = (ρ, ξ) * (ρ, q) is a quasi-strong equilibrium for 
( C , C ) . 
(ii) The proof follows immediately from (6.2.1) and (6.2.2). π 
For a bimatrix game an isolated equilibrium is an equilibrium which is a maximal 
Nash subset itself. In view of theorem 6.2.5 we obtain that theorem 6.3.1 also holds 
if we replace the word quasi-strong by isolated. In Jansen (1987) a regularity concept 
for equilibria is introduced and it is proved that an equilibrium is regular if and only 
if it is isolated and quasi-strong. Hence we have 
COROLLARY 6.3.2 Theorem 6.3. J also holds if quasi-strong is replaced by regular. 
Next we prove a result on perfect equilibrium. Instead of using the original definition 
of perfectness we use in the proof the equivalent concept of undominatedness (cf. 
theorem 3.3.1) . 
THEOREM 6.3.3 Let (C,C*) be the GKT-symmetrization of an τη Χ η bimatrix game 
(A, B) with A > 0 and В < 0. 
(*) If (Ρ,ύΛΡ'ί) e E(A,B) are perfect, then both (p,q) * (p,q) G E(C,C*) and 
(Ρ, ξ) * (P, q) £ E(C, C*) are perfect, 
(ii) If(p,a) e Е(С,С*) is perfect, then both {p
x
(p
x
, І т Г у К . І г , ) - 1 ) 6 E(A,B) 
and 
( Л хЛтУ^РуІРуЛп)-1) £ E(A,B) art perfect. 
PROOF, (i) Let (p, q),(ß,q) € E(A,B) both be perfect and define (ρ,σ) := (ρ, q) * 
(ρ, g). Since, by theorem 6.2.3, (ρ, σ) Ç Е(С,С*) we only have to show that ρ and σ 
are undominated strategies for the game (C, C*). Suppose a p G A
m
+
n
+ i exists such 
that ~pC > pC, or equivalently, using the GKT-product, 
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' ВРу+РЛт \ /Bq(2 + pAq)-i + (l-(2-
r
pAq)-1-(2-pBq)-1)l
m
\ 
p
x
A-ptln > \pA(2-pBq)-l-(l-{2+pAq)-1-(2-pBq)-1)ln 
SPV'
l
n)-(p
x
,l
m
)J \ (2 + pAq)-l-(2-pBq)-1 J 
(6.3.2) 
We consider two cases: 
(a) p, < 1 - (2 + pAq)-1 - (2 - рЯ,)" 1 
(b) pt > 1 -(2 + pAq)-1 - (2-pBq)-1. 
(a) Suppose py = 0. Then the third line of (6.3.2) yields 
-ІРтЛт) > (2 + pAq)-1 - (2 - pBq)-1. Since p, = 1 - (pt, l m ) , we obtain 
1 + (2 + pAq)~l - (2 - pBq)-1 <pz<l-(2 + pAq)-1 - (2 - p 5 g ) - 1 
This implies (2 + pAq)~l < 0, which contradicts A > 0. So py ^ 0. 
The first line of the inequality (6.3.2) yields Bpy > Bq{2 + pAq)~1, or equivalently, 
(py, l„)_Bpj(py, I«)" 1 > Bq(2 + pAq)~1. 
Since py(py,ln) x 6 Δ„, q is undominated and В < 0, we obtain from the last 
inequality that (py, 1„) < (2+pAq)~l. Then the third line of (6.3.2) yields (px, l m ) < 
(2 — pBq)~l. Since pz = 1 — (px, l m ) — (p y r 1„), the last two inequalities yield pz > 
l-(2+pAq)-1-(2-pBq)~1. Thus p
z
 = l-(2+pAq)~l-(2-pBq)-1. This implies 
{fix, lm) = (2 — pBq)-1 and (py, 1„) = (2 +pAq)~1. Then the undominatedness of ρ 
and q for (A, B) implies pC = pC. Consequently ρ is undominated. 
(b) A similar proof shows that also in this case ρ is undominated. 
We can also distinguish two cases to show that σ is undominated. Hence (p,<r) is a 
perfect equilibrium for the game (С, C*). 
It is easily verified that then also (<r, p) = (p,q) * (p, q) is an undominated and hence 
perfect equilibrium for (С, C"). 
(ii) Let (ρ, σ) be a perfect equilibrium for (C,C*). We only show that (p
x
(p
x
, lm) - 1 . 
"ν(σν> In) - 1 ) is a perfect equilibrium for (A,B). Suppose a p G Δ„, exists such that 
PA > Рх(рх, 1 т ) - 1 Л · Define ρ := (p(p
x
, l
m
),Py,Pz) € Д т + п + і . Then 
pC = (Вр
у
+р
г
1
т
,(р
г
, l
m
)pA - РЛПЛР l") ~ (Pt^m)) > pC. 
Since ρ is undominated, this implies pC = pC, and in particular pA = p
x
(p
x
, l
m
)~1A. 
Hence Pr(Pnlm) - 1 is undominated. Similarly one shows that also σ
ν
(σ
ν
,\
η
)~γ is 
undominated. Hence (p
x
(p
r
, l
m
) - 1 ."VÎ^y. In) - 1) ' s a perfect equilibrium for (A, B). 
A similar proof shows that (σ
χ
(σ
χ
, l
m
)~1,Py{Py, In) - 1 ) is also a perfect equilibrium 
ΐοι(Α,Β). a 
For proper equilibria it is possible to prove an analogue to theorem 6.3.3 (ii). 
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CHAPTER 7 
SEMI- INFINITE BIMATRIX GAMES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION AND DEFDÍITIONS 
So far we have only considered finite bimatrix games, i.e. bimatrix games where both 
players have a finite number of pure strategies. For such games Nash (1951) showed 
that there is always an equilibrium. In general a two-person game for which there 
is an equilibrium, i.e. a prescribed pair of strategies from which unilateral deviation 
does not pay, is called determined. 
If a game is not determined almost equilibria become important. In this chapter we 
discuss semi-infinite bimatrix games which are two-person games where one of the 
players (we will assume this is player 1) has a finite number of pure strategies and 
the other player (player 2) has a countably infinite pure strategy space. These games 
may not be determined (cf. example 7.1.1). In Lucchetti et al. (1986) different types 
of almost equilibria were defined for semi-infinite bimatrix games and they were used 
to define weak determinateness of these games. 
Earlier Wald (1945) showed that every bounded semi-infinite matrix game is weakly 
determined, Tijs (1975) proved that also unbounded semi-infinite matrix games are 
weakly determined and weak determinateness of semi-infinite bimatrix games where 
the second player has an upper bounded payoff matrix was shown in Tijs (1975), Tys 
(1977) and Tijs (1981). Lucchetti et al. dealt with semi-infinite bimatrix games with 
various boundedness restrictions guaranteeing weak determinateness. The problem of 
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weak determinateness of general semi-infinite bimatrix games is still unsolved. 
In this chapter we show that semi-infinite bimatrix games where player 1 has two pure 
strategies, are weakly determined. This chapter is based on Jurg and Tijs (1993). 
First we define general semi-infinite bimatrix games. 
Let A := [ а у ] £
х
 Jij and В := [bij]^ ?ii be two real m χ oo matrices. By (A, B) 
we denote the semi-infinite bimatrix game consisting of the payoff matrices A and В 
for player 1 and player 2 respectively and strategy spaces A
m
 for player 1 and 
oo 
Δ«, := {(уі,У2,···) I % €ffi., Vj > 0 for j € IN, ^Уі = 1 and % = 0 if j is large} 
for player 2. In a play of this game player 1 chooses a ρ € A m and player 2 chooses 
a q G Δοο. Subsequently player 1 obtains the payoff ρAq := Y^¡Ll YlJ^iPiuijQj and 
player 2 obtains pBq := ££Lj YlJLi PihjVj • 
In the following example we present a semi-infinite bimatrix game which is not deter-
mined. 
EXAMPLE 7.1.1 Consider the 2 χ oo bimatrix game (A, B) where 
A := 0 1 2 3 1 0 0 0 41 ".' , n ι . - 1 - 2 - 3 ,dB:=\. . 2 g 
Assume that (p,q) G A
m
x A „ is an equilibrium for (A,B). Then we must have pAq > 
pAq for all ρ G A
m
 and pBq > pBq for all q G Δ«,. If ρ G conv {(£, ¿),е2}\{(%, 5)} 
we can make pBq for q G Δοο arbitrary large by letting q¡ = 1 for j large. So ρ G 
conv {«1,(5,5)}. Then supçeAoo pBq is attained uniquely by q G Δ«, with ξι = 1. 
However, then ei Aq < e^Aq, which implies ρ = e 2 £ conv {ei, (5, 5)}. Since this is a 
contradiction, (A,B) has no equilibrium. Hence (A,B) is not determined. 
From example 7.1.1 we learn that there is a need for the notion of weak determinate­
ness. 
First we recall the definitions of the four types of almost equilibria for semi- infinite 
bimatrix games occuring in Lucchetti et al. Let (А, В) be an m χ oo bimatrix game 
and Ai, *2 G IR and ei,c2 > 0. Then (p, q) G Am χ Δ ^ is called 
an {c\,€2)-equilibrium if 
pAq + € 1 > pAq for all ρ G A
m
 ( 7 1 1 ) 
pBq + e2 > PBq for all q G Δ«, (7.1.2) 
an (ei, k2)-equilibrium if (7.1.1) holds and 
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pBq > Jfc2 (7.1.3) 
a (ii,ca)-egni7rtriiim if (7-1-2) holds and 
pAq > ¿i (7.1.4) 
a (ki,k2)-equihbrium if both (7.1.3) and (7.1.4) hold. 
By Ε**·"(Α,Β), Ee»k*(A,B), Ek*-e'(A,B) and Ek»k>(A,B) we denote the sets of 
(fiif2)-. (fi.^ì)-» (¿lif2)- and (ibi,Jfcj)-equilibria respectively. 
The game (A, B) is called weakly determined weak determined game if it has at least 
one of the following properties: 
(WD1) £ ; e - e »(A,B)^0foraUf 1 ) e 2 >O 
(WD2) Ek^(A, Β)φ<ο for all ibj e ΠΙ and f2 > 0 
(WD3) Е^к'{А,В) φ 0 for all t! > 0 and k2 G IR-
(WD4) Eki'k'(A, Β) φ г for all *
ь
 k2 G R. 
Since the equilibrium conditions are equal to (7.1.1) and (7.1.2) with fi = ej = 0, 
determinateness of (A,B) implies (WD1). 
The interpretation of an (ci.CjJ-equilibrium (p,q) for a semi-infinite bimatrix game 
is clear: if fi and e2
 a r e
 close to zero, then (p,q) is 'almost' an equilibrium, i.e. by 
unilateral deviaton player 1 and player 2 can at most gain fi and e2 respectively. This 
explains (WD1). 
It only makes sense to look for an (ει,^-equilibrium for an m χ co bimatrix game 
(A, B) if В is not upper bounded. Here an m χ со matrix D := [dijJ^ Lj ?L1 is called 
upper bounded (lower bounded) if there exists a ib £ ffl. such that dij < к {dij > ib) for 
all i G M and j £ IN. If В is upper bounded, then clearly (WD3) cannot hold. If 
В is not upper bounded, then (WD3) means that player 2 can guarantee himself any 
payoff by choosing the an appropriate strategy, while player 1 is always able to play 
an almost (up to fi) best reply to the strategy of player 2. 
The interpretations of (WD2) and (WD4) are now obvious. 
In the following example we show that the semi-infinite bimatrix game of example 
7.1.1 is weakly determined. 
EXAMPLE 7.1.2 Consider the 2 X 00 bimatrix game of example 7.1.1. We show that 
this game has the property (WD1). Let a, £2 > 0 and take t £ IN such that I > —. 
Define ρ := (^, \) £ Δ 2 and q £ Δ«, such that qi = ^ and qt = \. Then e\Aq = 
e2Aq so that (p, q) satisfies (7.1.1). Moreover pBq = ^η- > 1 — e2 > supg e A < i i i pBq—t2-
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Hence (p,q) satisfies (7.1.2). 
The following theorem summarizes some results of Lucchetti et al. 
THEOREM 7.1.1 Let (А, В) be an m χ сю bimatrix game. Then (A,B) is weakly 
determined if one of the following assertions hold: 
(i) В is upper bounded 
(it) both A and В are lower bounded 
(Hi) В is lower bounded and A is not upper bounded 
(iv) m = 2 ani В is upper or lower bounded. 
The 2 χ oo game of example 7.1.1 does not satisfy any of the conditions of theorem 
7.1.1, since the matrix В is neither uppei nor lower bounded. Nevertheless this game 
has the property (WD1) (cf. example 7.1.2). 
In section 7.3 we prove that every 2 χ oo bimatrix game either has the property 
(WD1) or the property (WD3). In order to show this we use a labeling method which 
is typical for 2 χ oo bimatrix game. Other tools are the results in section 7.2 which 
concern an arbitrary convex set and nonnegative directions in IRm. We conclude this 
chapter with some remarks in section 7.4. 
In view of the main result in this chapter we may entertain in a hope that every 
semi-infìnte bimatrix game is determined. With respect to infinite bimatrix games, 
i.e. games where both players have countably infinitely many pure strategies, such 
a hope is not justified, since in Wald (1945) an example of an infinite matrix game 
is given which is not determined. For the convenience of the reader we discuss this 
example below. 
EXAMPLE 7.1.3 Let A := [a¿;·],™! ^ be defined by 
Г1 if » > j 
aij := < 0 if t' = j 
l - l if t < j . 
We consider the game (A,— A) where both players have the strategy space Δ^,. 
Clearly for infinite bimatrix games properties similar to (WD1)-(WD4) can be de­
fined and also upper and lower boundedness of the payoff matrices. Then the matrix 
A is both upper and lower bounded, so that we can only hope for (WD1) to hold 
for this game. Then if (p,q) is an (ci,f2)-equilibrium for some fi,f2 > 0, we must 
have pAq + fi > supp€Aepj4ç = 1 and pAq — f2 < infieb^pAq = —1. So that 
1 — €\ < pAq < — 1 + 62. This is not possible for e ι and f 2 zero or close to zero. 
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7.2 TOOLS 
Let С be a convex set in IRm. In this section we interpret A
m
 as the set of all 
(normalized) nonnegative directions in lR m . We say that С is upper bounded in 
the direction ρ G Д
т
 if s u p
x e C p · χ < со. The set of all nonnegative directions in 
which С is upper bounded is denoted by UB(C), and its complement, A
m
\UB(C), 
by NUB(C). Note that UB(C) is convex. 
Let ρ G UB(C) and e > 0. An element г of С is called e-optimal in direction ρ if 
ρ • χ + e > supjjgcρ · χ. The set of all elements of С that are e-optimal in direction ρ 
is non-empty and convex. We denote it by О
р>с. 
Now let ρ € NUB(C) and t G E . An element χ of С is called к-guaranteeing in 
direction ρ if ρ • χ > к. The set of all elements of С that are ¿-guaranteeing in 
direction ρ is denoted by GPtk- Also this set is non-empty and convex. 
Note that for ρ € UB{C) and fi > 62 > 0 we have that Op , t l D 0P i f a and for 
ρ G NUB(C) and Jfci, Jb2 G Ш. with Jbi > jfe2 we have that GPikx С G P i t 3 . 
We investigate these notions in the following example. 
EXAMPLE 7.2.1 We let В be as in example 7.1.1. and let С be the set of all convex 
combinations of finitely many columns of B, i.e. С = {Bq \ q G AT O}. Then С С И 2 
is the grey area in figure 7.2.1. We have UB(C) = conv ( { e b (£, £)}) and NUB(C) = 
c o n v ( { ( i , l ) i e a } ) \ { ( £ , I ) } . 
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figure 7.2.1 
In figure 7.2.1. ρ G UB(C) and 0^ | ( is the vertically shaded part of С Further Ge3ik 
is the horizontally shaded part of C. Note that Opif Π G e j i t = 0 for large к. One 
easily checks that 0 ( ΐ ΐ ) £ Π Gea,ifc ^ 0 for all e > 0 and fc G It. 
Lemma 7.2.2 below generalizes some of the observations made in the example above. 
For the proof of lemma 7.2.2 we need the following well-known lemma. 
LEMMA 7.2.1 Let С be a convex set in H m . Letn1,...,n' É E ™ anda*,...,a' G Ж. 
Define :=П*
к=1Щп
к
,а
к). 
Suppose V φ % and СC\V = 0. Then there is an η G coni» { η 1 , . . . , η ' } АИСЛ ίΛα* 
χ • η < у • η for all χ £ V and y G С. 
PROOF. From a well-known separation theorem for convex sets we obtain the exis­
tence of an η G H m \ { 0 } such that χ • η < y · η for all χ G V and y € С. We have 
to show that there is а Л G H*, A > 0, such that $3¡t=1 ^*n* = η. Suppose such 
а Λ does not exist. We show a contradiction. Then Farkas' lemma (lemma 1.4.1) 
implies the existence of a x° G H m such that x° · η > 0 and x° · n* < 0 for all ib. 
Now take χ G V. Then clearly χ + μχ° G V for any μ > 0. Take y £ С. Since 
V С 7í(n,y · η), we have that χ + μχ° G W(n,y • η) for any μ > 0 and consequently 
у • η > (χ + μζ°) • η = Χ · η + ßx° · η. Since χ° • η > 0, this is a contradiction for large 
μ. a 
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LEMMA 7.2.2 Let С be a convex set in Rm and suppose UB{C) is nonempty. Then 
for every ρ G NUB(C), к G ГО. and с > 0 there exists a ρ* e UB(C) such that 
Gp.tnOpv^e. 
PROOF. Take ρ G NUB(C), к G ГО, and £ > 0. It suffices to show that GPik П 
(Up'6f/B(c)Op',() Φ 0. For a moment assume that this intersection is empty and take 
x° G Gp,t· Then we show a contradiction in two steps. 
(a) First we show that we can find an x1 € С such that x 1 > z° + e l
m
. Assume such 
an x
x
 does not exist. Then С П {у G ffi,m | у > x° + cl
m
 } = 0. Applying lemma 7.2.1 
we find that a ρ € conv { e i , . . . , e m } = Д
т
 exists such that ρ · χ < ρ · у for all χ G С 
and all y G IRm satisfying y > x° + e l
m
. In particular this implies ρ · χ < ρ • χ° + ε for 
all a; G С Hence ρ G UB(C) and x° G Op | t. However, this contradicts the assumption 
of the empty intersection. 
(b) By part (a) we can find a n i 1 £ С such that x1 > x° + el
m
. This implies 
ρ - χ
1
 > ρ · x° + £ and consequently x 1 G Gp,k- Then, by repetition of the arguments 
above, we can construct a sequence x°, x1, x 2 , . . . of elements of GPit such that x
n
 > 
χ "
- 1
 + £ l
m
 > x° + т»£І
т
 for η G IN. Take ρ G UB(C). Then for large η we have 
ρ • x° > ρ · x° + п£ > sup
x
^
c
p • χ, which is a contradiction. α 
Roughly speaking lemma 7.2.2 relates for a convex set С in IRm the sets UB(C) and 
NUB(C). For our purposes (cf. section 4) this relation suffices. Now we focus on 
UB(C). First we give a definition. 
Let С be a convex set in Щ.т and let e > 0. A subset 5 of С if said to e-dominatt С 
if for every x G С there is a y G 5 such that y > χ — £ І
т
. 
Note that if UB(C) = 0, there is no such subset for any f > 0. 
LEMMA 7.2.3 [Tijs (1977) and Tijs (1981)] Let С be a convex set in ГО,т and suppose 
A
m
 = UB(C). Then for every e > 0 iAere exists a finite subset S of С such that S 
t-dominaies C. 
LEMMA 7.2.4 Let С be a convex set in ffi.m and suppose UB(C) φ 0. Let V := conv 
{p 1,... ,p'} with p1,... ,pl G UB{C). Then for every e > 0 ¿Aere is a finite subset S 
of С such that S П Op>e φ 0 for every p£P 
PROOF. Let ε > 0 and С := {(ρ1 · χ ,ρ 2 · χ , . . . ,ρι • χ) \ χ G С). Then С is a convex 
set in ffi, and since for any p G Δ/ we have sup^p^px = sup
r
gC Σ ί = ι Pi(p' x) < °°· 
we have UB(C) = A¿. Applying lemma 7.2.3 to С and ^ε we obtain a finite subset 
S of С such that S ^ε-dominates С. Let 5 be a finite subset of С such that S = 
{(ρ1 · χ,ρ 2 · χ , . . . ,ρι • χ) | χ G S). Take an arbitrary p G V and x G Ορ,$£· Then there 
is an s € 5 such that s > (ρ1 · χ ,ρ 2 · χ , . . . ,ρ* · χ) — ^εΐ/, or equivalently, there is an 
s G S such that ρ' · s > ρ' · χ — ^ε for all ί G {1, · · ·,i}- Then also ρ · s > ρ • χ — ^c. 
110 Chapter 7: Semi-infinite bimatrix games 
Since χ e Oj, i ( I this implies ρ • s > s u p z e C p • χ — ^ e — ^ t = s u p r e C p · χ — с. Hence 
s G Op,e This completes the proof. α 
7.3 DETERMINATENESS OF 2 X OO BIMATRIX GAMES 
In this section (A, B) is a 2 χ oo bimatrix game and С is the set of all convex combi­
nations of finitely many columns of B, i.e. С = {Bq | q G Δ^,} С IR2. 
We define a labeling function λ : Δ 2 -» {0,1,2} as follows: For ρ G UB(C): 
1 if there is an e > 0 such that t\Aq > e2Aq for all 9 € Δ « 
with Sg G Op,
e 
•MP) = ^ 2 if there is an e > 0 such that e\Aq < e2Aq for all g G Δ » 
with Bq G Op,t 
0 else. 
and for ρ G NUB(C): 
1 if there is a Jb e IR such that e\Aq > ег-Ад for all q G Δ«, 
with Bq G Gpfc 
Ή Ρ ) = \ 2 if there is a Jt G IR such that e\Aq < e2Aq for all q G Δ«, 
with Bq G GP|* 
0 else. 
Accordingly we call (A,B) Q-determined if there is a ρ G Δ2 with Λ(ρ) = 0, 1-
determined if λ(ρ) = 1 for all ρ G Δ2, 2-determined if A(p) = 2 for all p € Δ ; and 
gnosi' O-determined if UB(C) φ 0 and for every e > 0 there are a ρ G UB(C) and a 
g G Δ,» such that Bq G Op>e and ei-Ag = e2vlg. 
It is the aim of this section to show that every 2 χ oo bimatrix game is 0-, 1-, 2- or 
quasi O-determined. This ensures weak determinateness since 
LEMMA 7.3.1 For α 2 χ 00 bimatrix game 0-, 1-, 2- and quasi 0-determinateness imply 
(WD1) or (WDS). 
PROOF. Let (A, B) be a 2 χ oo bimatrix game. 
(a) Let (A,B) be O-determined. Then there is a p G Δ 2 such that A(p) = 0. Suppose 
ρ G UB(C). Then for every e2 > 0 their either is a g G Δ«, such that Bq G 0PltJ and 
eiAq = e2Aq or there are g',g
2
 G Δ«, such that Bql,Bq2 G 0Pit3, ciAq
1
 > e2Aq
l 
and ei./lg2 < ег-Ag1. In the latter case let 
д ._ ^Aql - e2Aq
l
 д 
ei Лд1 - 62-Ag1 -I- е2Лд
2
 — e ^ g 2 
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and define q := (1 — λ)? 1 + Ac2. Then g G conv {g1,?2} and t\Aq — e2Aq. Since 
0 P | t a is convex, also Bq G Op¡t3. So the latter case implies the first one. Hence for 
every 62 > 0 we can find a g G Δ«, such that Bq G 0Pit, i.e. pBq > s u p „ e A e e pBy — c2 
and ei-Ag = e2Aq. The last equality implies that for every t i > 0 we have that 
pAq > 8ир
г
€
д
а
 xAq — t\. Hence (A, B) has the property (WD1). Similarly one shows 
that (A, B) has the property (WD3) if ρ G NUB(C). 
(b) Let (Α,Β) be 1-determined. Then X(ei) = 1. Suppose e
x
 G NUB(C). Then 
there is a ifc G IR such that ei-Ag > e2Aq for all g G Δοο with Bq G Ge ¿. Let ei > 0 
and jfc2 G IR. If *2 > *> then take g G Δ
Μ
 such that Bq G G
e i > * a С G e i j . If ¿2 < *, 
then take g G Δ«, such that Bq G G
e
 j C Gei,*2· In both cases ei-Ag > e^Aq, and 
hence e\Aq > sup r 6 Ä a ij4g — fi- Moreover, since also in both cases Bq G Geiik3 we 
have e\Bq > k2. Hence (ei,g) is an (ci, ^-equilibrium in both cases. Since ei > 0 
and jfc2 G Ш. were arbitrary, (A,B) has the property (WD3). Similarly one shows that 
(A, B) has the property (WD1) if e
x
 G UB(C). 
(c) Similar to (b) one shows that 2-determinateness implies (WD1) {e2 G UB(C)) or 
çwm)(e2eNUB(C)). 
(d) Let (A,B) be quasi O-determined. Let е
х
,е2 > 0. By definition UB{C) φ 0 
and we can find a pair (p,g) G Δ 2 x Δ^, such that ρ G UB(C), Bq G Op,ea and 
ejj4g = егЛд. This implies that (p,g) is an (ei,62)-equilibrium. Hence quasi 0-
determinateness implies (WD1). о 
In order to prove the final result of this section, we need two more lemmas. 
LEMMA 7.3.2 Let (A,B) be a 2 χ oo bimatrix game and let С := {Bq | g G Δ«,}. 
Suppose UB(C) = 0. Then (A, B) is either 1- or 2-determined if (A, B) is not 0-
determined. 
PROOF. Let (A,B) not be O-determined. Then λ(ρ) G {1,2} for all ρ G Δ2 = 
NUB(C). Suppose pl,p2 G Δ 2 exist such that Л(рг) = 1 and Л(р2) = 2. Then 
k\,k2 G Ш. exist such that e\Aq
l
 > e2Aq
l
 for all g1 G Δ«> with Bq1 G Gpii¡Sl and 
еіЛд
2
 < е2Лд
2
 for all g2 G Δ«, with Bg 2 G Gp2kl. This implies С п { г £ Е 2 | 
ρ
1
 · χ > ki and ρ 2 · χ > k2] = 0. Applying lemma 7.2.1 we obtain a ρ G conv {ρ1,ρ2} 
such that px < py for all 1 G С and all y G IRm satisfying ply > ibi and p2y > k2. 
Let y° be the solution of the system of equations pxy° = ¿1 and p2y° = k2. Then 
px < py° for all 1 G С Hence s u p
r e C p x < 00. This contradicts UB(C) = 0. So 
either λ(ρ) = 1 for all ρ G Δ 2 or λ(ρ) = 2 for all ρ G Δ 2 , which proves the lemma, a 
LEMMA 7.3.3 Let (A,B) be a 2 Χ oo bimatrix game and let С := {Bq \ q G Δ „ } . 
Suppose UB(C) φ 0. Then λ is constant on UB(C), if(A,B) is neither 0- nor quasi 
O-determined. 
PROOF. Let (A, B) be neither 0- nor quasi O-determined. Then there exists an с0 > 0 
such that for every ρ G UB(C), λ(ρ) = 1 implies ei-Ад > e2Aq for all q G Δ „ with 
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Bq G Ορ>ίο and A(p) = 2 implies e^Aq < e2Aq for all q G Δ«, with Bq G OPtt0. 
Take pl,p2 G UB(C). Let p(l),p(2),... be a sequence of elements in conv {px,p2} 
with A(p(n)) = 1 for all η € IN, which converges to p. Clearly ρ G conv ({ρ 1 ,? 2 }) 
We show that A(p) = 1. By lemma 7.2.4 there is a finite subset S of С such that 
SnOp>ιCo ^ 0 for all ρ € conv {p1,^2}. So for each η G IN we can take q(n) G Δ « such 
that Bq(n) G 5ПО
я
(„) ±
€e. Consequently e\Aq{n) > ejj4ç(n). Since S is a finite set 
we may assume, without loss of generality that q(n) = q for all n. Take q° G Δ „ such 
that Bq° G Op iCo. Then for each η G IN we have p{n)Bq > sup r e Cp(n) · χ — убо > 
p(n)Bq° — ^(Q. This implies that pBq > pBq° — %e0 > sup t e C p • χ — |eo — \ta, so 
that ßg G Op.to- Since еіЛс > е2Хс, this implies e\Aq > e2Aq for all q G Δ«, with 
Bq G Op((„. Hence λ(ρ) = 1. So the set of all ρ G conv {ρ1,ρ2} having λ(ρ) = 1 is 
closed. Similarly the set of ρ G conv {ρ1,ρ2} having λ(ρ) = 2 is closed. Since (A, B) is 
not O-determined, conv {pl,p2} is the union of these two sets. But then X is constant 
on conv {pl,p2}. Since px,p2 G UB(C) were taken arbitrary, we can conlude that A 
is constant on UB(C). π 
We are now in a position to prove 
THEOREM 7.3.4 Every 2 x oo bimatrix game is 0-, 1-, 2- or quasi O-determined. 
PROOF. Let (A,B) be a 2 x oo bimatrix game and let С := {Bq | q G A œ } . 
Suppose (А, В) is neither 0- nor quasi O-determined. We show that (A,B) is either 
1- or 2-determined. In view of lemmas 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 we may suppose UB(C) φ 0 
and NUB(C) φ 0. By lemma 7.3.3 A is constant on UB(C) and since (A, B) is 
not O-determined, we can assume without loss of generality that A(p) = 1 for all 
ρ G UB{C). Since (A,B) is not quasi O-determined we can find an f0 > 0 such that 
for all ρ G UB{C) and q G Δ « with Bq G 0
Р
,«
О
 we have e\Aq > tiAq. Now take 
ρ G NUB(C) and ib G IR. Then, by lemma 7.2.2, there is a p1 G UB(C) such that 
Gp,t Π Op",«,, φ 0. Take q G Δ«, such that Bq G GPit П OpiiCo. Since tiAq > e2Aq 
and since (A, B) is not O-determined, this implies that A(p) = 1. So we have showed 
that A(p) = 1 for all ρ G Δ2 and hence that (A, B) is 1-determined. 
Similarly one shows that (A, B) is 2-determined if A(p) = 2 for all ρ G UB{C). a 
As we have mentioned before we have in view of lemma 7.3.1 
COROLLARY 7.3.5 Every 2 X oo bimatrix game has the property (WD1) or (WD3). 
7.4 REMARKS 
Carefully looking at the proof of lemma 7.3.1 one will find that a 2 χ oo bimatrix 
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game actually has stronger properties than (WD1) or (WD3), namely for every 2 χ oc 
bimatrix game we have: 
(i) there is a (0, e)-equilibrium for every e > 0 
or 
(ii) there is a (0, Jfc)-equilibrium for every Jt G IR. 
For m χ co bimatrix games where m > 3, our labeling method fails. The actual 
problem is the following: in the proof of proposition 7.6 we used that, if there arc 
q1^2 € Δ«, such that e\Aql > e2Aq
l
 and eiAq2 < e2Aq
2
, then there is a q € conv 
i?1 .?2} s u c n that eiAq = e3Aq. This property fails to hold already for m = 3 
Let (A, ß) be a 3 x oo bimatrix game such that the first column of Λ is ( O l and 
w 
the second is [ 4 I. Let q1 = (1,0,0,...) and q2 = (0,1,0,...). Then eiAq1 > 
W 
e3Aq
l
 > e2Aq
l
 and eiAq2 > e^Aq2 > eiAq2, but there is no q £ conv {q1^2} with 
eiAq2 =• e^Aq2 > e^Aq2. A similar problem occurred in Borm et al. (1989). 
Finally we remark that the results stated in this chapter also hold for mixed extensions 
of two-person games (Χ,Υ, Κγ,Κϊ), where \X\ = 2, Y is arbitrary and Κι,Κι := 
Χ χ Y —• JR are the payoff functions to player 1 and 2 respectively. 
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SAMENVATTING 
De speltheorie bestudeert wiskundige modellen voor (conflict)situaties waarin de be-
langen van verschillende individuen een rol spelen en waarin elk van deze individuen 
een of meer keuzes voor een actie heeft. Het doel van de speltheorie is om voor 
elke gemodelleerde situatie een Oplossing' te vinden. Een oplossing bestaat uit een 
voorschrift voor de keuzes van elk individu waarbij rekening is gehouden met het eigen-
belang van elk individu. De speltheorie is ruwweg onder te verdelen in coöperatieve 
speltheorie en niet-coöperatieve speltheorie. De eerste theorie beschrijft situaties 
waarin door de individuen afspraken kunnen worden vastgelegd, terwijl de tweede 
theorie zich richt op situaties waarin juist geen bindende afspraken kunnen worden 
gemaakt. 
Dit proefschrift is gewijd aan de niet-coöperatieve speltheorie en bestudeert oplossing-
en voor situaties waarin de belangen van twee individuen een rol spelen, en waarin 
beide individuen slechts één keuze uit een verzameling van keuzes kunnen maken. Er 
wordt van uit gegaan dat de verzameling van keuzes voor beide spelers in principe 
eindig is, maar dat de spelers ook de keuzes kunnen 'mengen'. Een voorbeeld daarvan 
is dat een speler twee keuzes selecteert en vervolgens door een muntje op te gooien 
bepaald welk van deze twee het moet worden. Er wordt dan gezegd dat die speler de 
twee geselecteerde keuzes elk met kans | speelt. 
De modellen behorend bij dergelijke situaties worden 'bimatrix spelen' genoemd, om-
dat ze te beschrijven zijn met behulp van twee matrices. De mogelijke keuzes heten 
in zo'n model 'strategieën'. 
De oplossingen die bekeken worden hebben één uitgangspunt gemeen: gegeven de 
keuze die de ander heeft gemaakt, mag geen van de twee individuen mag achteraf 
spijt hebben van zijn/haar keuze. Dit is het principe van een oplossingsconcept dat 
bekend is als het 'Nash-e ven wicht'. Dit proefschrift gaat in op de problematiek dat er 
vaak meerdere (en soms oneindig veel) oplossingen van dit type (of een aanverwant 
type) mogelijk zijn. Door inzicht te verschaffen in de wiskundige 'ligging' van de mo-
gelijke oplossingen ten opzichte van elkaar, kan soms een antwoord gegeven worden 
op de vraag voor welke oplossing gekozen zou moeten worden. Het laatste gebeurt 
in dit proefschrift niet expliciet, maar wel wordt de struktuur van verzamelingen van 
de oplossingen van eenzelfde type bekeken. Dit wordt voor verschillende typen van 
oplossingen gedaan, zowel in algemene als meer specifieke modellen van situaties. 
Hoofdstuk 1 is inleidend. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een nieuw bewijs gegeven van het 
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feit dat de verzameling van Nash-evenwichten voor een bimatrix spel bestaat uit de 
vereniging van eindig veel maximale Nash verzamelingen, die bestaan uit het pro-
dukt van twee polytopen. Verder wordt in hoofdstuk 1 ingegaan op de bijzondere 
eigenschappen van extreme evenwichten en wordt globaal een algoritme beschreven 
waarmee deze uit de beide matrices die bij het spel horen kunnen worden afgeleid. 
Omdat volgens een bekend algoritme alle andere evenwichten uit de extreme even-
wichten kunnen worden afgeleid, is er in principe dus een algoritme beschikbaar om 
alle evenwichten van een bimatrix spel te vinden. 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden evenwichten bestudeerd die bestand zijn tegen minstens één 
of juist alle kleine verstoringen van de strategieënruimten van beide spelers. In de 
literatuur wordt wel gezegd dat dit evenwichten zijn die bestand zijn tegen de 'tril-
lende handen' van de spelers. Evenwichten die bestand zijn tegen minstens één zo'n 
verstoring heten 'perfect'. Evenwichten die bestand zijn tegen alle verstoringen heten 
'strict perfect'. De laatste bestaan niet altijd, maar wel bestaat altijd een verzameling 
van evenwichten die in zijn geheel bestand is tegen al zulke verstoringen. De klein-
ste verzamelingen van dit type heten 'minimaal strict perfecte verzamelingen'. Het 
hoofdresultaat uit dit hoofdstuk is dat zulke verzamelingen altijd bestaan uit eindig 
veel evenwichten. Verder wordt aangetoond dat er voor een bimatrix spel eindig veel 
essentieel verschillende minimaal strict perfecte verzamelingen bestaan. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt gekeken naar verschillende verfijningen van perfecte evenwichten, 
zoals propere evenwichten en equalized perfecte en propere evenwichten. Er worden 
onderlinge verbanden gelegd en verbanden met andere verfijningen van evenwichten. 
In hoofdstuk 5 worden twee extreme typen van evenwichten bekeken: volledig gemeng-
de en zuivere evenwichten. Er wordt gekeken naar de speciale eigenschappen van spe-
len met alleen maar volledig gemengde evenwichten, spelen met minstens één maxi-
male Nash verzameling die bestaat uit alleen maar volledig gemende evenwichten, en 
spelen die geen zuivere evenwichten bezitten. 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een bepaalde methode om matrix spelen te symmetrizeren uit-
gebreid naar de situatie voor bimatrix spelen. Er worden verbanden gelegd tussen 
(verfijningen van) evenwichten in het originele spel en de symmetrizering van het spel. 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt gekeken naar spelen waarbij een van de spelers een zuivere 
strategieënruimte heeft met aftelbaar oneindig veel elementen. Omdat er voor zulke 
spelen niet altijd evenwichten bestaan, worden er 'bijna-evenwichten' gedefinieerd. 
Het hoofdresultaat zegt dat ab de speler met de eindige zuivere strategieënruimte 
maar twee zuivere strategieën beeft, er altijd bijna-evenwichten bestaan. 
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STELLINGEN BIJ HET PROEFSCHRIFT 
SOME TOPICS IN TEE THEORY OF BIMATRIX GAMES 
van 
Peter Jurg 
1. Laat (А, В) een m ж η bimatrix spel zijn. Noem (t,í) 6 Δ,η χ Δ„ een 'limietpunt' van een 
rijtje foutvectoren {(«*,А*)}»ЕІЧ in H m χ H n dat naar (0,0) convergeert als een deelrijtje van 
het rijtje {((*(Σ^ι «,*)-1.<*(ΣΓ»ι *і*)-,)}*еЫ naar (r,í) convergeert. Laat voor een evenwicht 
(p.ï) л п (А, В) de verzameling R(j>,q) bestaan uit alle limietpunten van rijtjes foutvectoren 
{(^,ί*)}ί
€
Γ» die naar nul convergeren en waarvoor er een rijtje {(p*,î*)}*eni С Δη, χ Δ„ is 
dat naar (p,q) convergeert met de eigenschap dat (p*,çè) e E(A(6k),B(ck)) voor iedere к e IN 
(waarbij A(Sk) en B(ek) zijn gedefinieerd zoals in paragraaf 3.2 van dit proefschrift). 
Dan geldt het volgende: 
(i) R{p,q) φ 0 dan en slechts dan als (ρ, q) een perfect evenwicht is van (A,B). 
(ii) R(p,q) = Δη, χ Δ„ dan en slechts dan als (ρ, q) een strict perfect evenwicht is van (A,B). 
(iii) Laat F een kant van een maximale Nash verzameling voor (A,B) zijn en laat (p,q) in 
het relatief inwendige liggen van F. Dan is R(p,q) = R(x,y) voor alle (г,il) die ook in het 
relatief inwendige liggen van F en R(p,q) С R{x,y) voor alle (x,y) die in een kant van F 
liggen. 
2. Laat A een m χ η matrix zijn en laat QA en V(A) zijn gedefinieerd zoals in paragraaf 2.3 
van dit proefschrift, laat TA '•= {x € fft"|r < y voor zekere y € V(A)). Dan is VA een n-
dimensionale polyhedrische verzameling. We noemen een normaal q van een facet van VA 
'genormeerd' als q 6 Δ„. Laat QA zijn gedefinieerd zoals in paragraaf 2.3 van dit proefschrift. 
Dan geldt: 
(i) Er is een α € IR zodat (q,a) een extreem punt is van QA dan en slechts dan als q de 
genormeerde normaal is van een facet van VA-
(iï) Er is een één-eenduidige relatie tussen de verzameling van extreme punten van QA en 
de verzameling van genormeerde normalen van facetten van VA· 
3. Laat A een η χ η matrix die de gespiegelde van zichzelf is. Definieer voor y £ Δη en voor 
ι 6 {1, . ,n} het getal r¡(y) := m\x{0, e, Ay — yAy) en vervolgens voor z(t) £ Rn de differenti-
aalvergelijking: 
¿*.W = r.(«(0)-«.ω Σ**«*». 
met begin voorwaarde z(0) = ig £ Δ , . 
Dan convergeert voor t —» oo de oplossing van deze differentiaalvergelijking naar een even­
wicht van het bimatrixspel (A,A). 
(Indien de gespiegelde van A gelijk is aan —A, is het mogelijk om een differentiaalvergelijk­
ing op te stellen waarvan de oplossing voor t —> oo convergeert naar een evenwicht van het 
matrixspel A, zie BROWN aw, «» NEUMANN J (1950), Btac lolatiou of discrete guna. Ann. of Math. 
Stud., Vol 24, pp. 73-79) 
4. Veronderstel dat een bimatrixspel (A,B) de representatie is van een conflictsituatie die de 
samenstelling is van een eindig aantal kleinere, op zichzelf staande, conflictsituaties, die 
ieder ook weer door een - kleiner - bimatrixspel gerepresenteerd kunnen worden. Als we 
veronderstellen dat in het spel (A,B) beide spelers een uitbetaling groter dan 0 ontvangen 
dan en slechts dan als zij in feite één van de kleinere bimatrixspelen spelen, en overigens een 
uitbetaling 0 ontvangen, dan geldt: 
(i) Met een evenwicht in een van de kleine bimatrix spelen correspondeert altijd een even-
wicht van (A,B). 
(ii) Met een evenwicht van (A, B) correspondeert altijd een niet lege verzameling van even-
wichten, waarvan elk element een evenwicht is van een van de kleine bimatrixspelen en 
geen twee elementen een evenwicht van hetzelfde kleine bimatrixspel zijn. 
(¡ii) De uitspraken (i) en (ii) gelden ook als het begrip 'evenwicht' vervangen wordt door: 
perfect evenwicht of minimale strict perfecte verzameling. 
[JUHQ AP, RAVINDRAN a, TUS SH (1994)), Games of coordination. In: B. Dntta, D. Mookherjee, T. Parthasara-
thy, T.E.S. Raghavan, D. Ray, S. Ti> (Ed·.), Game theory and economie application», Proceeding· of tbc 
International Conference beid at the Indian Statistical Iutitnte, New Delhi, India., Springer Verlag, Berlin] 
5. De meest voor de handliggende manier om een quantumtheorie voor gravitatie te beschrijven 
is door de klassieke Lagrangiaan van de algemene relativiteitstheorie te gebruiken in het 
pad-integraal formalisme, waarbij de metriek wordt gesplitst in de metriek voor de vlakke 
ruimte en een kleine storing daarop. De storing representeert dan het elementaire deeltje 
dat de gravitatie bewerkstelligt, het graviton. Hoewel deze quantumgravitatietheorie de 
struktuur van een ijktheorie heeft en daarom tot ijkonafhankelijke quantumcorrecties zou 
moeten leiden, is er een ijkafhankelijkheid in de quantumcorrecties op de massa van een 
deeltje af te leiden als de interaktie van het graviton met dat deeltje wordt bekeken. 
[JURO АР (1987), Gange dependence in qnantnrn gravity. Afstudeerscriptie, Instituut voor theoretische fysica. 
Universiteit Utrecht] 
6. De ITU X.500 aanbevelingen voor een wereldwijde electronische 'Directory Service' zijn goed 
bruikbaar voor allerlei toepassingen op kleine schaal. 
7. Volgens de definitie dat kunst een gestileerde menselijke aktiviteit is, die een ontroering 
teweeg brengt (Gerard Revé), kan wiskunde wel kunst zijn, maar het werk van Harry Mulisch 
niet. 
β. Dat wiskundige theorieën de werkelijkheid volledig kunnen beschrijven is een vergissing die 
eerder zal worden gemaakt door mensen die wiskunde alleen toepassen dan door wiskundigen 
zelf. 
9. Theorieën over de algemene struktuur van de menselijke persoonlijkheid zeggen vooral iets 
over de persoonlijkheidsstruktuur van de bedenker(s) van de theorie. 
[NICK HOEKZEMA, privécommunicatie via e-mail] 
10. Mensen die zich laten voorstaan op niet meer dan de kennis die zij hebben vergaard, dienen 
zich af te vragen of zij beschikken over een grotere intelligentie dan die in de wetenschap met 
'kunstmatige intelligentie' wordt aangeduid en die alleen bij computers wordt verondersteld. 
11. Met het oog op het 'Prisoner's Dilemma' mag het niet vreemd zijn dat wielrenners die in 
een wielerwedstrijd in een kopgroep rijden bindende afspraken maken over samenwerking. 
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